Duties of Rescue: a Moderate Account by Nishimoto, Craig Takeshi
 Duties of Rescue: a Moderate Account
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation No citation.
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:24:38 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11181182
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
HARVARD
Graduate School
UNIVERSITY
of Arts and Sciences
DISSERTATION ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE
The undersigned, appointed by the
Department of Philosophy
have examined a dissertation entitled
Duties of Rescue: a Moderate Account
presented by Craig Takeshi Nishimoto
candidate forthe degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby
certifr that it is
Signature
Typed name: Prof. Sel
Signature
mas Scanlon" Jr.
Signature
Typed name: Prof. Frances Kamm
Date; September 5,2013
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page intentionally left blank 
  
 
 
DUTIES OF RESCUE: A MODERATE ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED 
 
BY 
 
CRAIG TAKESHI NISHIMOTO 
 
TO 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE SUBJECT OF 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Craig Nishimoto 
 
All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advisor: Selim Berker                                                             Craig Nishimoto       
iii  
 
 
 
Duties of Rescue: A Moderate Account 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Peter Singer’s famine-relief argument forces attention upon a class of 
requirements that make demands of an interesting kind.  These are requirements to rescue 
another when hardly anything is at stake for the would-be rescuer and yet the utmost is at 
stake for the would-be rescuee.  It is common to regard such requirements as moral duties, 
with all the significance that this implies.  Since, however, the circumstances in which 
such duties apply can apparently repeat ad infinitum, the cumulative costs of compliance 
threaten to become shockingly great.  I argue that there is a deep and legitimate challenge 
here that should neither be dismissed nor combined with superficially similar puzzles.  
Rather, for those of us wishing to maintain a comfortably moderate view about the 
demands of morality, the challenge is to find something to say that doesn’t smack of mere 
rationalization.  It is the kind of challenge that, when duly addressed, is likely to force 
broader changes in the way we think.  
Broadly speaking, my method is to give successive clarifications of the challenge 
interspersed with attempts to locate and develop the most promising conservative 
response to it.  Clarifications of the challenge inform the response, which in turn allows 
refinements to the challenge.  The result is a clarified version of the famine-relief 
argument along with a comfortably moderate response that, while it asks us to accept
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certain broader implications, recommends those implications as crucial and plausible 
alternatives to revisions that would, I expect, seem to many more radical.  Rather than 
creating problems elsewhere, the recommended implications may provide useful 
perspective on a variety of moral phenomena, including the general relevance of 
compliance costs, the nature of deontological constraints, the category of special duties, 
and the justification of consequence-based evaluations of actions when the individual 
effects of such actions are negligible. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE PROBLEMS OF DEMANDINGNESS 
 
 
 
1. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF MORALITY GENERALLY 
 
 
Philosophers commonly think about the demandingness of morality, but not about 
the demandingness of self-interest, personal projects, aesthetic ideals, sportsmanship, 
philosophical rigor, etc.  This focus plausibly arises from four properties that characterize 
moral requirements, each inferred from the way we ordinarily think about such 
requirements, and from the role of moral judgment in our practical deliberations and our 
assessments of actions and people.  These four properties are priority, importance, 
categorical application, and pervasiveness.1    
The priority of moral requirements is their status relative to other sorts of 
practical considerations.  We commonly associate this feature of deliberative priority 
with the idea that moral requirements are overriding, or decisive.  That is, if an action is 
morally required, then this is often assumed to give us decisive reason to perform the 
action—regardless of any and all our reasons for doing otherwise.  If faced
                                                
1 I draw the ideas of priority and importance from Scanlon 1998: ch. 4, categorical nature from Kant, 
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with the choice of either violating a moral requirement or sacrificing some cherished 
personal goal, we suppose that the only correct decision, ordinarily, is to sacrifice the 
personal goal.  Even if weighty reasons of personal interest, aesthetics, sportsmanship, 
special relationships, etc., all combine against fulfilling a moral requirement, the latter 
requirement is commonly thought to carry the day, overriding or undercutting every 
consideration to the contrary.  
The importance of moral requirements concerns the special significance 
appropriately attached to compliance with moral requirements.  Though we can overlook 
some deviation, we pay special attention when someone neglects or disregards moral 
considerations, especially when this is done deliberately, broadly, or somewhat 
gratuitously.  The comparable neglect or disregard of nonmoral considerations does not, 
at least in general, occasion the same sort of serious concern and censure.  
Comparatively, violations of moral requirements tend, more generally, to license attitudes 
of guilt, remorse, resentment, indignation, and blame.  When a violation of a moral 
requirement takes place, this is moral typically something that has to be addressed.  
The categorical application of moral requirements concerns the way in which a 
moral requirement upon a person does not depend on that person’s contingent aims.  
While this property isn’t unique to moral requirements (Foot 1972), it does mark a way in 
which moral requirements are less escapable than others, a way in which a person has 
less control over whether or not a moral requirement applies to him or her.  So, while the 
requirements of tightrope walking may be severely confining, they are more obviously 
self-imposed and optional since its requirements only apply insofar as a person 
voluntarily endeavors to attempt the feat.  
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Finally, the pervasiveness of moral requirement concerns the scope of moral 
evaluation: no type of voluntary action is in principle immune to becoming morally 
obligatory or forbidden.  Even brushing one’s teeth is susceptible to moral evaluation—
and the activity may, for instance, be impermissible if one chooses to brush one’s teeth 
while an infant drowns in the bathtub (Scheffler 1986: 533-34). 
These apparent properties of moral requirements mean that such requirements are 
likely to conflict with other sorts of practical considerations.  The pervasiveness and the 
categorical applicability of moral requirements mean that moral considerations can in 
principle invade any area of our lives.  Combining these properties with priority and 
importance means that we are uniquely vulnerable to monopolization by morality, its 
demands confining us to a very narrow set of options, deviations from which are failures 
of an especially serious kind. 
In addressing concerns about demandingness, it may be appropriate to examine 
whether or not we really should ascribe these properties to morality.2  My immediate aim, 
however, is to think about how such apparent properties can give rise to separable 
                                                
2 Since I will be investigating Peter Singer’s famine-relief argument, it is worth nothing that Singer doesn’t 
assume the priority of moral requirements (1999a: 308, 2007: 478-79, 82).  While this may remove certain 
grounds for opposing Singer’s conclusion in his famine-relief argument, it does so at the cost of his 
conclusion’s significance (Singer suggests that reasons arising from “[one’s] own interests, and those of 
[one’s] family” may regularly “counteract the demands of morality”).  If the priority of moral requirements 
is implied by ordinary usage of the relevant moral judgments, then Singer would be making room for the 
revisionist demands of his particular conclusions through a revisionist relaxation of the idea of moral 
obligation generally.  If I am right about ordinary usage (that moral obligation has the property I am calling 
“priority”), and if Singer isn’t committed to simply changing ordinary usage (and why should he be?), then 
he can state his intended conclusion as follows. “While the requirements of ‘Singer-morality’ are highly 
difficult to fulfill with regard to famine victims, we shouldn’t assume that such requirements are, in the 
usual and most general sense, obligatory.”  Singer, however, would likely want to insist further that the 
requirement to act on behalf of distant famine victims has (relative to considerations arising from one’s 
own interests and those of one’s family, etc.) as much priority as the requirement to rescue the nearby child 
from the shallow pond.  Granting that the requirement to rescue the nearby child garners the high priority 
usually attributed to moral obligation generally, Singer’s rejection of the priority of moral obligation 
generally is a moot point, despite his suggestion to the contrary.   
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concerns about demandingness.  This will help me to distinguish the particular problem 
of demandingness I intend to address.  
 By itself, the supposed priority of moral requirements can prompt the question 
why we should grant it that status.  Combined with categorical applicability, moral 
requirements are typically thought to constitute decisive reasons even for the person who 
sees no point in acting in any of the particular ways that morality prescribes.  The task is 
to make better sense of this authority.  If, warned by H.A. Prichard against appealing to 
non-moral values, all we can say is that this way of acting is right, or that it is one’s duty, 
even normal people might sympathize with the amoralist’s failure to be moved (1912; 
Scanlon 1998: 149-50).  Such answers leave the demands of morality mysterious.   
 So this first kind of “problem” of demandingness might be described as the 
problem of explaining morality’s authority.  I take this problem primarily to be one of 
finding a satisfying explanation; it is the task of providing an account of morality that 
renders more intelligible the legitimacy of these commonly ascribed features.  A 
satisfying explanation here is likely also to contain an explanation of morality’s 
importance.  That is, a good explanation is likely to explain the priority of morality in 
terms of a grounding, or a subject matter, that ordinary people can readily appreciate as 
significant in those distinctive ways that are characteristic of morality’s importance.   
 A philosophical account that addresses this first broad problem of morality’s 
demandingness isn’t likely to be neutral between competing moral frameworks and first-
order moral judgments (Scanlon 2003a: 129).  If, for example, the Kantian appeals to the 
rational requirements of agency to explain the priority and categorical applicability of a 
moral requirement, this tends to lead to distinctively non-consequentialist principles, such 
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as a prohibition against the lying promise derived from the formula of universal law 
through the “contradiction in conception” test (Kant, Gregor 1998: Section 2).  On the 
other hand, when the consequentialist seeks to explain the general priority of morality in 
terms of the well-being of people, or the idea that “it can never be right to prefer a worse 
state of affairs to a better” (Foot 1985), then teleological principles are likely to displace 
the kinds of constraints characteristic of Kantian views.   
Insofar as the moral framework points us to the grounds from which we might 
hope to account for morality’s distinctive authority, those same grounds are apt to serve 
as the guidelines for identifying more particular moral requirements.  Whichever theory 
we choose, it is likely to give rise to a second kind of demandingness problem, wherein 
we must deal with any apparently excessive requirements favored by that theory.  If, for 
example, we adopt as a foundational thesis the idea that it can never be right to prefer a 
worse state of affairs to a better one, then this will plausibly favor a prohibition against 
purchasing new shoes, whenever something even slightly better can be done instead. 
 
2. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF MORAL THEORIES 
 
This second kind of demandingness problem, therefore, concerns views about the 
demands of morality reached through the conscious application of a theory.  Sometimes 
the theory is quite minimal, as when Thomas Nagel proposes that moral judgment 
requires reconciliation with an impersonal point of view (1995, 1986).  Demandingness 
problems arising from more highly specified theories are easy to find.3 
                                                
3 The demandingness problems associated with consequentialism are the most well-known (Williams 1973, 
Kagan 1989, Scheffler 1994).  Williams (1981) discusses demandingness objections to Kantianism; 
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While it is the conscious application of the theory that generates the problematic 
demands in this kind of demandingness problem, it isn’t always clear what generates the 
resistance to those demands.  Often the resistance to the demands seems to arise 
independently of any conscious application of principles.  In that sense, then, the 
resistance to the demands is intuitive.4  This isn’t to say that one always arrives at an 
intuitive response without careful consideration of the subject matter; it is only to say that 
a particular act of consideration isn’t necessary, namely the conscious inference from 
general principles to that intuitive response, or the conscious recollection of having made 
some such inference.  If we are asked to defend our intuitive responses, we can often give 
reasons, but in formulating these justifying reasons, the task will typically be to newly 
locate or formulate them, rather than to remember them.  The intuitive response may be a 
belief or judgment, or it may be some reactive attitude.  The objects of such responses are 
also diverse.  They may be directed towards specific attitudes or actions or other features 
in a specific circumstance.  If the intuitive response is a belief, it may be a belief about 
the moral status of a given action or attitude, the moral significance of a given factor, the 
sufficiency of a given reason, or the legitimacy of a general principle.  
To say that one’s resistance to the demands of given moral theory is intuitive isn’t 
to say much.  A judgment that I now arrive at intuitively might once have been a 
conclusion I would reach only after a consciously processed inference from principles 
that I later “internalized.”  Intuitive judgments or inclinations are also commonly false or 
                                                                                                                                            
Ashford (2003) argues that Scanlon’s contractualism is as demanding as utilitarianism when it comes to 
helping others meet their basic needs.  
 
4 I borrow the phrase “conscious application of principles” from Frances Kamm’s characterization of 
intuitive judgments.  Kamm similarly contrasts intuitive judgments with those that are “deliberately 
constructed” (2001: 11-12).   
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misleading.  It is sometimes easy to debunk them, to explain why we have them in a way 
that provides no promise for justifying them.  If the intuitively arrived at belief is 
inconsequential with respect to one’s other beliefs and commitments, it may be easy to 
repudiate.  As a child, I had persistent, idiosyncratic, and conflicting convictions about 
compass orientation.  I believed that the large window of my first-grade classroom faced 
west.  Google Maps now shows that this belief was false, but it might have been 
debunked early on by noting the orientation of my classroom desk from which I would 
have viewed all the maps.  
The cases that are of more general interest will involve intuitive moral responses 
that we can reasonably expect others to share, or at least sympathize with.  They will 
involve that subset of intuitive responses that belong to what is called commonsense 
morality.  As the term is currently used, “commonsense” designates a privileged class of 
commonly shared, or at least peculiarly shareable, beliefs.5  Mere popularity isn’t enough, 
for even if some religious dogma, such as the Immaculate Conception, gained 
overwhelming popularity through demographic change, perhaps we should not say that it 
becomes a commonsense belief.  What accounts for the privilege is not the popularity of 
commonsense beliefs, but rather their special kind of plausibility.  
 This kind of plausibility we attribute to commonsense beliefs explains why they 
tend to be commonly shared, or are at least peculiarly shareable.  When we react with 
suspicion or incredulity at someone’s denial of a commonsense belief, this is partly 
because the plausibility of such beliefs is thought to be independent of one’s acceptance 
                                                
5 Though I here speak of commonsense beliefs, a broader range of moral attitudes, views about morality, 
and perhaps forms of moral reasoning could easily be said to belong to commonsense morality.  We might 
say that, in a given circumstance, responding with a certain reactive attitude is part of commonsense 
morality (along with the judgment that such reactions are appropriate).   
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or non-acceptance of any special theory or ideology.  We expect, therefore, that any 
person of normal capacity can be brought around to at least appreciating the intuitive 
plausibility of a commonsense belief, even if this appreciation requires a special effort of 
attentiveness on their part, along with care to avoid certain of the defects mentioned 
above.  
 If we are dealing with what we regard to be a commonsense belief, then 
someone’s failure, or refusal, to accept that belief tends make one suspicious of defect in 
that person.  We suspect a misunderstanding, insufficient attention to (or ignorance of) 
key facts, false beliefs, perceptual malfunction, imbecility, insanity, or some kind of 
mental mismanagement.  Or, in those cases in which it is unreasonable to suspect defect 
in the person in question, such a one is still subject to our incredulity, and this sentiment 
often lingers even if that person’s rejection of the commonsense belief is seen to make 
sense in light of his or her otherwise respectable belief system.6  
 Commonsense beliefs tend to be the kinds of beliefs that are simply taken for 
granted.  They tend to be the kinds of beliefs by which we evaluate other ideas.  Hence, 
the second demandingness problem is often used as a criticism of the theory at issue.  
Often defenders of the theory will try to show that there isn’t any conflict with 
commonsense morality after all, or they will try to modify the theory so as to make this 
so.  When one instead opts with the theory against some aspect of commonsense 
                                                
6 Some examples might help.  To commonsense morality belongs the belief that one should not gratuitously 
inflict suffering upon random strangers, and also the belief that, if it costs you nothing to prevent a horrific 
traffic accident, you probably should.  These principles strike me as particularly plausible and I would 
expect others to share them (barring deep disagreement over relevant facts, such as the fact that preventing 
horrific traffic accidents would not generally frustrate the workings of a perfectly good and omniscient 
god).  If I were to encounter someone who did not at least appreciate the plausibility of such principles, 
then I would suspect some deficiency in that person or in my communication of these principles.  If these 
and other defects were ruled out, and the person still couldn’t in the least even sympathize with my sense of 
the plausibility of these principles, I would be astonished.   
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morality, the revision tends to be profound, for what gets revised are beliefs that are 
broadly accepted and particularly plausible.  They are beliefs around which we have 
shaped other ideas and commitments.  These last points suggests why challenges to 
commonsense morality are of particular interest whether or not the tenets of 
commonsense morality really should be accorded their de facto privileged status.  
 
3. SELF-STANDING MORAL DEMANDINGNESS 
 
Much of what gets called a demandingness problem fits this characterization of 
the second demandingness problem, where the problematic demands depend on 
principles distinctive of some particular theory about morality.  Are there, however, 
problematic apparent moral demands that arise independently of particular moral 
theories, or which are at least common to a broad range of moral theories?  If an 
intuitively apparent moral requirement is problematic whenever it is in tension with other 
pressing practical considerations, then there would be many problems of this sort.  Many 
hard cases, apparent moral dilemmas, and puzzles involving trolley cars would fit this 
characterization.  However, the problems I am most inclined to think of as problems of 
demandingness have a further feature: resistance to the demand appears to arise, at least 
in part, from considerations of self-interest or partiality, as opposed, in particular, to 
competing moral considerations.  So, in a paradigmatic demandingness problem, the 
tension is between some apparent moral requirement and some other consideration of 
special importance to the person to whom the apparent moral requirement would apply.  
That is, when I face one of these demandingness problems, the apparent moral 
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requirements pull against my own self-interests, or the special projects or relationships 
that happen to matter to me.  Moreover, while I can imagine many scenarios in which the 
demands of morality would conflict with important considerations of these kinds, I think 
of demandingness problems as those cases that call into question the legitimacy of the 
apparent moral demand.  If a problem can be found that fits these constraints, then there 
is a third kind of demandingness problem.  Unlike the first, it is a problem internal to 
morality.  Unlike the second, the problematic demands are largely independent of 
particular moral theories.   
A prominent candidate for a demandingness problem of this third sort is the kind 
of challenge pressed by Peter Singer in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972).  
Singer’s intent is to present an argument that “does not depend on any specific values or 
ethical principles” (2011: 202), and, if successful, his argument would show that it is 
wrong to do many things that most of us regard as entirely permissible: spending on non-
essential consumables, and pursuing most hobbies or any kind of comfortable, non-
lucrative career.   
 If something like Singer’s argument does provide a demandingness challenge of 
the third kind then it is worth treating it as such, rather than regarding it as a problem 
raised by utilitarianism or of some particular moral theory.  When, as is often done, the 
problem is subsumed under the second demandingness issue, fundamental tensions in our 
widely shared assumptions may get buried under problems of a more manufactured sort.  
By embedding the demandingness problem in a particular theory, we are limited by the 
resources of that theory when formulating the problem, even if such resources only 
poorly capture the relevant tensions.  Free from such restrictions, we may discover that 
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the pull towards highly demanding conclusions is not most convincingly represented as 
requirements to prefer the better state of affairs, to promote individual well-being, or 
even any general obligation of beneficence.  Reliance on a theory may also constrain our 
resources for resolving the problem.  The rescue cases may seem to be just one more case 
for which agent-centered prerogatives must be explained, or for which the personal point 
of view needs to be accommodated.  Such efforts may only take us a step backwards to 
work on a problem whose resolution doesn’t promise to resolve the specific tensions of 
the rescue case.  We may also find that any overdemandingness objection framed on 
behalf of our intuitive judgments fails to get off the ground.  Proponents of utilitarianism, 
for example, can respond that objections about over-demandingness simply beg the 
question against the theory (Kagan 1984, 1989, Murphy 2000, Sobel 2007).  
 Are there other demandingness problems of the third sort?  I am not aware of any.  
More exactly, I don’t know of any such problems that are nearly as compelling as those 
that, in the spirit of Singer’s famine-relief argument, appeal to individual duties to rescue 
particular others from serious peril when this can be done at little cost to ourselves.7  If 
                                                
7 Garrett Cullity suggests that there are other demandingness problems of the third kind.  He proposes that 
all plausible moral views face challenges from the famine-relief argument because they will all “make the 
promotion of others’ welfare at least a part of morality” (2009: 9).  Similarly, Cullity suggests, all plausible 
moral views will recognize other aspects of morality that give rise to additional demandingness problems.  
He proposes two such aspects: (a) that “minimal restrictions on my liberties can be required in order to 
protect others’ liberties against great curtailments,” and (b) that I can be required to contribute to 
cooperative activities that protect or produce public goods.  Both aspects, according to Cullity, can, through 
repeated application, result in an accumulation of small constraints or requirements that, in aggregate, 
constitute demands far greater that many would find tolerable. However, for (a) to generate intolerably 
great demands the world may have to change a great deal (I give an example of such a change in chapter 
four).  The curtailments Cullity does suggest strike me as either reasonable and non-threatening, or they fail 
to be examples of one person’s behavior greatly curtailing another person’s liberty (16).  As for (b), Cullity 
himself recognizes that the needed versions of the relevant principle are controversial (18).  I can plausibly 
deny that I am required to contribute to every cooperative activity that supports important public goods that 
I enjoy.  In a proliferation of such activities and public goods, perhaps I contribute my fair share to the 
general public good when I pick some cooperative activities to support and I try to avoid obstructing the 
others.  
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such problems are unique, then I suspect it is because they exploit what can be seen as a 
unique vulnerability in a standard taxonomy of moral duties.  Consider the following 
divisions of moral duties. 
 
    Moral duties for 
                                                    Individuals 
  
 
 
                     General          Special  
 
  
 
                          Positive            Negative 
 
 
 
              Perfect             Imperfect 
 
The categories represented here are familiar.8  What is noteworthy is how each of the 
rightward branches represents a way of limiting the demandingness of moral duties 
falling to individuals.  Special duties, as opposed to general ones, are only owed by those 
who have made a special, voluntary transaction, or to those with whom one stands in 
some special relationship.  Duties of the latter kind are limited because one naturally only 
stands in the relevant relationship with few people (one has only so many parents or 
siblings).  Duties of the former kind are only those that have been, in some sense, 
voluntarily assumed.  One can regulate how many, or what kinds of, promises one makes, 
or which roles one adopts; one doesn’t have to enter into a friendship, a marriage, or a 
                                                
8 Rawls presents a take on this taxonomy in sections 18-19 of A Theory of Justice, without including the 
division between perfect and imperfect duties.  H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between special and general moral 
rights is often generalized to distinguish special and general obligations (1955: 183).  The distinction 
between perfect and imperfect duties has been variously characterized and traces back to Grotius and 
Pufendorf, and through Kant and Mill (Schroeder, forthcoming). 
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special contract with everyone, and when one voluntarily enters into such roles or make 
such contracts, the resultant demands are commonly offset by various benefits (the 
demands of a friendship, for example, go both ways).  A negative duty (“Never kill”) 
tends to be less monopolizing than its positive correlates (“Always prevent killings”).  
Imperfect duties characteristically allow the agent significant latitude in how they are to 
be fulfilled.  A prototypical duty of this sort issues a demand like this: help someone or 
another, at sometime or another, in some or another way.  Imperfect duties are therefore 
the kind of duty you can fit into a schedule.   
 If we follow the leftward branches all the way down, we come to a subset of 
moral duties for which there is no category-given means of limiting demandingness.  
These are the general, positive, perfect duties.  Within this category, duties will vary 
according to the significance we would attach to their violations.  So, while I might have 
a duty to helpfully give directions to a passing driver from out-of-town, violating such a 
duty would not be as significant as refusing to rescue a drowning child from a shallow 
pond.  If the famine-relief argument is uniquely compelling among demandingness 
problems of the third sort, it is because of the way it leverages a particularly serious 
moral duty within a category of duties that uniquely lacks a means for limiting demands.  
 The famine-relief argument may well be a uniquely compelling example of a 
demandingness problem of the third type.  Moreover, if the pull towards its problematic 
demands is securely grounded in judgments of commonsense alone, then, for the reasons 
suggested earlier, our rejection of those demands will likely require profound revisions to 
widely shared assumptions.  
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If such revisions are to be made, a convincing case for the problem will have to 
precede them.  Singer’s own presentations of the famine-relief argument can be criticized 
on several grounds.  I do not believe that his arguments secure his highly demanding 
conclusions independently of controversial moral and empirical premises that go well 
beyond the kinds of intuitive moral judgments that I am interested in here.  In the next 
chapter, I survey the limitations of the famine-relief argument along with attempts to 
improve it. 
Chapter two’s clarifications set the stage for the construction of a challenge, in 
chapter three, that draws upon the main elements of the famine-relief argument while 
working within its limitations.  There I provide a demandingness problem of the third 
kind where I try to show the ways in which the pressure towards the problematic demand 
is rooted in commonsense morality.   
As I examine the famine-relief argument and seek to provide my own version of 
it, my ambition is always to better understand what it is that makes the argument 
compelling, and what it is that makes it so difficult to provide a satisfying rejection of its 
demanding implications.  It is in the clarification of the challenges that I look for hints 
concerning their most promising resolution.  The hints I uncover lead me, in chapters four 
and five, to what I take to be the most promising defense of a moderate position of our 
moral duties.  The moderate position will itself simply be the rejection of the famine-
relief argument’s shocking implications, and I will be looking for defense of that position 
that is both philosophically satisfying and minimally revisionist.  When I must make 
revisions, I try to show them to be the necessary costs of opposing revisionistically 
demanding views about duties on behalf of strangers.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LIMITATIONS OF THE FAMINE-RELIEF ARGUMENT 
 
 
 
In this chapter I consider Peter Singer’s famine-relief argument and its limitations.   
I then consider the limitations of two of the most developed attempts to improve Singer’s 
argument.  All this sets the stage for clarifying an important challenge to which Peter 
Singer and others have drawn attention.   
 
1. THE FAMINE-RELIEF ARGUMENT AND ITS WEAKNESSES 
 
Arguments for the claim that we as individuals are obligated to make shockingly 
great sacrifices on behalf of strangers typically appeal to some general duty-specifying 
principle that specifies something individuals are morally required to do.  Singer 
proposes, “[I]f it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so” (2009: 10).  Though 
Singer’s principle specifies duties to prevent bad events, alternatives more narrowly 
require individuals to help others, or to rescue others from dire straits.  To the general 
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duty-specifying principle is added further claims about how we continually face scenarios 
for which the principle applies.  The conclusion is then drawn that our moral duties are 
shockingly demanding.  Following Singer, I will call any argument of this form a famine-
relief argument.9   
While we can find problems with each version of the argument, I find certain of 
Singer’s general strategies promising.  I will formulate several challenges that draw from 
Singer’s own arguments and the attempts of others to improve upon them.  My goal is not 
the ambitious one of trying to secure Singer’s demanding conclusion; it is rather to show 
only how difficult challenges arise from our own intuitive or commonsense moral 
judgments.   
Let us first survey the main weaknesses in Singer’s attempts to secure a highly 
demanding conclusion.  I count four.  Three are problems with Singer’s strategies for 
securing his general duty-specifying principle.  The fourth weakness concerns the 
empirical claims required to secure the demanding conclusion from such a principle.   
 
1.1 The methodological challenge 
                                                
9 Singer has defended the famine-relief argument (so named in Singer 1977), with minor variations, since 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972).  Here is a recent formulation: 
 
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. 
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so. 
Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of 
food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important. 
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate aid to aid agencies, you are doing something morally 
wrong. (2009: 15-16; see also 2011: 200-12, 1972: 231)  
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Singer’s first strategy is to select a general principle of moral duty that is 
intuitively plausible.10  The basic problem here is there is ample room for skepticism 
when the object of our intuitive judgments is a principle, and especially when the 
principle is both highly general and is designed to carry shocking implications.  When a 
principle is intuitively judged to be correct, this may only be because the principle is 
imprecise and malleable (the “Golden Rule” and Kant’s Humanity Formula are, I think, 
good examples), or because one hasn’t yet fully considered the principle, failing to 
realize certain of its problematic implications (as with Frege’s Basic Law V).  Although it 
is dangerous to conclude that a principle is true before appreciating what the principle 
commits us to, this often seems to be exactly what we do when forming an intuitive 
judgment about substantive principles (McMahan 2000).  In various proposed versions of 
the famine-relief argument we can readily see a failure to duly assess the implications of 
the proposed general principles of individual moral duty.  When these principles are 
formulated so as to generate Singer’s intended conclusion, their plausibility is often 
superficial.  Scrutiny tends to show that the proposed principle is more dubious than 
initial appearances suggest, requiring tweaking or fine-tuning that render the principles 
either too weak or inexact to sustain the original conclusion, or too complex to sustain 
their intuitive appeal.11   
                                                
10 Singer is sometimes interpreted as inferring the general principle from cases in which one is intuitively 
required to rescue someone, e.g., Gomberg 2002: 31.  Singer does not interpret his argument as relying on 
this dubious inference.  
 
11 For variations of the relevant principle see Sidgwick 1981: 348-49, Singer 1972: 231, 235, Slote 1977: 
127, Arthur 1977: 48, McKinsey 1981: 313, Fishkin 1982: 65, Unger 1996: 57-58, 144, Scanlon 1998: 224, 
Herman 2001: 227, Kekes 2002: 514, Ashford 2003: 287, Cullity 2004: 19.  For principles that are clearly 
too weak (often by design) to easily secure Singer’s conclusion see Unger 1996: 12, McGinn 1996, Hooker 
2002: 167, Miller 2004: 359, Cullity 2004: 174.  
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Insofar as the intuitive attractiveness of a principle is vulnerable to 
counterintuitive implications attributable to the principle, Singer’s style of argument 
threatens to undermine itself: if the argument is successful, then it shows that the general 
principle of beneficence has surprising and counterintuitive implications; these same 
implications, however, simultaneously threaten the initial plausibility of the general 
principle of beneficence.  While threats of this kind can be overcome in various ways, it 
typically requires work to do this (to somehow show, for example, that the problematic 
implications of the principle are more acceptable than the problematic implications of 
rejecting it).  Garrett Cullity has called it the “methodological challenge”: if the key 
principle’s intuitive plausibility is all that it has going for it, then its strongly 
counterintuitive conclusions substantially threatened it (1994: 104-5, 1996: 52).  By 
simply giving greater credence to our intuitive resistance to Singer’s demanding 
conclusion, some would view Singer’s argument as a reductio ad absurdum of his 
principle (Trammell 1975: 133-4, Lewis 2000: 155, Thomas 2009: 132).  
 
1.2 The grounding challenge 
Singer’s second strategy is to reinforce the plausibility of his general principle of 
beneficence by grounding it in a more fundamental feature of morality.  Singer tries to 
ground his principles in a fundamental requirement, named “impartiality” or 
“universality,” which he claims has been recognized throughout history, across cultures, 
and by a wide range of moral theorists (1977, 2004, 2011: 10ff).  In the widely varied 
traditions that Singer cites, it is far from clear that there is convergence on any 
universalization requirement suitable for his purposes (in the Judeo-Christian 
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formulations of the “Golden Rule,” in Kant’s formula of universal law, in the impartial 
spectator of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith, in the basic axioms of the utilitarians, and in 
Rawls’s use of the veil of ignorance).  If there is convergence in these traditions, it is it 
hard to believe that it includes the universalization requirement that Singer claims is most 
precisely formulated by R. M. Hare (1995: 174, citing Hare 1965: ch. 2).  Singer’s own 
formulations of that requirement are dubious.12   
 Consider, for example, Singer’s formulation in terms of giving “equal 
consideration” to interests, regardless of to whom they happen to belong. 
The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give 
equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by 
our actions. This means that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act 
[and its alternatives], and if X stands to lose more than Y stands to gain, it is 
better not to do the act. (2011: 20) 
 
There is a sense in which it is better to act as such a principle advises.  This would the 
sense in which more interests, or more weighty interests, would be met.  It is difficult, 
however, to find any uncontroversial way to translate this into a standard for moral 
permissibility.  Even if we accept that impartiality is an important feature of morality, we 
needn’t accept the idea that, at a fundamental level, the moral point of view bars the 
individual from assessing options with partiality.13  So, although such a principle might 
ground Singer’s preference-utilitarianism, it is at best a highly controversial interpretation 
                                                
12 Singer nearly concedes these points in Practical Ethics (2011).  Instead of deriving his utilitarianism 
from the widely recognized “universal aspect of ethics” Singer instead proposes that it establishes a 
presumptive case for “a broadly utilitarian position,” such that good reasons need to be given for any 
departure from utilitarianism (11-12).  Insofar as the famine-relief argument is designed to appeal to those 
who believe there are good reasons for departing from utilitarianism, Singer’s maneuver here is ineffective.  
 
13 Singer notes: “Kamm correctly states that, in contrast to the views held by Samuel Scheffler and Thomas 
Nagel, my conception of the moral point of view does not, at the critical level, allow us to weigh things 
partially” (Singer, Jamieson 1999: 308).   
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of what morality is about.  It is too controversial to add much plausibility to the famine-
relief argument’s key principle.   
 Besides this equal consideration standard, Singer also proposes a striking 
procedure in his discussions about universalizability: 
As I have argued elsewhere, I know of no better way of deciding what we ought 
to do than to put ourselves in the position of all those affected by the actions open 
to us and do what we would prefer if we had to live all their lives. (2010: 195) 
 
One might interpret this as mere advice for how we might improve, in a moral respect, 
our decision-making.14  Such an imaginative exercise could be helpful in the way that 
taking a deep breath and counting silently to ten might be helpful before responding to 
someone in the heat of anger.  Such tricks help one to overcome or counteract certain 
predictable problems in deliberation.  To imaginatively put oneself in another’s position 
is, I take it, a common way of raising one’s awareness of morally relevant considerations, 
helping to counteract one’s bias towards one’s own interests. While I would have no 
objection to such advice, it fails to reveal the kind of fundamental feature of morality that 
Singer wants, the kind that could justify the principle of individual moral duty he needs 
for his famine-relief argument.  Even if I can duly understand and appreciate the 
standpoints and conflicting concerns of every relevant person, any particular method of 
arbitration remains controversial.  So while it may be morally helpful to consider the 
competing concerns of others, the helpfulness here presupposes, rather than provides, the 
moral standard for arbitrating the concerns of different people.  
 If Singer intends this suggestion to provide the content of “impartiality” or 
“universality” then we must reject it as unclear, incoherent, or unfeasible.  Singer would 
be suggesting something akin to Rawls’s original position, conditioned not by a veil of 
                                                
14 This reading may be suggested in Singer 1995: 174-75.  
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ignorance, nor by the prospect of having your position randomly or maliciously assigned, 
but rather by the certainty that we would actually live the lives of all of those affected “by 
the actions open to us.”  The problem is figuring out what it is that we are supposed to be 
imagining when we imagine living the lives of all these other people.   
One thing that seems quite possible for me to do is to abstract away some of the 
particularities about myself and my own circumstance, and imagine that I instead share 
certain of the features and circumstances of another person.  After doing this, I might 
further imagine what I, transformed in this way, would want or prefer.  Not just any way 
of doing this will be adequate for determining moral guidelines.  In selecting the features 
of myself to remove and the features of the other person to adopt, I have to make sure 
that I am adopting for the other person all the morally important features and shedding 
from myself all the features that would distort moral judgment, at least for the question at 
hand.  This means we need a way of identifying the relevant features.     
Since Singer’s proposal doesn’t provide guidance for identifying such features, it 
is tempting to read it in a more radical way: in placing myself in the other person’s 
position, I am supposed to imagine losing all of the features peculiar to myself and my 
own circumstances and gaining all of the features of that other person and her 
circumstances.  If, however, I try to imagine having only that other person’s memories, 
attitudes, dispositions, relationships, plans, etc., then, to the extent that I am successful, I 
strongly suspect that this fails to be a case of putting myself in the other person’s position.  
When Singer suggests that we should put ourselves in another person’s position 
and imagine having to live his or her life, it is not clear why we should expect the 
hypothetical preferences to helpfully correspond to anything in good moral deliberation.  
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If, on the one hand, I am completely successful in imagining myself with only other 
person’s features, then my hypothetical preferences will simply be the preferences of that 
other person.  All I am then doing is accurately imagining the other person from her own 
point of view.  After successfully accomplishing this task, my resources for moral 
reasoning are no better than those of that other person who has yet to follow Singer’s 
advice.  If, however, I am less successful, then my hypothetical preferences will just be 
the preferences of a hypothetical person constructed from some mixture of my own 
features and the other person’s features.  It is difficult to see how it could be helpful to 
consider the preferences of a person who, for example, has my beliefs, memories, and 
friendships, but has some other person’s tastes, intentions, and life goals.15 
Suppose, however, that there is a way to work out such difficulties and that, in 
some relevant way, it is possible to put oneself in another’s position.  To follow Singer’s 
advice for deliberation, we also have to figure out a sensible way of imagining how we 
are to do this for all of the relevant people.  Since all the relevant people are all of those 
affected by the actions open to me, it is a great many people.  We might initially suppose 
that we can limit the number, realizing that the kinds of actions open to me become 
limited by whatever actions I take.  If I spend the rest of my life in Paris I cannot also 
spend the rest of my life in Malawi.  If, however, my decision to spend the rest of my life 
in Paris implies that few Malawians are affected by the actions open to me, then Singer’s 
formulation would bizarrely generate strong reasons against going to Malawi, or any 
                                                
15 In may be that Singer means that, in putting oneself in the position of others, one must only adopt the 
preferences of those others, as suggested in Singer, Jamieson 1999: 298.  It is unclear, however, what this 
would mean if we had to put ourselves in the position of more than one person simultaneously.  If Singer 
means that we give weight to others’ preferences “in proportion to the strength with which they hold them” 
(1988: 152), or that we should “adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the preferences of those 
affected” (2011: 12), then this universalization requirement may boil down to Singer’s principle of equal 
consideration, without removing any of our reasons for doubting that principle.  
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other place of relative misery.  That is, if I had to live the lives of everyone affected by 
my actions, prudence would instruct me to guide actions according to whom I happen to 
affect: I should avoid affecting (in any way whatsoever) people with miserable lives; on 
the other hand, I should actively stalk people whose lives I would like to live, with the 
aim of affecting them in some trivial or positive way.   
We must therefore interpret Singer’s formulation in the following way: even if I 
decide to live in Paris, I must still imagine myself in the position of all of those whom I 
might affect were I instead to have decided to live in Malawi—or China, or India, etc.  If, 
moreover, in any of these possible paths it would have been open to me to affect in any 
way those multitudes, then I must also imagine living the lives of all of those multitudes.  
Since for every person there is likely to be some course of action or other open to me 
through which I could affect that person (either intentionally or otherwise), then on 
Singer’s proposal I must imagine living the lives of nearly all presently living people (I 
might perhaps exclude individuals who are just about to die in highly isolated places).  
Since, moreover, even minor effects on people who are alive now can alter who comes 
into existence later, I may also have to imagine living the lives of all people who are yet 
to be born. 
While the number and diversity of all such people burdens the imagination, there 
is a more basic problem of figuring out how I am to imagine living multiple lives (even 
assuming, again, that there is an appropriately helpful way of imagining living one other 
person’s life).  One way of imagining living multiple lives, suggested by C.I. Lewis, is to 
imagine living each of these lives seriatim (1946: 546-47).  We might try to imagine this 
as a long series of reincarnations back into the present world to live out one of the lives of 
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someone else.  This innovation might seem to resolve certain problems associated with 
aggregation (small costs and benefits would become more significant to you as more 
people experience them because each new person represents a new cost/benefit to 
yourself).  It may even do this without allowing trivial benefits to the many to outweigh 
extraordinary costs to the few (given that you would still have to suffer those 
extraordinary costs).  Distortions, however, arise under the seriatum interpretation 
because of the way it suggests that I regard the lives of others as temporal segments of 
my own very long life.  The problem with this is that it often makes sense for me to 
impose sacrifices during one time of my life for benefits that I will receive later.  This 
means that the seriatum interpretation will tend to license the harming of one person for 
benefits received by others as if it is one and the same person experiencing the harms and 
receiving the benefits.  Since, however, what is fair to a person so compensated for her 
sacrifices may not be fair to a person receiving no such compensation, the seriatum 
interpretation will distort our judgment.   
 A second interpretation, proposed as “highly speculative” by Thomas Nagel, is to 
imagine living all the lives “as a set of distinct individual lives….not in a series, but 
simultaneously” (1978: 140-42).  This interpretation is supposed to help block the 
“interpersonal compensation for sacrifices” that the seriatum interpretation threatens to 
license.  The cost, however, is apparent incoherence.  To consider what should 
presumably be a relatively easy case, suppose that I only have to imagine simultaneously 
being both myself and one other person whom I know quite well.  What is it to imagine 
myself simultaneously being both myself and my wife?  The suggested task seems to be 
that of simultaneously imagining myself being just like myself and being just like 
      
25  
someone who is not like myself, and this seems a lot like trying to imagine a square 
circle.  To imagine being just like someone who is not just like myself is to not imagine 
being just like myself.  
 Nagel argues, however, that  
the conditions of choice can be understood metaphysically, for we can imagine a 
person splitting into several persons, each of whom bears to the original, over 
time, the kind of relation that constitutes trans-temporal personal identity for an 
individual person….This provides a sense in which an individual might expect to 
become each of a number of different persons—not in a series but 
simultaneously—so that each of their lives would in a sense be his unique life…. 
(1978: 141)  
 
If it is in this way possible to imagine becoming multiple persons existing 
simultaneously, then we might try to interpret Singer’s proposal along similar lines.  I am 
to imagine what I would prefer if I knew I were about to split into multiple persons, 
where these multiple persons are all those affected by the actions open to me. The value 
of Nagel’s proposal is in showing that there is no conceptual barrier to imagining one’s 
preference under the knowledge that one is about to become, in a sense, multiple and 
simultaneously existing persons.   
The concern, however, is whether this element of fiction introduces any new 
distortions to moral deliberation concerning actions that affect people who aren’t really 
future branches of myself.16  Suppose I know that I will soon split into two persons in the 
way Nagel proposes, so that my present decisions will affect both branches.  In making 
these present decisions, does mere prudence lead me to balance the interests of these two 
future branches in what would be a morally appropriate way were they not each branches 
of my present self?  Under some circumstances, I think that the answer is “no.”   
                                                
16 In thinking about the branching of a person, and of myself, I am indebted to Derek Parfit’s discussions 
(1989: part 3).  
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 I can imagine, for example, a scenario in which it would be intuitively prudent to 
take action that would severely sacrifice the interests of one of my future branches for the 
sake of another of my future branches.  Suppose I am in need of a skin graft and I can 
issue orders to have myself split, or “duplicated,” as I sleep, with the provision that either 
my duplicated self or the original will be immediately and painlessly killed for the sake 
of its skin.  When only the one branch of me awakes the next morning, it will be just as if 
I have never branched, but I will have the needed skin for my graft.  This strikes me as a 
potentially prudent alternative to removing healthy skin somewhere else on my non-
duplicated body.  I take it, however, that it would be wrong to kill any other person in his 
or her sleep for the sake of my skin graft.17   
 It may seem that a crucial factor is that the person to be sacrificed is a duplicate, 
or a near duplicate, of either the person whom the sacrifice will benefit, or of the person 
who has placed the orders to perform the sacrifice.  Though this strikes me as plausible, it 
suggests a new problem with interpreting Singer through Nagel’s proposal.  If, instead of 
being able to nearly perfectly duplicate myself, I can instead only issue orders to create so 
poor a duplicate that it results in a person who bears no closer resemblance to me than 
any other random stranger, then it seems to me that there is something much more 
problematic about issuing those orders to create such a person for the sake of his/her skin.  
Here, however, my hesitation is not based in prudence but morality.  From the point of 
view of narrow self-interest, creating such a person for his/her skin seems preferable even 
                                                
17 Some may think that a crucial factor in this scenario is that my duplicate never gains consciousness. 
Suppose instead that, for whatever reason, the skin donor must gain (or regain) consciousness before he is 
killed the next night.  To me it still seems prudent to make the orders if I can also ensure that the person to 
be killed does not know (or entirely fails to remember) that he will be sacrificed for his skin the next night.  
This might be ensured by sequestering the branches separately for the day and by using an effective 
memory-inhibiting drug. 
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to creating a near duplicate of myself, assuming compatible skin.  What makes the 
interpersonal sacrifice objectionable, therefore, is precisely that the person to be 
sacrificed is not me but someone else entirely.  This suggests that the idea of me splitting 
into multiple distinct persons can lead to distortions in moral thinking that are only 
corrected by rejecting the very intuition that is supposed to be providing us with moral 
guidance: the intuition that the other persons are also oneself.  
 I conclude that Singer has not identified any fundamental feature of morality in 
which he can convincingly defend a general principle of beneficence needed for the 
shockingly demanding conclusion he wishes to draw.  Singer’s principle of equal 
consideration of interests is itself too controversial, and Singer’s proposed strategy for 
deliberation fails to provide any suitable criterion for arbitrating the competing concerns 
of different persons.   
 
1.3 The disanalogy challenge 
Singer’s third strategy for defending his general principle of beneficence is a 
combination of tactics to resist the criticism that his principle mistakenly requires action 
in specific kinds of cases, and, in particular, those kinds of cases that would make 
compliance alarmingly difficult (as when relatively affluent individuals can, through 
small donations to aid agencies, rescue some of “the nearly 10 million young children 
dying every year from avoidable, poverty-related causes” (2009: 8-9)).  The initial move 
is to ask the critic to specify what it is about such cases that make them relevantly 
different from analogous cases that Singer constructs, cases that typically involve 
children dying in shallow ponds.  Once the reason for exception is specified, Singer 
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considers its moral significance.  Singer dismisses some of the proposed reasons, such as 
the consideration of mere physical proximity to the imperiled person, for their prima facie 
insignificance.18  Singer dismisses other reasons by observing that such considerations 
intuitively fail to counteract the obligation to act in analogous cases, which are often 
variants of a case in which a child is drowning in a shallow pond.  So, in response to the 
proposed reason for exception that there are others who could also help the “10 million 
young children,” Singer responds with a question: “Should I consider that I am less 
obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, 
no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?” 
(1972: 233).  
Singer’s use of these analogies draws heated criticism.  It is, according to John 
Kekes, “a rhetorical stratagem that misleads the uncritical and infuriates the critical” 
(2002: 506).  The basic problem, as I see it, is that these appeals to analogous cases 
cannot fulfill their intended purpose of demonstrating that the proposed reason for 
exception lacks the relevant moral significance (by the critics’ own intuitive judgments or 
otherwise).  To suppose otherwise is to overlook or disregard what Frances Kamm calls 
the Principle of Contextual Interaction: a given feature may behave differently in 
different contexts (2007: 17).19  So, although the presence of others intuitively fails to 
counteract the moral obligation to help in the modified pond case, we cannot thereby 
conclude that the same feature doesn’t affect the moral obligation in other contexts.  Even 
                                                
18 More specifically, Singer dismisses the moral significance of physical proximity as until then undisputed 
(2004: 11), by appealing to the impartiality claims discussed previously (1972: 232), or simply by the 
intuitive moral insignificance of the feature when considered abstractly. 
 
19 Shelly Kagan discusses the fallacy of overlooking what amounts to Kamm’s principle in his “The 
Additive Fallacy” (1988).   
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if we can trust our intuitive judgments about our moral obligations in the analogous 
cases, such judgments cannot therefore be used to demonstrate the general moral 
insignificance of any particular feature.  
When discussing his use of analogies, Singer concedes that they can be “pushed 
too far.”  He suggests that Shallow Pond works by “pulling on your heartstrings” through 
“focusing on a single child in need,” contrasting this with “appeals to your reason” (2009: 
17).  Elsewhere, Singer explains these cases as an appeal to his readers’ intuitive 
judgments.  Since, however, Singer is willing to be somewhat dismissive of such 
judgments, he explains that for him “an appeal to intuitions is always an ad hominem 
argument” (Singer, Jamieson 1999: 315).  Singer means that the appeal to intuitions is a 
device by which he “might win certain kinds of opponents over to his own views,” views 
which Singer finds compelling on independent grounds (Singer 1974: 498).  
Such responses do not engage the criticism that I have just raised.  If the point of 
the analogies is simply to focus our attention on a single child in need, it is hard to see 
why Singer cannot rather focus our attention by describing in detail one of the children 
perishing overseas.  It is hard to see why he should appeal to analogous cases.  If, 
however,“[t]he point of the analogy is to force people to recognize an inconsistency in 
their moral convictions” (Singer 2007: 480), it remains unclear what that inconsistency is 
supposed to be.  Given the Principle of Contextual Interaction, the judgment that a given 
consideration fails to counteract the obligation in a case involving nearby drowning 
children is perfectly consistent with the judgment that the same consideration generally 
does create a reason for exception concerning our opportunities to rescue “the nearly 10 
million young children dying every year from avoidable, poverty-related causes.”  I 
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conclude, therefore, that Singer is not actually attempting to give a response to the 
concern raised by the Principle of Contextual Interaction.   
 
1.4 The empirical challenge 
 The fourth weakness concerns the empirical claims that are needed to show that a 
plausible general duty-specifying principle can generate demands with regard to the 
distant needy.  These are concerns about the effectiveness of aid agencies, the unintended 
consequences of providing foreign aid, facts about how aid organizations actually work, 
and the best options individuals have for dealing with chronic poverty and its associated 
problems.  Facts of these sorts threaten to undermine an empirical claim critical to the 
famine-relief argument, such as Singer’s claim that, “[b]y donating to aid agencies, you 
can prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without 
sacrificing anything nearly as important” (2009: 15-16).   
 
2. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE FAMINE-RELIEF ARGUMENT 
 
 Peter Unger and Garrett Cullity have endeavored to improve Singer’s famine-
relief argument.  While these are not the only attempts to defend or improve the famine-
relief argument, they are noteworthy in this literature for the sustained attention they give 
to the matter.  I discuss these attempts with the goal of highlighting their limitations. 
 
2.1 Unger’s attempt 
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We can understand Unger’s contribution as a response to the methodological 
challenge through a sustained attempt to undermine our intuitive resistance to the highly 
demanding conclusion.  Unger tries to undermine this intuitive resistance by advancing a 
debunking hypothesis largely based on what he calls “informal moral psychology” (1996: 
23).  By examining our intuitive responses to numerous hypothetical cases, Unger 
believes he can identify the factors to which our intuitive judgments are sensitive.  Since 
the operative factors cannot, according to Unger, plausibly sustain the normative 
significance our responses seem to give them, they are best viewed with suspicion.  By 
explaining our intuitive resistance to Singer’s highly demanding conclusion in terms of 
these psychologically significant factors, Unger tries to clear the way for us to regard the 
highly demanding conclusion as reflecting our “deepest moral commitments.”   
 To make his case Unger tests our intuitive responses to hypothetical cases with 
the twin goals of dismissing common ideas about potentially normative factors that might 
seem to be driving our intuitive responses (e.g., “social distance,” “informative 
directness,” and “urgency”) (33-54), and of inferring the factors that are influencing our 
intuitive responses (e.g., “fallacious futility thinking,” “projective separating/grouping,” 
and the conspicuousness of the need).  Towards the first goal, Unger constructs 
imaginative cases that reveal, or are supposed to reveal, that the factors in question do not 
consistently alter the relevant intuitive judgment.  Typically the compared cases vary in 
more than one way.  As a result, to directly conclude that a given factor isn’t 
psychologically relevant from our responses to such cases is to overlook a close cousin to 
the Principle of Contextual Interaction.  That is, if the effect of the factor in question on 
our intuitive judgments can vary due to other features of the context, then we cannot 
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conclude that a given factor generally doesn’t affect our intuitive responses from the 
mere fact that it fails to affect them in the particular cases that Unger provides.  
 Towards the second goal (that of identifying the factors that are influencing our 
intuitive responses to cases), Unger expands his investigation to cases far beyond those 
simply having to do with help or rescue.  While Unger’s hypotheses often seem to do a 
good job at explaining many of the otherwise mysterious responses we intuitively make, 
his hypotheses are justified only to the extent that they provide the best explanations of 
these responses.  As such, the arguments are only as strong as our reasons for concluding 
that there are no equally good alternative explanations for our intuitive judgments.  In her 
detail analysis of Unger’s efforts, Frances Kamm’s alternative interpretations of his cases 
make such a conclusion difficult to reach (2007: ch. 6). 
 Even if Unger’s explanations of our intuitive responses to particular cases are 
correct, it is a further step to show that these explanations debunk our intuitive responses.  
We would still need to show that factors that Unger identifies as psychologically 
influential are normatively insignificant.  This further task isn’t easily accomplished.  
While the identified facts may, on their face, compellingly appear to be normatively 
insignificant, the further implications of that insignificance may prove to be more 
implausible than the denial of that compelling appearance.  This was David Lewis’s 
response to Unger’s conclusions (2000: 157-58).  Moreover, the apparent normative 
insignificance of a given factor may disappear once the factor is placed in the context of a 
richer explanation.  In discussions of the so-called special duties, one commonly 
encounters explanations for the normative significance of a factor that, from certain 
angles, appears as if it should be without significance (such as the fact that one happens 
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to have been born to these parents rather than those, or that one was born on this side of 
the border rather than that side).   
 Finally, even if Unger succeeds both in identifying the psychological factors that 
are generating our intuitive responses to cases, and in showing the normative 
insignificance of such factors, this only shows that we should not trust a conclusion 
because of its correspondence to our intuitive responses about cases.20  While such 
debunking explanations would give us grounds for heightened scrutiny of theories that 
might be biased to align with our intuitive responses, they would still not supply 
everything we need to reach Singer’s conclusion.  We may still have additional grounds 
for resisting Singer’s conclusion.  In particular, we may simply think that Singer and 
Unger have misinterpreted our deepest moral commitments or the relevant moral 
principles.  We therefore still lack the positive guidance of the sort that the general duty-
specifying principle is supposed to provide.   
A lack of positive guidance gravely weakens Unger’s debunking explanations of 
our intuitive resistance to the demanding conclusion.  Even if we accept that our intuitive 
responses to cases are overly influenced by factors which, of themselves, are morally 
empty, we do not yet know, for any particular case, whether or not these factors are 
distorting or correcting our intuitive judgments.  Unger, for example, sometimes claims 
that one morally empty factor is correcting the distorting influence of another morally 
empty factor, but these claims about which factor is distorting and which is correcting 
                                                
20 As Singer puts it, “[Unger’s] explanations are devastating for the view that we should take our intuitive 
responses to particular cases as a test of a sound theory, because the explanations show that our intuitive 
judgments are based on things that are obviously of no moral significance at all” (Singer, Jamieson 1999: 
316). And so, “Post-Unger, no-one should place weight on our intuitive responses to such cases until they 
have empirically tested, and refuted, Unger’s account of them” (Singer 1999: 187).  
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depend on an independent method of determining the correct judgment we should 
make.21  
In summary, while Unger has moved us beyond the methodological challenge per 
se, this is only to push us into the controversial thickets that lay just beyond it, where his 
own proposals face challenges on multiple fronts.  
 
2.2 Cullity’s attempt 
 Garrett Cullity devotes the second chapter of The Moral Demands of Affluence to 
improving Singer’s famine-relief argument.  He calls his new version the argument from 
beneficence.  This argument begins with the scenario in which he “could easily save 
someone’s life which is threatened right in front of [him], and there is no further 
countervailing consideration [against performing the rescue], beyond the small effort it 
would cost [him] to help” (2004: 19).  Failing to perform the rescue in such a scenario 
would be morally wrong, and Cullity explains this wrongness as an absence of sufficient 
“discriminating concern for other people’s interests,” or, for short, a “failure of 
beneficence.”  Such failures occur, according to Cullity, whenever one fails to act when 
                                                
21 Unger claims that we have “two main guides” in theorizing about morality.  The first guide is our moral 
intuitions about particular cases.  Unger’s arguments are for the most part aimed at showing how this guide 
tends to be influenced by factors that seemingly shouldn’t carry much moral significance.  The second 
guide is what Unger calls our “general moral common sense.”  This “sensibility” is supposed to be like the 
first except that it is “directed at matters at least somewhat more general”: it is “[p]itched at a level 
somewhere between the extremely general considerations dominating the tenets of traditional moral 
theories, on the one hand, and the quite fine-grained ones often dominating the particular cases 
philosophers present, on the other.”  Unger suggests that this second guide is more likely to reflect our 
deepest moral commitments (our “Basic Moral Values”) and, “less directly, morality itself” (1996: 28).  
What I find missing in Unger’s arguments is a clear articulation and defense of the supposed content of this 
general moral common sense—clear enough, at least, to help us determine when a factor influencing our 
intuitive responses about cases is distorting, as opposed to correcting, our moral judgment.  As my own 
proposals in chapters four and five will ultimately suggest, Unger neglects certain considerations that our 
“basic moral values” plausibly accommodate, in particular, the cumulative costs to an individual of 
compliance with a rule, alongside the distinctive values of localized fellowship and solidarity that would, in 
addition, be lost if our practice were to treat the perils of strangers nearby as dismissively as we are prone 
to treating the perils of strangers far away. 
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one’s reason for helping another person is very strong and the opposing considerations 
aren’t sufficiently significant.  Cullity then argues that, by parity of reasoning, the failure 
to make life-saving donations to aid agencies is also an impermissible failure of 
beneficence. 
 We might object to Cullity’s conclusion by arguing that differences between the 
two cases show either that the reasons for helping in both cases aren’t equivalent, or that 
there are stronger countervailing considerations in the second case.  Cullity believes he 
can resist these objections, and he illustrates his strategy by considering whether 
differences in the “immediacy” of the need might render the two cases sufficiently 
incomparable.  An impermissible failure of beneficence occurs if an agent is “too self-
regarding.”  To say that the immediacy of the need in the first case is part of the agent’s 
strong reason for helping in that case would make the agent’s reason too self-regarding 
(21-23).  Likewise, to say that the non-immediacy of the need in the second case 
undermines the reason for helping would make the agent’s justification for not helping 
too self-regarding (25).  The consideration of immediacy is too self-regarding simply 
because it appeals to one’s own proximity to the need and the reasons that are 
“characteristic of a beneficent person to recognize” do not contain self-reference (22-23).  
 Cullity’s strategy is broadly applicable inasmuch as it treats as too self-regarding 
any consideration that contains reference to the potential benefactor.  This is a remarkable 
standard.  I can readily imagine various possible facts that contain reference to myself 
and which are nonetheless highly relevant to my reason for helping others in need: that I 
am too ill at the moment, that helping the person would require me to sacrifice my own 
life, that I am currently occupied with the task of defusing a terrorist’s bomb.  Moreover, 
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it seems misleading to say that “the force of the reason for me to help someone who 
needs it comes from a fact about him, not a fact about me.”  The force of my reason to 
help another person may, on the contrary, have quite a lot to do with the fact that I am, 
for example, in a particularly good position to offer help, or that helping the other person 
would cost me very little.  Far from introducing too much self-regard, in some of these 
examples the self-reference introduces no self-regard, at least if we take self-regard to 
mean a regard for one’s self-interest.  Since reference to the self can have so little to do 
with self-regard, I think we must reject Cullity’s criterion. 
 If instead of self-reference we focus on the idea of self-regard, we still need a way 
of showing that a given consideration contains too much self-regard.  In discussing the 
beneficent agent’s reason for rescuing someone, Cullity apparently thinks that any 
element of self-regard in such a reason is too much self-regard.  Cullity can think this 
because of the way he differentiates the agent’s reason for helping from the 
considerations that countervail against that reason.  With this distinction, Cullity would 
resist the idea that his reason for helping the other person is that the other person needs 
help and it takes him (only) a minute to provide that help.  Rather, Cullity would insist 
that his reason for helping the other is simply that the other person needs help.  The fact 
that it takes him only a minute to provide that help factors not into the reason for helping, 
but rather into the “significance of any considerations that countervail against that 
reason” for helping.  Generally, any consideration one appeals to in one’s justification for 
not helping is separated off as a countervailing reason.  This distinction explains Cullity’s 
suggestion that, in one’s reason for helping another, any amount of self-regard can be too 
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much self-regard.  On some occasions any degree of self-regard in one’s reason for 
helping another will imply insufficient beneficence.  
 I see no point in challenging Cullity’s distinction between reasons for helping and 
countervailing reasons.  We can instead focus on Cullity’s standard for determining when 
a justification for not helping is too self-regarding. Cullity claims that an appeal to the 
non-immediacy of the need in justifying inaction would be too self-regarding because it 
implies that “the force of the reason for me to help” is weakened by “facts about me,” 
rather than facts about the person in need (25).  This response implies, implausibly, that 
facts about oneself—or, more narrowly, self-regarding considerations—can never make it 
permissible to refuse help to another person.  However, strong self-regarding reasons 
(such as the fact that offering help would place my own life at risk) can plausibly weaken 
or even block my duty to help, even when there are strong considerations that count in 
favor of helping another person (perhaps, e.g., the person will suffer and soon die 
otherwise).  Cullity’s argument from beneficence fails to provide a plausible criterion for 
determining if a given consideration is too self-regarding to countervail against one’s 
reason for rescuing others.  His rejection of non-immediacy as a countervailing 
consideration is flawed and he provides no reason for thinking that there aren’t other 
considerations that countervail against our reasons for making life-saving donations to 
aid-agencies.  It is understandable why, in his otherwise favorable review of Cullity’s 
book, Singer himself doesn’t think the argument from beneficence makes a significant 
advance in their shared goal of creating an argument with broad-based appeal (Singer 
2007: 476). 
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 Cullity’s other contribution to improving Singer’s argument is his response to the 
empirical challenge, including his sustained efforts to address the fact that effects of 
individual contributions to aid agencies tend to be thinly dispersed, with the seemingly 
relevant consequence that individual contributions typically have no significant impact 
for any beneficiary (1996, 2000, 2004: chapters 3-4).  While I don’t want to minimize 
these contributions to the famine-relief argument as such, my peculiar interests in that 
argument will allow me to side-step these empirical controversies.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE DIFFERENTIATION QUESTION 
 
 
 
In the last chapter I considered the limitations of both the famine-relief argument 
and two attempts to improve it.  My present aim isn’t to exploit these limitations to rebut 
the highly demanding conclusion, but rather to articulate the legitimate challenge that 
remains.  The famine-relief argument still poses a pressing challenge even for those who 
do not share Singer’s utilitarian assumptions, Unger’s conclusions from informal moral 
psychology, or Cullity’s empirical claims about aid organizations and their effectiveness.  
This chapter’s articulation of the challenge sets the stage for a fuller investigation into 
what it is that makes this challenge so difficult to resolve. 
 
1. THE DIFFERENTIATION QUESTION 
  
 
Let us say that I rescue another person if and only if I cause someone or other to 
be saved from serious peril whose likelihood to escape such peril is otherwise extremely 
low (less than one percent, we can say).  Serious peril is intense, debilitating suffering, 
which, barring intervention, is immediately followed by death.  Even granting these 
      
40  
restricted definitions, I am not morally required to act in every occasion in which I have 
the opportunity to rescue someone, but sometimes I am.  A paradigmatic case in which I 
am so required is  
Shallow Pond: on a leisurely walk, I find myself uniquely positioned to rescue a 
drowning toddler from a knee-deep pond. Performing the rescue would be easy 
and safe, but I will ruin the new shoes I bought only a few days ago. (Adapted 
from Singer 2009: 3) 
 
A paradigmatic case in which, perhaps, I am not so required is  
Distant Rescue: I am well acquainted with an international aid organization, 
Heroes for Hamiltons, which identifies neglected opportunities for saving people 
from serious peril at very low costs.  Since the organization always identifies far 
more potential beneficiaries than its budget allows it to rescue, every $10 
donation it receives will be used for the rescue of some additional person. (At the 
time of donation, this person is randomly selected from the large and continually 
replenishing pool of candidates, most of whom will perish.)  Heroes for 
Hamiltons can therefore guarantee that, for every $10 I donate, they will rescue 
someone or other.  I can conveniently send such donations via mobile phone text 
message, and I know that the organization has an excellent track record. 
 
In each of the above cases the salient fact obtains: I can rescue another person at a small 
personal cost.  I call it the salient fact because, when considered in the abstract, it appears 
to possess considerable normative significance.  If I am required to rescue others 
whenever the salient fact obtains, then we should draw the demanding conclusion: I must 
rescue others so long as the salient fact obtains.  A moderate account of our moral 
requirements of rescue has two features: it rejects the demanding conclusion in Distant 
Rescue, and it affirms the duty to perform the rescue in cases like Shallow Pond.  
 A philosophically satisfying defense of the moderate position must explain why I 
should not regard Shallow Pond as presenting just an additional opportunity of rescue 
right alongside those presented in Distant Rescue.  Otherwise, so long as ten dollars 
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remains a small cost to me, I ought to regard myself as obligated to donate to Heroes for 
Hamiltons whenever I am obligated to rescue the imperiled person in Shallow Pond. 
To make the line of reasoning here more explicit, we can say that, for any number 
n, Distant Rescuen is the scenario in which I have already contributed enough money to 
rescue n imperiled people.  Let m be the maximum number of ten-dollar donations I 
could contribute to Heroes for Hamiltons such that I am still in a state in which ten 
dollars constitutes a small cost to myself.  Distant Rescue + Shallow Pond is the scenario 
in which the two cases obtain simultaneously.  That is, it is the case in which I encounter 
the imperiled person in Shallow Pond while also faced with the opportunities to rescue 
the distant needy through Heroes for Hamiltons.  The moderate must avoid this 
argument’s conclusion: 
1. For all n < m, I am obligated to rescue the nearby drowning person in Distant 
Rescuen + Shallow Pond. 
 
2. For all n < m, if I am obligated to rescue the nearby drowning person in 
Distant Rescuen + Shallow Pond, then I am obligated to donate $10 in Distant 
Rescuen.  
 
3. Therefore, for all n < m, I am obligated to donate $10 in Distant Rescuen. 
 
The moderate must in particular find a way to reject the second premise.  In so doing, the 
moderate will be rejecting the idea that the imperiled person in Shallow Pond should be 
regarded as just another person whom she might rescue at a small cost to herself.  The 
central philosophical challenge facing the moderate is the challenge of justifying the 
intuitive moral difference between Shallow Pond and Distant Rescue. At the center of 
this challenge is a question: given the standing opportunity to rescue others at small cost 
through Heroes for Hamiltons, why, at some point, must I still rescue the person who 
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would perish for want of my action in Shallow Pond, but not the person who would 
perish for want of my action in Distant Rescue?   
 Plausible responses to this question will account for widely shared and stable 
intuitive judgments that affirm similar moral judgments about variants of the Shallow 
Pond and Distant Rescue.  These two cases can be treated as paradigms of two kinds of 
rescue cases.  Pond-like cases are those rescue scenarios that an intuitively plausible 
moderate position will treat like Shallow Pond.  Generally, whatever other opportunities 
one may have to rescue others, pond-like cases are those that continue to generate a duty 
to perform a specific act of rescue.  Famine-like cases are cases like Distant Rescue.  
Although they also present an opportunity to rescue another person at a small cost, they 
appear, at least to the non-idiosyncratic moderate, not to generate a similarly strict duty of 
rescue regardless of what one has already done.  The names are meant to recall Peter 
Singer’s examples (1972) without assuming or identifying any principled basis for 
treating the cases differently (it should be obvious that ponds and famines are 
inessential). 
 The differentiation question, then, is the central philosophical question posed by 
the famine-relief argument to the moderate.  It asks the moderate why one must continue 
to perform rescues in pond-like cases but not in famine-like cases.22  
 
                                                
22 Unger also frames the question of accounting for the intuitive normative difference between two types of 
cases when he presents “Vintage Sedan” alongside “The Envelope” (1996: 24-25).  He then attempts to 
make the challenge more forceful by his comparison of  “Bob’s Bugatti” and “Ray’s Big Request” (135-
37).  In constructing his pairs, Unger tries to make the differences between the cases such that, when 
considered in the abstract, those differences should actually strengthen the reason for acting in the case in 
which the rescue is more like Distant Rescue and less like Shallow Pond (in the former case, e.g., more 
people will be rescued, the cost of rescue is far less, etc.).  By appealing to our intuitive response to Bob’s 
Bugatti (a case of in which the rescue of a nearby stranger is extremely costly to the rescuer), Unger argues 
(with the aid of the conclusions drawn from his efforts at informal moral psychology) that we are obligated 
to make similarly costly sacrifices to save the lives of distant strangers (1996: ch. 6).   
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2. PRESSING THE DIFFERENTIATION QUESTION 
 
As a question of explaining an intuitive normative difference between two types 
of cases, the differentiation question is not unlike the trolley problem.  Many of us 
intuitively discern what we take to be a difference in moral permissibility between 
turning the trolley so that it runs over the single person instead of the five, and sacrificing 
the one healthy patient so that her vital organs can be used to save the lives of five others.  
It has also, however, proven difficult to account for this difference.  
While the differentiation question is like the trolley problem in these respects, I 
believe it is made more difficult by an additional source of skepticism.  The moderate’s 
resistance to the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue is plausibly motivated by the 
moderate’s own will.  While it is, for many, difficult to give up the idea that turning the 
trolley is morally permissible (or the idea that sacrificing the one is a permissible means 
to saving the many), there is a further kind of difficulty that the moderate must overcome 
in accepting the demanding conclusion in the famine-relief cases.  In the differentiation 
question, the moderate’s own will and sense of moral rectitude are plausibly 
strengthening her resistance to that conclusion in a suspicious way.  Elements of the 
famine-relief argument draw out these suspicions.  Showing just how they do will reveal 
what is right about the famine-relief argument. 
 
2.1 A general duty-specifying principle 
 As discussed in chapter two, all variants of the famine-relief argument appeal to a 
general duty-specifying principle, the support of which is characteristically problematic.  
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I will argue for a plausible version of such a principle that will serve the more modest 
task of making a presumptive case against the moderate, transforming the differentiation 
question from a puzzle into a pressing challenge.   
In Shallow Pond and Distant Rescue, the salient fact obtains. That is, in each case 
I can rescue another person from serious peril at a small personal cost. When considered 
in the abstract, the salient fact seems to be morally significant.  To affirm this 
significance is to affirm much less than some ideal of impartiality, universality, or of 
respecting others’ interests or preferences as I do my own, or even at some discounted 
rate below my own.  Rather, it is only to affirm that, when I can easily do something to 
relieve it, the intense, debilitating suffering and survival of another person as such has 
moral significance for me.  In speaking of “another person as such” I mean to refer to 
persons as mere persons, as not as siblings, friends, or others to whom we bear some 
special relationship.  
Rejecting such an affirmation would be difficult.  To see this, we might set aside 
the occasions in which I am, or might through my decision become, causally responsible 
for the suffering and threat of death of the other person.  If, in the remaining possible 
circumstances, the suffering and survival of another person as such isn’t morally 
significant to me when I can easily provide the remedy, then, it is hard to think why such 
considerations should ever be morally significant to me.  Moreover, if the suffering and 
survival of another person as such isn’t morally significant to me, then it is hard think 
why any of the interests or concerns of another person as such should be morally 
significant to me.  It is, however, hard to think that anything should be morally significant 
to me if the interests and concerns of another person as such are never are.  So, if 
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anything is morally significant to me outside of special relationships and occasions in 
which I am or would be causally implicated in someone else’s harm, then the salient fact 
plausibly is.  Put another way, acceptance of any positive duty of beneficence towards 
other persons as such would be difficult to square with the denial of the salient fact’s 
moral significance.   
 Accepting that there is some general duty of beneficence towards other persons as 
such, the salient fact should not only be significant, but highly significant, given the 
particular kind of opportunity it presents.  It presents not simply an opportunity to do 
better for someone else than I can otherwise do for myself, but rather an opportunity to 
do much better for someone.  Moreover, it is not simply that there is a great disparity 
between what is at stake for me and what is at stake for the other person whom I might 
affect (as when I could rescue a person from death by sacrificing one of my arms; or 
when I could save a person from walking a mile by giving a ride).  Rather, what is at 
stake for the other person concerns rescue from serious peril, and what is at stake for me 
is, in contrast, a very small cost.   
 When we attempt to specify the intuitive significance of the salient fact through a 
general moral principle defining our duties, we encounter a difficulty common to all such 
tasks: for whatever duty-defining principle we specify, there almost always seem to be 
exceptions.  So, although the salient fact seems to be the sort of fact that might give rise 
to a moral obligation, we can easily think of cases in which the salient fact doesn’t suffice 
to create a moral obligation (e.g., when the rescue would endanger the lives of others, 
when it would sacrifice opportunities to do even better things, when it would encourage 
others to get themselves into similarly serious peril, etc.).  The salient fact, therefore, 
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doesn’t always give rise to a moral obligation to rescue the person. It might even be that, 
when it obtains, the salient fact doesn’t even usually give rise to the moral obligation.  
Perhaps there are usually further considerations that effectively counteract any such 
obligation.   
We can acknowledge the intuitive significance of the salient fact while still 
respecting these exceptions by saying that the salient fact is morally significant by 
default.  More specifically, we can say that the salient fact obligates me to save the 
person from serious peril so long as that duty isn’t effectively counteracted by other 
features of my circumstance.  To say, in the intended sense, that a consideration23 
counteracts the presumptive duty is to say that it undercuts or overrides the presumptive 
duty to save the person (it is not enough if the consideration merely provides opposing 
normative force, or that it to some extent weakens the reasons to perform the duty).  
Here, then, is a plausible general duty-specifying principle: 
Rescue principle: If I can rescue someone from serious peril at a small cost to 
myself, and there are no counteracting considerations, then I am morally required 
to rescue the person.24  
 
The rescue principle says that, by default, I have a duty to perform the rescue when the 
salient fact obtains.  Our recognition of this status is, I think, reflected in the 
presumptions that would be associated with the salient fact.  To see this, suppose my new 
                                                
23 It may be that what counteracts the presumptive duty to perform the rescue is most easily thought of not 
as a single consideration, but rather a set of considerations, or of one consideration interacting with others.  
Since, however, we may speak of a set of considerations as itself “a consideration,” I will not always make 
the explicit distinction between single considerations and sets thereof.   
 
24 I am here borrowing from Garrett Cullity (2004: 17-19).  Many versions of the general duty-specifying 
principle have been offered, but the one I settle on is perhaps closest to Cullity’s version: “[W]hen 
someone’s interests will be very seriously compromised if I do not help him, but there is no seriously 
countervailing consideration, then not helping is…morally wrong” (19).  I prefer to use “counteract” 
instead of “countervail” since the latter term more readily suggests considerations that override instead of 
undercut.  Cullity, however, is careful to define “countervail” so as to include considerations of both kinds.  
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neighbor learns the following random fact about me: I, his new neighbor, have recently 
refused an opportunity to easily rescue another person from serious suffering and death.  
My sense is that such a fact is bound to reflect poorly upon me.  While my new neighbor 
might recognize that my behavior may have been excusable or even entirely appropriate 
(given other special considerations undisclosed), the bald fact seems to create a 
presumption to the contrary.25 
The rescue principle gains plausibility from its modesty.  It only claims that the 
salient fact creates a moral duty if other factors don’t create exceptions.  As to what these 
exceptions might be, the door is left open.  Left open is the possibility that, because the 
salient fact doesn’t have much force or significance, these exceptions are easy to come 
by.  Given its accommodation of such interpretations, the rescue principle is difficult to 
deny.  While theories about morality will differ in how they explain the rescue principle’s 
legitimacy, I expect that most sensible theories will accept it.26 
Despite its ability to accommodate wide interpretations of the salient fact’s 
significance, the rescue principle still carries force.  The principle claims much more than 
simply that we have duties to rescue imperiled persons except when we don’t.  The 
rescue principle resembles any moral principle, except that it makes explicit the room for 
exceptions that we tend to tacitly recognize in other principles.  For example: you ought 
not to intentionally deceive another person at least in the absence of counteracting 
                                                
25 It might be thought that the neighbor’s reaction is likely to be influenced by various types of implicatures 
attached to how he has received the information.  If a person conveys such information to my neighbor it is 
likely to be interpreted as a warning, implying that there were no special counteracting reasons for my 
behavior.  So we might imagine that my neighbor comes by this information about me through a device that 
simply spits out random facts, most of which are entirely pointless.  In such a case, the bald fact still seems 
to reflect poorly upon me by default.   
 
26 This provides the sense in which a demandingness problem grounded in the rescue principle differs from 
the second category of demandingness problems discussed in chapter one, where the demandingness 
requires the assumption of a principle peculiar to a more specific theory.   
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considerations—which sometimes obtain.  We cannot, moreover, build a principle out of 
just any fact.  The salient fact is special.  We would not, for example, say that I am, by 
default, morally required to kick off my shoes whenever someone drops a penny.  The 
fact that someone has dropped a penny doesn’t even count in favor of kicking off my 
shoes; there is simply nothing to counteract.  The rescue principle therefore attributes a 
special kind of moral significance in the salient fact, and this is a status it shares with the 
kinds of considerations generally found in the principles that state our moral duties.   
 We might better understand this special kind of significance that the rescue 
principle gives to the salient fact by considering what a counteracting consideration 
would have to be like.  In Shallow Pond, the salient fact obtains.  I assume, with the 
moderate, that it is morally wrong not to save the imperiled child in Shallow Pond.  More 
tentatively, I find it plausible that this wrongness is closely associated with the salient 
fact, and, in particular, that the refusal to rescue the child is wrong because it violates the 
rescue principle. 
 
2.2 Appeals to analogy 
 Despite the plausibility of the rescue principle, and its applicability to Shallow 
Pond, it may be that the wrongness of refusing to save the drowning child results from 
some other features of that scenario.  Or it may be that the wrongness of such a refusal is 
over-determined in Shallow Pond.  That is, there may be other features of Shallow Pond 
that would also suffice to require one to rescue the drowning child.  Finally, it may be 
that certain features of Shallow Pond function to block considerations that would, in other 
circumstances, tend to counteract the duty to save an imperiled person.  We mustn’t 
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assume that a consideration that is morally significant under one set of circumstances 
carries the same moral significance under different circumstances.  
We should remember these possibilities whenever we are tempted to use cases 
like Shallow Pond to draw conclusions about the suitability of a proposed counteracting 
consideration for the rescue principle.  As discussed in chapter two, this is a common, yet 
questionable, strategy of proponents of the famine-relief argument.  When it is suggested 
that a given consideration effectively counteracts the obligation to save a person in a 
famine-like case, Shallow Pond is then modified to incorporate that consideration.  
Someone might suggest that, in some situations in which the salient fact obtains, the 
presence of others who are better positioned to save the imperiled person would 
counteract my obligation to perform the rescue.  If, however, we populate a pond-like 
case with a couple of other passersby who are better positioned to help the drowning 
child, but who are neglecting to do so, we intuitively judge that the proposed 
consideration does not counteract the moral duty to save the child in the shallow pond 
case.  I will call this argumentative move an appeal to analogy.  
 
2.3 Appeals to analogy and skepticism of the will 
While in the last chapter I pointed out the limitations of appeals to analogy, here I 
want to argue that there is a way in which such appeals increase the forcefulness of the 
differentiation question through an appropriate kind of skepticism towards the moderate.  
The appeals to analogy strike many people as intuitively forceful and I want to identify a 
sense in which such intuitions are right.  
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The popularity of appeals to analogy would be explained by a popular assumption 
that a given factor makes the same difference everywhere if it makes that difference 
anywhere.  Shelly Kagan argues that this “ubiquity thesis,” as he calls it, is supported by 
the attractive but dubious assumptions that (a) “the status of the act is the net balance or 
sum which is the result of adding up the separate positive and negative effects of the 
individual factors” (the “additive assumption”), and that (b) “variations in the other 
factors will not affect the contribution made by the factor in question” (this is the denial 
of Kamm’s Principle of Contextual Interaction, mentioned previously) (Kagan 1988).  
Since these assumptions are so questionable, Kagan’s explanation would seem to debunk 
the appeals to analogy.  This debunking explanation seems particularly plausible when 
appeals to analogy are offered as demonstrations of the general moral insignificance of a 
given factor.   
It is tempting, therefore, to reject all of the appeals analogies as sophistry aimed at 
persuading critics of the famine-relief argument to concede more than they really should.  
However, there is also a non-debunking explanation.  We can alternatively view such 
appeals as exploiting a plausible extension to the universality requirement of reasons, or 
of judgments about reasons.  A plausible version of this requirement of reason finds 
universality in the very concept of a reason: “the claim that X is a reason for one person 
to do A entails the claim that it is also a reason for anyone else whose circumstances are 
similar in relevant respects” (Scanlon 2003c: 177-8).  Similarly, the claim that some 
factor counteracts someone’s duty to perform a rescue might plausibly be thought to 
entail the claim that the same factor would counteract the duty of anyone else whose 
circumstances are similar in relevant respects.  The claim that a given factor counteracts 
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the presumptive duty in one case in which the salient fact obtains entails the claim that 
the same factor counteracts the presumptive duty across the range of relevantly similar 
cases.    
Insofar as this extension maintains the plausibility of the universality requirement 
of reasons, it shows very little.  In particular, it doesn’t show that a proposed 
countervailing consideration in Distant Rescue must also counteract the duty in Shallow 
Pond.  It is entirely possible that the pond-like cases typically aren’t “relevantly similar” 
to the famine-like cases.  So, even though we intuitively judge that the presence of others 
in a better position to help does not counteract the duty to rescue the drowning child in 
Shallow Pond, it can always be denied that Shallow Pond is relevantly similar to Distant 
Rescue.  
Such a denial of relevant similarity, however, shouldn’t be automatically granted. 
In particular, if we insist that the pond-like cases aren’t relevantly similar to the famine-
like cases, there is some pressure to say why this is so.  If we cannot explain why the 
cases aren’t relevantly similar, then the appeals to analogy reveal that we lack a 
principled way of determining when the proffered consideration counteracts a 
presumptive duty and when it doesn’t.  While this kind of inability may not be worrisome 
in some contexts, I think that it makes our attempts to offer counteracting considerations 
in the face of the salient fact worrisomely ad hoc.   
 Ad hoc proposals of counteracting considerations are worrisome in the face of the 
salient fact for two reasons.  First, such counteracting considerations are supposed to 
counteract a feature that is, when directly considered as described, intuitively significant: 
one could rescue someone from serious peril at a small cost to oneself.  Second, these 
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counteracting considerations create permissions that typically favor those who propose 
them.  As the differentiation question shows, without some such proposal for limiting 
obligations in the face of the salient fact, the demanding conclusion follows.  That 
conclusion, as I will later argue, means that morality threatens to make demands that 
many of us would be unwilling to meet.  So, although a counteracting consideration must 
only counteract the salient fact in relevantly similar circumstances, I am suggesting that 
appeals to analogy can sometimes show that our denials of relevant similarity are ad hoc, 
and worrisomely so given the intuitive significance of the salient fact and the moderate 
suspicion we should have towards proposals that advantage ourselves.  To answer in a 
satisfying way the concerns raised by appeals to analogy, we need to specify a 
counteracting consideration that answers to the intuitive significance of the salient fact, 
that avoids licensing morally wrong inaction, and that does not rely on an ad hoc 
application to certain cases but not to others.   
 The difficulty of finding a compelling counteracting consideration is well attested 
in the literature that addresses the famine-relief argument, some of which I will consider 
in the next chapter.  Many differences separate pond-like cases from famine-like cases, 
and many counteracting factors have been proposed.  Still, even if no single proposal is 
of itself satisfactorily plausible, the moderate might take comfort in the thought that some 
suitable counteracting consideration, or set thereof, is bound to exist.  This insistence, 
however, would be awkward.  The awkwardness would be similar to that of insisting that 
I have an excuse for my behavior, but that I just can’t figure out what that excuse is.  If 
the moderate is unable to specify the counteracting considerations, then respect for the 
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significance of the salient fact and a modest suspicion of motive should provoke some 
moral discomfort.  
 
2.4 Side-stepping the empirical challenge 
The denial of the demanding conclusion serves the interests of the one who 
occupies the position of the prospective beneficiary in Distant Rescue.  This adds to our 
suspicions of the moderate’s motives, which in turn pressures the moderate to answer the 
differentiation question.  Distant Rescue, however, is a merely hypothetical scenario.  
Critics of humanitarian aid efforts cast doubts upon their effectiveness and raise concerns 
about their unintended consequences.  It is difficult to believe, moreover, that each small 
individual contribution serves to rescue someone or other.  Mindful of such things, the 
moderate may not feel threatened by the realization of a case like Distant Rescue when 
resisting the demanding conclusion.  Skepticism towards that resistance may therefore be 
undermined by the purely hypothetical status of Distant Rescue.   
The moderate’s motivation to resist the demanding conclusion, however, doesn’t 
depend on conceding the likelihood of Distant Rescue.  The facts separating the supposed 
actual world from a world in which a famine-like case occurs are the sorts of facts that 
might change, or which we can readily imagine being different.  The moderate can 
imagine discovering that Distant Rescue is far likelier than was formerly thought, or that 
the relevant facts have suddenly changed.  It is easy to imagine, for example, discovering 
that there are many millions of seriously imperiled people overseas.  We can further 
imagine that the Gates Foundation unveils tomorrow the creation of an organization of 
Heroes for Hamiltons to meet the needs of these people.   
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The first question to ask is whether these changes would so dramatically change 
the moral facts about what individuals are required to do.  That I don’t think so doesn’t, 
at least to me, seem to be determined by my assessment of whether or not the 
hypothetical changes are a live possibility.  More relevant, it seems, is my sense that the 
supposed changes in the empirical facts are not the sorts of changes that should effect 
such a dramatic change in my moral duties.  My thought seems to be that, if I am not 
obligated now, then I shouldn’t suddenly be so obligated after the mere sort of change 
effected by the Gates Foundation.   
The mere conceptual possibility that my moral duties could be so dramatically 
altered by these sorts of changes is disquieting.  If one’s moral situation is so dramatically 
altered by such considerations, then acknowledging this may perhaps be enough to make 
one lose one’s sense of security against such threats of demandingness generally.  One’s 
moral situation may seem too vulnerable to the wrong kinds of contingencies, even if the 
particular hypothetical contingency we have used to show this isn’t likely to obtain.   
Moreover, even if I think that I am not presently confronted by any famine-like 
case, I can make plans for what I would do if I were, or if I should suddenly learn that I 
am continually confronted by the salient fact.  The force of these considerations about 
planning is clearest when I engage in first-personal inquiry.  Let me therefore present a 
line of such inquiry that I expect will be shareable by others who are both attracted to the 
moderate position and earnest about the demands of morality.   
I first realize that I can plan out what to do if confronted by Distant Rescue.  
Earnest about the demands of morality, I don’t want to plan to do that which I believe to 
be, or even suspect to be, morally wrong, since to plan to do what is morally wrong is a 
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particularly bad kind of moral failing.  On the one hand, it is unlike those failures that I 
can relegate to my past, and of which, as an earnest moral agent, I can come to terms with 
through remorse, a new commitment to doing what is right, and perhaps some 
compensatory behavior.  On the other hand, it is also a failure that belongs to the merely 
foreseeable future, for which I might say with a shrug, “Try as I may, I sometimes fail.”  
When I refuse to intend to fulfill my moral duties, this is a present refusal to adjust my 
inappropriate attitudes.  To concede such a failure is to actively perpetuate it.  
So, if I accept the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue, then I must either 
refuse to plan what to do should such a case arise, or I must plan to comply with the 
demanding conclusion in that case.  When I consider doing the latter, I discover it to be 
very difficult.  I find it difficult to say, as a statement of intention, that I will comply with 
the demanding conclusion should certain contingent facts suddenly change.  
Possibly, my resistance to forming such a plan is appropriate.  I may resist such a 
plan because I doubt that the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue is correct.  That is, 
my doubts about the demanding conclusion in such a case may explain my resistance to 
it.  Similarly, I would resist the demand to mow my neighbor’s lawn should he leave on a 
vacation because I doubt the legitimacy of such a demand.  However, the order of 
explanation may be the reverse.  I might resist accepting the demanding conclusion in 
Distant Rescue because of my difficulty in adopting a plan to comply with it should such 
a case arise. 
The latter explanation is disconcertingly plausible.  In the lawn-mowing case, I 
can imagine the conditions under which I would change my mind and adopt the plan to 
mow my neighbor’s lawn.  Often, when I am unwilling to do something, I can identify 
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conditions under which I would become willing.  This doesn’t happen when I think about 
the demanding conclusion, where my unwillingness to comply is remarkably robust.  
That unwillingness persists under a wide variety of conditions, and under a wide variety 
of cases in which the salient fact persistently obtains.  Whenever the salient fact 
persistently obtains, it is difficult for me to specify any further conditions under which I 
would be willing to plan to comply with the demanding conclusion.  This suggests either 
that my grounds for doubting the demanding conclusion are robust in the same way, or 
that it is deeply entrenched unwillingness to comply with the demanding conclusion 
under that broad range of cases that is driving my doubts about that conclusion.  
To show that it isn’t my own unwillingness to comply with the demanding 
conclusion that is driving my resistance to it under such a broad range of cases, I might 
try to provide a case in which I would be willing to comply with a similarly demanding 
conclusion on behalf of the needs of strangers.  Failing that, I might try to show that I 
have grounds for doubting that conclusion under the broad range of cases in which I 
resist the demanding conclusion.  Whether or not I can do this will depend in part on the 
breadth of that range.  These grounds will have to justify my resistance to the demanding 
conclusion not only in Distant Rescue, but also in all of the other variants in which I 
likewise resist the conclusion.  So here again, appeals to cases that are in this way 
analogous to Distant Rescue provide legitimate challenges.   
The challenge of planning is one that I place upon myself.  (Pitching it to others 
provides a sense to Singer’s idea that his famine-relief argument presents an ad hominem 
challenge.)  I might think that I can evade the challenge by simply refusing to plan what I 
will do if famine-like cases should arise.  If, however, my refusal to so plan is motivated 
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by my desire to avoid this challenge, then I can no longer say that I am making a good-
faith inquiry into my attraction to the moderate position.27  Inasmuch as making this 
good-faith inquiry is a part of what it means to be earnest about the demands of morality 
in approaching the differentiation question, this is not an option I can take.  I must instead 
answer the differentiation question in a way that reveals a justification for refusing to 
form the intention to comply with the demanding conclusion not only in Distant Rescue, 
but also in a range of analogous cases where I similarly resist forming an intention to 
comply.  Failing this will make it all too plausible that my attraction to the moderate 
position is better explained by a fundamental unwillingness to comply with the kinds of 
demands that the rescue principle might generate.   
 
2.5 Taking stock 
 In this chapter I have extracted a challenge posed by the famine-relief argument.  
This challenge is the task facing the moderate of providing a plausible response to the 
differentiation question.  My argument for why this task is particularly pressing for the 
moderate follows the pattern of Singer’s own argument without crossing the limitations 
of that argument identified in chapter two.  I proposed a general duty-specifying 
principle, but one whose plausibility does not depend on meeting the grounding challenge 
through a defense of the sorts of purported fundamental features of morality that Singer’s 
principles require.  Following Singer, I also used appeals to analogy, but I avoided the 
                                                
27 I might alternatively say that my refusal to plan what to do in Distant Rescue is motivated by the 
difficulty of determining whether or not the demanding conclusion is correct in such a case.  Such a 
difficulty, however, arises because it is difficult to either affirm or reject the demanding conclusion in such 
a case.  So, the question just shifts to why I think it is difficult to either affirm or reject the demanding 
conclusion in such cases.  The debunking explanation of why I think this has just as much force so long as I 
cannot better explain my resistance to affirming the demanding conclusion in such cases.  As previously 
discussed, I cannot escape by simply saying that I might have good grounds for resisting the demanding 
conclusion in such cases, despite my inability to identify those grounds.  
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disanalogy challenge by giving such appeals a role that avoids violation of the Principle 
of Contextual Interaction.  I implicitly addressed the methodological challenge by raising 
skeptical concerns I raised about the moderate’s motivations.  Such skeptical concerns 
target the moderate’s resistance to the demanding conclusion, suggesting a way to 
debunk the counterintuitive force of that conclusion.  Finally, I side-stepped the empirical 
challenge by treating the famine-like cases as purely hypothetical, suggesting how their 
mere proximity to the actual world can still plausibly motivate the moderate’s position.   
 My results, of course, are more modest than those sought by either Singer or 
Unger.  I don’t draw any shockingly demanding conclusion about what we as individuals 
are morally required to do presently.  I don’t even draw the demanding conclusion for the 
hypothetical famine-like cases.  I have rather identified what I take to be the central 
philosophical challenge presented by the famine-relief argument.   
 
3. ARE WE COMMITTING SOME FALLACY? 
 
In presenting and pressing this philosophical challenge there is room for suspicion 
that I have fostered some kind of fallacy, rendering foolish my further efforts to answer 
that question.  A prominent worry is that there is something deceptive in the way that I 
have treated our opportunities to rescue others in the famine-like cases.  I have treated 
them as so many individual cases in which one can rescue imperiled individuals, by 
individual actions, each of which requires only a small sacrifice.  I may be inducing error 
when I regard these opportunities as discrete and sequential events.  Three versions of 
this worry are worth considering.  
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3.1 Iterating what we should aggregate? 
The first version of the worry concerns Garrett Cullity’s distinction between 
iteration and aggregation.  To introduce this distinction, consider how David Lewis 
describes how we arrive at the shockingly demanding conclusion: 
An argument that is cogent once is cogent twice over.  If indeed it is seriously 
wrong not to save the life of one distant child…then why is it not equally wrong 
not to save the life of the next distant child? And the next, and the next…?  There 
is nothing to shut the argument off after you have saved one life.  Or after you 
have sent [the funds] to save many lives….When you have so little left that it 
becomes doubtful whether you can live to give again another day, then the 
argument shuts off.  But only then. (2000: 154) 
 
Cullity sees the “iterative approach” in this form of reasoning:  
The iterative approach uses the following method to derive a conclusion 
concerning what an agent is morally required to do when presented with more 
than one person in extreme need: begin with what you would have been required 
to do for a single needy person, then iterate this for every other. (1996: 61-2; 
compare 1995: 194) 
 
By “the iterative approach,” Cullity seems to have in mind two distinct ideas.  First, he 
seems to mean an approach whereby the question of whether or not one is morally 
required to act on behalf of an imperiled person is determined solely by the costs to the 
rescuer of helping that particular person.  If those costs are really low, then you are 
presumably required to help.  So, even when there are numerous such opportunities to 
help, you will presumably be required to help each time until you are so impoverished 
that giving even a few dollars would be, of itself, a significant sacrifice to you.  What gets 
left out on this approach, or what is assumed to be insignificant, is any consideration of 
the cumulative costs of helping many such persons, including the sacrifices you have 
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already made, or of the sacrifices you might have to make in compliance with one’s 
duties so assessed.28 
 So understood, the iterative approach supports the demanding conclusion in a 
dubious way.  Such an approach simply assumes that the cumulative costs of your acting 
similarly (or even of your having already acted similarly) do not bear on the question of 
whether or not your are required to act so on a particular occasion—except if past costs 
have impoverished you to the point where an otherwise small additional cost becomes 
sufficiently dear to you.  This is to disregard without argument sources of potentially 
counteracting considerations, considerations that may well be at least as forceful as any 
others.  David Schmidtz rightly criticizes those who adopt this approach as considering 
only “Token-Costs” while negligently disregarding “Type-Costs” (2000: 691-93). 
 On a second interpretation, the iterative approach is simply the denial of the 
“aggregative approach,” and, strangely, the alternative to it.29  According to Cullity, the 
                                                
28 This interpretation is clearest when Cullity speaks of the iterative approach as one in which “[n]ot 
making [another contribution] will be wrong provided only that, considered in isolation (that is, apart from 
any contributions I have already made), not making it remains comparable to the direct and unextenuated 
failure to save a life” (2003: 413), and when Brad Hooker describes it like this: “If personal sacrifice is 
assessed iteratively, then a rule requiring you to help others in great need when this involves modest 
personal sacrifice would require you to help another in great need whenever the sacrifice involved in 
helping on that particular occasion is relatively little” (Hooker 1999: 180).  Cullity also describes the 
approach as “holding that, for each needy person, it would be wrong for me not to help unless the cost of 
helping that person is large” (Cullity 1996: 59), or to involve “treating each person I could contribute 
towards helping as though he were the only person needing help” (2004: 173).  
 
29 Cullity writes, “The issue is not whether the cost to the agent of helping is an appropriately 
countervailing consideration in relation to beneficence. It is whether we should think of the cost to the 
agent iteratively or aggregatively” (2004: 87); also: “The alternative [to the iterative approach] is to take 
what I call the ‘aggregative approach.’ This denies what the iterative approach asserts….” (2003: 413).   
More significantly, the idea that these two approaches are our only (plausible) choices is also implicit in 
Cullity’s form of argument: since the iterative approach leads to absurdity, we are justified in adopting the 
aggregative approach instead: “Part I has defended the life-saving analogy, but has shown that an iterative 
approach to it yields the Extreme Demand. Part II has shown that the Extreme Demand must be rejected. 
Together, then, they give us an argument for adopting the other possible approach to the life-saving 
analogy: an aggregative approach” (2004: 173).  (My observations about the two distinct senses of the 
iterative approach therefore undermine Cullity’s central argument.  Even if he can show that the iterative 
approach—under the first interpretation—leads to absurdity, this doesn’t justify that we should instead take 
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aggregative approach instructs us to “begin instead by assessing the magnitude of the 
overall collective need of the people who could be helped, then ask directly what overall 
sacrifice can be morally demanded of you in response to that collective need” (1996: 61-
62); on this approach, “we should ask not about the size of the sacrifice I need to make to 
save each person, but about the size of the aggregate sacrifice that would be involved in 
helping them collectively” (2003: 413).  Significantly, Cullity interprets the aggregative 
approach as “suggesting, in effect, that we should lump together all of the people I could 
contribute to helping, and ask what I should be prepared to do for this collective entity” 
(2004: 86). 
 Since, on the second interpretation, the iterative approach is simply the denial of 
the aggregative approach, it is clearly a mistake to equate the two interpretations of the 
iterative approach.  To equate them would mean that the only alternative to thinking only 
in terms of overall needs and overall sacrifices is to consider only the costs of helping one 
particular person on one particular occasion.  In other words, I must choose between 
thinking as if the person whom I might help is the only person I might help, and 
disregarding the fact that the cost to me of rescuing another person remains very small.  
There are, however, two potentially relevant considerations here and there is no obvious 
reason why I cannot keep my eye on them both.  Put generally, the two considerations are 
(a) the cost to me of helping on the one occasion, and (b) the accumulating (or 
accumulated) cost to me of acting similarly (or of having acted similarly) on similar 
occasions.  I see no reason why we cannot bear in mind both the fact that I can rescue 
another individual at a small cost to myself while nevertheless remaining open to the 
                                                                                                                                            
the aggregative approach to assessing costs/duties, especially when the aggregative approach is 
characterized so distinctively.) 
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possibility that the cumulative costs of rescuing others (or of having had rescued others) 
can directly weigh into the question of how I am required to respond.   
Keeping in mind both considerations is exactly what my framing of the challenge 
allows us to do.  The rescue principle would have us keep our eyes on the salient fact 
(that I can rescue another individual at a small cost to myself), while remaining open to 
whether the accumulating costs of similar sacrifices figure in as (or to) a counteracting 
consideration.   
Of course, although we should leave it as a possibility that facts about what I have 
already sacrificed, or by the expected cumulative costs to me of acting similarly on 
similar occasions, counteract the obligation to respond to the salient fact, we would want 
an argument for this.  It isn’t easy to see how such an argument might go.  Such an 
argument would need to explain how that fact about the accumulating costs could carry 
sufficient force.  Cullity expresses the difficulty this way: 
Why should my failure to save the hundred-and-first, or the thousand-and-first 
person be any more excusable than my failure to save the first, if the cost remains 
trifling compared to what is at stake for that person?  My having already saved a 
thousand lives does nothing to alter the fact that I could save this person at an 
insignificant cost. (1996: 565) 
 
The task of answering this question remains hard even though it doesn’t yet force us to 
say, with Lewis, that “[t]here is nothing to shut the argument off after you have saved one 
life.  Or after you have sent [the funds] to save many lives.” Therefore, we can affirm the 
legitimate challenge without assuming the dubious version of the iterative approach. 
 
3.2 A Sorites paradox?  
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The second version of the worry is the suspicion that the challenge prompts us to 
engage in a form of reasoning that generates a sort of Sorites paradox.30  The Sorites 
paradox arises in cases in which a given property and its negation are connected by a 
continuum of incremental differences, each of which is seemingly trivial (e.g., the 
difference of losing a single hair), and, as a consequence of their triviality, no particular 
one of these incremental differences appears able to sustain the distinction between the 
property and its negation.  As a result, there is no point at which we can plausibly say the 
property arises.  Similarly, by conceiving of what we might be required to do on behalf of 
others on a continuum of small increments (from giving nothing to giving nearly all that I 
possess, in $10 increments), it should be similarly difficult to say precisely where we 
should draw the line between obligation and supererogation.  Wherever we try to draw 
that line, we might always ask, “Why not $10 more, or less?”  It is understandable, then, 
to think that, in thinking of the problem in this way, we have set ourselves an impossible 
task. 
It is not only the size of the required sacrifice that can be placed on a paradox-
inducing continuum.  We might also be able to think of the two kinds of rescue cases 
(Shallow Pond and Distant Rescue) as standing on a continuum separated by many 
incremental and seemingly trivial differences.31  In this way, then, the challenge of saying 
what exactly is supposed to constitute the morally significant difference between the two 
cases might seem like a task for which there can be no satisfactory answer.   
                                                
30 The Sorites paradox is discussed in relation to the famine-relief argument in Fishkin 1982: 54-59, 
Feinberg 1984: 64-65, and Cullity 2004: 176-77.  Mothersill attributes this kind of reasoning to Shelly 
Kagan in his arguments for demanding conclusions (1993: 542-43).   
 
31 Kamm sees this strategy at work in Unger’s arguments (2007: 199).  
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The mistake here, however, is to assume that the answer we are expecting is to be 
given in terms of a precise dollar amount, or in terms of an exact number of individuals 
we are required to save, or in terms of a single simple feature grounding the moral 
differences between the two types of rescue cases.  I make no such assumptions.  The 
challenge of identifying a counteracting consideration, or set thereof, that will block the 
rescue principle from becoming shockingly demanding does not require that the 
counteracting consideration be any simple feature distinguishing Distant Rescue from 
Shallow Pond, nor does it require us to specify a precise point at which we no longer 
have to go on saving the lives of distant strangers.  Where the duty ends and when a 
consideration comes to counteract the presumptive duty may be vague matters.  
If, moreover, in Distant Rescue there is pressure against drawing the line of duty 
at any precise number of lives to be saved or dollars to be donated, it has at least as much 
to do with the fact that giving just a little bit more money would rescue another person’s 
life.  Unlike the typical cases of the Sorites paradox, what counts against drawing a line is 
not simply the apparent arbitrariness of drawing the line in one place rather than another, 
whether the difference between these two alternatives is so seemingly trivial, but that an 
additional life can be saved if one gives just $10 more.  
 
3.3 Like the paradox of the self-torturer? 
  The third related worry is that the form of the challenge is structurally similar to 
the conundrum facing Warren Quinn’s self-torturer.  Here is Quinn’s scenario.  
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The Self-Torturer:32 Suppose that there is a medical device that enables doctors to 
apply electric current to the body in increments so tiny that the patient cannot feel 
them.  The device has 1001 settings: 0 (off) and 1 … 1000.  Suppose someone 
(call him the self-torturer) agrees to have the device, in some conveniently 
portable form, attached to him in return for the following conditions: The device 
is initially set at 0.  At the start of each week he is allowed a period of free 
experimentation in which he may try out and compare different settings, after 
which the dial is returned to its previous position.  At any other time, he has only 
two options—to stay put or to advance the dial one setting.  But he may advance 
only one step each week, and he may never retreat.  At each advance he gets 
$10,000….The trouble is that there are noticeable differences in comfort between 
settings that are sufficiently far apart. Indeed, if he keeps advancing, he can see 
that he will eventually reach settings that will be so painful that he would then 
gladly relinquish his fortune and return to 0. (Quinn 1990)     
 
The self-torturer’s predicament is that he can foresee a series of decisions which, when 
considered one-by-one, will foreseeably lead to an outcome that the self-torturer has very 
strong reason to avoid.  The difficulty, however, is that there nevertheless appear to be 
good reasons to consider each new decision individually.  This predicament seems 
similar to our own decisions when facing Distant Rescue.  Although I foresee that the 
cumulative consequence of my continued contributions will be shockingly burdensome, 
there nevertheless appear to be quite compelling reasons to donate each additional $10.  
The difficulty here, moreover, clearly cannot be attributed to the iterative approach 
described above.  Each individual decision still seems to be appropriate despite the self-
torturer’s continuous recognition of their cumulative costs.  
 If the self-torturer doesn’t stop himself somewhere before the end of the series, he 
will end up having done something that is against his own self-interest.  This is peculiar 
because every individual decision he would have made up to that point was seemingly in 
his own self-interest.  The suggested parallel might be this: if, in $10 increments, I end up 
                                                
32 While I borrow the term “torturer” here, it is arguably misplaced.  Torture doesn’t just involve the 
infliction of pain, but also a specific relationship between the torturer and the tortured—which doesn’t 
obtain in the case described.  
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giving all of the money that I can to Heroes for Hamiltons, then I will have ended up 
doing something that is well beyond what is morally required; this is peculiar because 
each particular donation seemed to have been morally required.   
 I have two reservations about this suggested analogy.  First, although it is 
apparent that the self-torturer would have cumulatively done something against his own 
self-interest, it is not as apparent that I would have done beyond what is morally required 
of me in giving away all of my money to Heroes for Hamiltons.  If I can be morally 
required to save one person for $10, then perhaps I really can be morally required to save 
n persons for $(10 x n), at least up to the point at which an additional $10 becomes 
extremely dear to me.   
To circumvent this first reservation, it might therefore be helpful to merge the two 
scenarios, so that the cumulative cost to me is not primarily financial.  Suppose that I 
wear a device very similar to that of the self-torturer, and that only by the click of the dial 
I can rescue another person (we should also stipulate that this is the only way these 
people can be saved and that this is the only benefit I can get from turning the dial).  Am 
I morally required to “torture” myself for the sake of saving 1000 imperiled persons?   
Suppose that the difference between no electrical shock and a continually “tortuous” 
electrical shock can be bridged by only 20 increments, where the difference between 
adjacent increments to me is still trivial.33  Can it be that I am morally required to inflict 
continuous agonizing pain upon myself for the sake of saving 20 imperiled people?  
Since I find it much easier to judge that I would not be morally required, we here have a 
                                                
33 There is nothing conceptually impossible about this, or at least not obviously.  Larry Temkin (1986) 
considers the case of color perception. Borrowing that comparison, we might notice that relatively few 
paint chips may be needed to bridge the gap between a lovely shade of green and a truly awful one such 
that any perceived difference between any two adjacent chips is trivial.  This feature of color perception, of 
course, might not be shared in the experience of pain.  
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case that might provide instructive similarities connecting the Self-Torturer to Heroes for 
Hamiltons.  Call this new case the Beneficent Self-Torturer. 
My second reservation about the suggested parallel is that, in the original Self-
Torturer case, the cumulative result of his actions threatens to be self-defeating.  That the 
cumulative effects of the self-interest action would be against the agent’s self-interest 
suggests irrationality.  By allowing the agent to turn back the dial for a sufficiently high 
price, we can turn the agent into a money pump.  In the Beneficent Self-Torturer and in 
Distant Rescue, there is no similar suggestion of self-defeat or irrationality.  There is, for 
example, no sense in which the cumulative effect of my individual donations puts me in a 
place such that I am now morally required to try to take back all that I have donated.  It is 
doubtful that I would even be morally permitted to take anything back.   
On account of this remaining difference between the Self-Torturer and the 
Beneficent Self-Torturer, I find it less convincing that the cumulative cost to me of my 
donations reveals that there must be something defective about the judgment that each of 
the individual donations is morally required.  That is, the mere fact that I would not be 
required to turn the dial from zero to 20 to save 20 people does not show that I would not 
be required to perform each of a series of actions that cumulatively have the equivalent 
consequences both to myself and to the twenty.  While there may be something surprising 
about this (particularly since there don’t seem to be any reasons that favor advancing the 
dial incrementally rather than all at once), it doesn’t, at least in any obvious way, involve 
any self-defeat or irrationality.  
Despite these differences, Quinn’s Self-Torturer may instruct us in two ways.  
First, the Self-Torturer suggests that, at least in the pursuit of our own self-interest, in our 
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assessments about whether we should perform some particular action (to advance the dial 
by one setting) we seem to have a blind spot for facts about our past and potentially 
future actions, and for how such facts can even be relevant.  In the case of the Self-
Torturer, such facts clearly are relevant, but we continue to have a difficult time 
incorporating their significance into any particular decision.  This supports the suspicion 
that, in cases like Beneficent Self-Torturer and Distant Rescue, we may be affected by the 
same kind of blind spot.  So, even if facts about our past and potentially future financial 
contributions are directly relevant to the question of whether we should or must donate 
another $10, we might expect that the significance of these facts will be difficult for us to 
see and appreciate when posing the question this way.  Although we shouldn’t conclude 
that there is anything misguided about the challenge to find counteracting considerations 
to keep the rescue principle from generating shockingly extreme demands in cases like 
Distant Rescue, Quinn’s Self-Torturer provides us with a reason for suspicion: we may 
have difficulty appreciating the counteracting force of our past and potentially future 
contributions. 
The second way in which Quinn’s Self-Torturer is instructive is this: even though 
in Beneficent Self-Torturer the series of individual advances of the dial are not self-
defeating, it is nevertheless quite plausible that the cumulative effect on the benefactor is 
so terrible that it couldn’t possibly be a sacrifice that morality effectively demands, even 
if this demand arises via a series of smaller requirements (the individually trivial 
sacrifices each of which rescues an imperiled person).  If, though, we so assess the 
Beneficent Self-Torturer, then however we should think about the counteracting 
consideration in that case may give us insight into how we should think about Distant 
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Rescue.  In the Beneficent Self-Torturer, the salient fact obtains.  If we can more 
confidently suppose that considerations of some sort prevent the rescue principle from 
demanding self-inflicted continuous electrical torture, then we can more confidently 
suppose two things: first that there is, at least in this case, a counteracting consideration 
for us to identify; and, second, that the counteracting consideration presumably has 
something to do with the way that costs of individual sacrifices accumulate for the 
beneficent agent (possibly in combination with other factors).  At least at some point, 
then, the cumulative cost of individual responses to the salient fact can become so great 
that this can limit the would-be benefactor’s obligation to respond to the salient fact 
(despite the individual cost of rescuing another individual person remaining trivial).    
Unless more can be said, however, these lessons would only discredit the 
assumption that the cumulative costs to me of acting, or having acted, similarly do not 
factor into the question of how I must respond to an individual opportunity to rescue 
another person at a small cost to myself.  That assumption, however, has already been 
dismissed.  We rejected it in rejecting what Cullity calls the iterative approach (under its 
first interpretation).   
Moreover, the remaining differences between the Beneficent Self-Torturer and 
Distant Rescue mean that it still remains unclear whether, in the latter case, the 
cumulative costs of responding to the salient fact can ever similarly limit what I must do 
in any individual decision about whether to rescue another person for $10.  At least when 
the costs to me are primarily financial, there is reason to think that, at least in some 
cases,34 most of what I posses can be required of me even to rescue a single stranger.  If 
                                                
34 Peter Unger’s “Bob’s Bugatti” (see p. 134 below) is a vivid example of a high-cost rescue scenario, 
where the person to be rescued is a stranger to the potential rescuee (1996: 135-36).  It may, of course, be 
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such cases show that even most of my personal fortune may have to be sacrificed in order 
to save one stranger, then it is less plausible that the accumulation of small dollar 
amounts sets a significant limit on my responses to the salient fact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
argued that we should separate off Bob’s Bugatti as a special sort of case, or that the kind of sacrifice 
required in Bob’s Bugatti is qualitatively different in important ways from the kind of standing obligation 
that threatens to arise in Heroes for Hamiltons (I pursue this line of thought in chapter 4, section 3.3).  
Other high-cost rescue scenarios are described in Rachels 1975: 79, Murphy 2000: 127, Hershenov 2002: 
277, Ashford 2003: 274.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE POND QUESTION AND THE FAMINE QUESTION 
 
 
 
 In chapter three I presented the differentiation question and I explained why the 
moderate is under pressure to find a plausible answer to it.  In this chapter I consider what 
it is that makes such an answer so difficult to provide.  Though proposed answers to the 
question are many and diverse, they all tend to generate dissatisfaction of one kind or 
another.  Clarifying the difficulties provides guidance, both for constructing a more 
promising answer to the differentiation question and for acknowledging the kinds of 
dissatisfaction that are, for the moderate, inevitable.  
 Given a standing opportunity to rescue others in Distant Rescue, the moderate is 
committed to this: I must rescue the imperiled person in Shallow Pond even when I am 
not required to perform a rescue through Heroes for Hamiltons (the aid organization of 
Distant Rescue).  The differentiation question asks why.  As such, the differentiation 
question is a conjunction of two component questions, which I will call the pond question 
and the famine question: 
Pond question: Why must I rescue the person who would perish for want of my 
action in Shallow Pond? 
Famine question: Why don’t I have to rescue anyone else through Heroes for 
Hamiltons? 
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The differentiation question’s difficulties can be seen in the way that answers to each of 
the component questions, which appear fitting (at least apart from a certain angle), leave 
us in a poor position to answer the composite question.  In this chapter I will try to bear 
out this idea.  First I consider the seemingly fitting answers to the pond question and the 
famine question, and how such answers increase the difficulty of the differentiation 
question.  I then discuss how an aim to mitigate these tensions provides the moderate 
with guidance in answering to the differentiation question.  That guidance will allow us 
to propose the general shape of a promising moderate solution and to articulate the 
consequent challenges.   
 
1. THE POND QUESTION 
 
1.1 Sufficient answers and inappropriate additions 
 When considered on its own (and by this I mean specifically apart from the 
differentiation question), a seemingly fitting answer to the pond question would be 
something like this: I must rescue this person because he/she is perishing, and I can so 
easily rescue him/her.  That is, a seemingly appropriate answer will point to something 
close to the salient fact.35  Put another way, we can say that, in the context of the Shallow 
                                                
35 It might be thought that there is a crucial difference between the salient fact and the suggested answer to 
the pond question: in the answer to the pond question, the demonstrative “this” picks out a specific person, 
whereas the salient fact obtains so long as someone or other gets rescued if I donate $10 to Heroes for 
Hamiltons—and, if I refuse to perform the rescue, no particular person perishes who would otherwise be 
saved.  Caspar Hare provides a helpful discussion of this distinction in “Obligations to Merely Statistical 
People” (forthcoming), tentatively concluding that if the distinction does matter, it doesn’t matter very 
much.  For what it is worth, my own intuitions are that my obligations do not change when we modify 
either Shallow Pond or the operations of Heroes for Hamiltons so as to eliminate this difference.  (Imagine, 
for example, that there are many imperiled people in the pond, and I only have the opportunity to rescue 
someone or other—and who it is who would be rescued by my action isn’t determined.  Alternatively, we 
can imagine that, after I open a tab on the donation page of Heroes for Hamilton’s website, the website 
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Pond, and of pond-like cases generally, one need look no further than the salient fact to 
discover that one is obligated to perform the rescue.  Plausibly this is because under such 
conditions the salient fact is a sufficient condition for the duty.  That is, given the 
circumstances that constitute a pond-like case (whatever they are) the fact that I can 
rescue the imperiled person at a small personal cost is sufficient to guarantee my duty to 
do so.  
 This apparent sufficiency of the salient fact is further evinced in attempts to 
answer the pond question that cite the both the salient fact and certain additional features.  
If I were to say that the reason I am obligated to rescue the child in Shallow Pond is that I 
can easily rescue her and she is imperiled through no fault of her own, then I seem to say 
too much.  Adding such additional information is not just unnecessary; it is inappropriate 
insofar as it suggests that I would not be so obligated if the child were drowning in the 
pond because of her own recklessness.  In the pond-like cases there is a sense in which it 
is inappropriate for me even consider whether the person is imperiled through some fault 
of her own.  The same is true for a wide range of further considerations I could 
conceivably contemplate in the pond-like case.  Facing such an emergency, it is 
                                                                                                                                            
generates a number, specifically for me, corresponding to a particular rescue candidate. If I close this tab 
before donating, that number gets shuffled to the bottom, nearly guaranteeing that the candidate won’t be 
rescued; if, on the other hand, I donate another ten dollars, the particular candidate will be rescued and I am 
promptly issued the number of a new rescue candidate.)   
Hare is inclined to grant some significance to the distinction inasmuch as he takes consolation in 
the fact that there is no one dead or seriously imperiled now who would have been rescued had he donated 
more money to charity.  He reports this consolation in the face of the simultaneous (supposed) fact that 
some distant person would (likely) have been rescued if he had donated more money (13-14).  I wonder if 
Hare’s consolation—or at least the plausibility of its legitimacy—isn’t in part due to an understandable 
fallacy: when I say to myself, “There isn’t anyone whom my donation would have benefitted,” it easy to 
take this to mean that my donation would not have benefitted anyone (i.e., my donation would not have 
made any positive and significant difference).  Contrary to Hare, moreover, it is not as if refusing to give 
more money “was just very, very slightly bad for each of a vast multitude of people” (14).  That Hare 
makes such a claim suggests that, in taking consolation, he temporarily loses sight of a more salient detail: 
that, by his own assumptions, giving more money would, in addition to being very slightly good for each of 
a vast multitude, likely have also been tremendously good for someone or other, saving such a person from 
sickness or death. 
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inappropriate to first consider why the child is imperiled in the pond, or whether or not 
rescuing such children might damage the socially important incentive for parents to be 
vigilant over the safety of their young ones, or whether or not I might be able to make up 
for letting this child drown by boosting my contributions to Oxfam, or to the Nature 
Conservancy.36  This suggests that many such further considerations, some of which 
provide tempting answers to the famine question, do not properly figure into the 
explanation of why I must rescue the imperiled person in the pond-like cases. 
 There are, then, two features here.  First, it appears to be entirely appropriate and 
sufficient to answer the pond question with the salient fact.  Second, additional 
considerations appended to the salient fact in answering the pond question are often 
inappropriate.  What is it that accounts for these features of the pond question?  A 
tempting answer is that the salient fact simply is sufficient to require me to act: since the 
salient fact requires me to act wherever it obtains, it explains why I must act in any 
particular case in which it obtains.  This is close to how James Fishkin understands the 
demandingness problems associated with the famine-relief argument.  According to 
Fishkin, we normally assume that “if [one] can save a human life at minor cost, [one is] 
obligated to do so” (1982: 3, 65), with the problem, of course, that the salient fact also 
obtains in the famine-like cases, whose occurrence, or possibility of occurrence, may also 
be “normal.”  
   
                                                
36 Douglas Odegard and Paul Gomberg draw attention to these observations (Odegard 1989: 81-2, 
Gomberg 2002).  Noting the asymmetry with the sorts of considerations we take to be relevant to famine-
like cases, Gomberg offers this as evidence that it is a mistake to suppose commonality in our reasons to 
respond to emergency cases like Shallow Pond and our reasons to respond to distant poverty (2002: 37-40).  
Nigel Dower suggests that Peter Singer’s own argument, and perhaps utilitarianism generally, provides “the 
wrong kind of reason” for rescue, “by making this care impersonal because it is simply a contingent means 
towards maximizing the good, or…of preventing evils….” (2003: 647).  
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1.2 Avoiding Fishkin’s inference 
 If Fishkin is right, and the assumption he ascribes to us is correct, then the 
demanding conclusion cannot be plausibly avoided.  If Fishkin is right, but the 
assumption he ascribes to us is incorrect, then the moderate should not only explain why 
the imputed assumption is incorrect but also explain the widespread error.  I see no 
reason, however, why the moderate should think that Fishkin is right.  What Fishkin 
interprets as a general assumption may rather be this more restricted one: for pond-like 
cases we generally assume that if I can save a life at minor cost, then I am obligated to do 
so.  Or, as I put it before: in the context of pond-like cases, the salient fact is, and is 
generally assumed to be, sufficient to show that I have a duty to perform the rescue.  The 
moderate needn’t grapple with Fishkin’s more general assumption if it can just be 
explained why the salient fact seems to be a fitting and sufficient answer to the pond 
question, and why it is that it often seems inappropriate to append further considerations 
to such an answer. 
One alternative explanation, tempting to the moderate, is to appeal to the urgency 
of the pond-like cases, or to say that in such cases the factors that might counteract the 
presumptive duty to perform the rescue are so unlikely that it is inappropriate even to 
look for them when considering what one should do.  Consider first the urgency factor.  It 
might be thought that the inappropriateness of adding further considerations to the salient 
fact is due to the special urgency often associated with pond-like cases.37  The Shallow 
                                                
37 On the association with urgency, Murphy’s remark is typical: “What we can call rescue situations are, 
paradigmatically, sudden, unexpected, serious harm-threatening emergencies that arise in the agent’s 
immediate vicinity: the standard example is that of being easily able to save a child from drowning in a 
shallow pond” (2000: 127).  A.I. Cohen (2005) proposes the feature of emergency is “a key, morally 
relevant difference between babies drowning at our feet and distant peoples suffering from hunger.”  
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Pond is an emergency that calls for immediate action. Since there is no time to weigh the 
various particulars of the situation, considering various factors beyond the salient fact is 
inappropriate. 
This urgency-based explanation of the fitting answers to the pond question loses 
its appeal, however, when we consider pond-like cases prospectively and retrospectively.  
We can regard Shallow Pond as a situation I might someday have to face, and therefore 
as a type of scenario for which I can develop a plan for what to do should the need arise.  
In the relaxed position of developing a plan, I readily concede that it would be good for 
me to at least be disposed to respond to such emergencies automatically, responding 
simply to the salient fact.  Erring on the safe side, I will be better able to fulfill any rescue 
duty that I do encounter at the tolerable risk of possibly performing a small-sacrifice 
rescue even when I am not morally required to do so.  This, however, is a dubious 
explanation of why I should be disposed to respond automatically to the pond-like case 
emergencies.  It allows that in some pond-like cases I am not in fact required to perform 
the rescue.   
Looking at the Shallow Pond retrospectively this point becomes still clearer.  If I 
have earlier refused to rescue the drowning child, I do not think that, upon further 
investigation into the sorts of considerations listed earlier, it might turn out that my 
omission was permissible.  If it turns out, for example, that the child was in the shallow 
pond because of personal irresponsibility, I do not then judge that this made my omission 
permissible.  Such facts would not imply that I was morally lucky. 
This urgency-based explanation also overlooks the counterfactual possibility that 
my own deliberative capacities enable me to cultivate highly discriminating dispositions 
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concerning emergency rescue scenarios, so that, even if most people should settle with 
the ham-fisted disposition to automatically respond to all such emergencies, I am 
permitted to take a different approach, enabling me to both refuse to perform some pond-
like case rescues and rebut any criticism that I have acted wrongly, deliberated poorly, or 
that I possess any faulty dispositions.38 
The related explanation, that of saying that, in a world like ours, the presence of 
counteracting factors would be so unlikely in pond-like cases as to be appropriately 
disregarded, can first be illustrated.  In Shallow Pond, the presumptive duty to perform 
the rescue could plausibly be counteracted if it were also true that, as an unintended 
consequence, my action would serve to perpetuate the societal conditions that are to 
blame for numerous yearly fatalities.  Since, however, in the actual world it is so unlikely 
that pond-like case rescues have this side-effect, this is the kind of consideration which, 
when faced with a pond-like case, it is inappropriate for me to seriously consider.  Going 
down the list of considerations that the moderate is prone to entertaining when 
considering the corresponding famine question, we might similarly preclude each as 
inappropriate for pond-like cases in a world like ours, leaving me with a compelling 
reason to respond simply to the salient fact in a case like Shallow Pond.   
                                                
38 The urgency explanation is further challenged by non-emergency variants of Shallow Pond.  I might 
encounter someone in a remote wilderness who, though not currently experiencing intense, debilitating 
suffering, is going to do so next week, after which she will die.  I can easily intervene to save her, but I 
have at least a week to decide (whether I intervene immediately or later makes no difference to her).   
 Finally, it is difficult to understand why we should not regard Distant Rescue (or at least close 
variants of that case) as also involving the element of urgency.  The idea might be that, in Distant Rescue, a 
failure to send a donation just now isn’t urgent because a failure to send the donation right now will simply 
mean that a different imperiled person gets rescued if you send the donation later.  Since there is no reason 
to rescue one person rather than the other, there is no urgency to send the donation now. If, however, the 
assured later opportunity of someone else’s rescue can defeat the apparent urgency of the opportunity of 
rescue now, then it is unclear why the availability of Heroes for Hamiltons wouldn’t also defeat the 
apparent urgency in Shallow Pond (when combined with Distant Rescue): even if I don’t act in time to save 
the drowning person right in front of me, I can always donate more later to Heroes for Hamiltons.   
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On this type of explanation, the moderate is claiming that the pond-like cases 
differ from the famine-like cases in an important way: the pond-like cases, but not the 
famine-like ones, constitute the sorts of circumstances for which it is highly unlikely that 
there are any factors that counteract the presumptive duty to perform the rescue.  This 
difference could explain why we are inclined to answer the pond question as we are, 
considering it inappropriate to seriously regard the sorts of considerations that the 
moderate might suddenly take seriously in any famine-like case.   
This route seems promising for the way that it also suggests an answer to the 
famine question.  Our typical opportunities to support humanitarian efforts occasion 
strong doubts as to whether the salient fact even obtains.  As often as not, we learn that 
the relevant aid organizations must rely on unreliable intermediaries, and it is typically 
not true that my small individual donation will have any such significant effect on what a 
large and efficient international aid organization accomplishes.  Or, even if the salient 
fact isn’t in question, there are still legitimate concerns about the deleterious side-effects 
of international aid efforts generally, or of my donations to any one organization in 
particular.  We aren’t surprised to learn that well-intentioned disaster relief efforts end up 
serving corrupt or unsustainable local practices.  When I open my mailbox, it is difficult 
to resist the suspicion that my small donation just supports future advertisements, 
possibly drawing funds away from organizations seeking to provide long-term solutions, 
or to save the Atlantic bluefin tuna.  
So, in answering why I needn’t perform the rescue in Distant Rescue, the 
moderate would hope to identify some counteracting consideration in that case whose 
occurrence is also highly unlikely in the pond-like cases, thereby answering the 
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differentiation question.  This very hope, however, is threatened by Distant Rescue’s 
idealizations.  The idealized famine-like case with which our moderate must deal is 
constructed so as to preclude many of the sorts of factors that might plausibly block or 
reduce one’s obligations in the messier sorts of international aid opportunities usually 
encountered.  All such plausible suspicions about the salient fact or the presence of 
counteracting considerations are eliminated in Distant Rescue.  So, the suggested 
explanation of our answers to the pond question suggests a moderate strategy that is 
ultimately problematic.  Viewed generally, the problem is that the suggested solution 
relies heavily on facts about how the world is, or usually is, and these are the sorts of 
facts that can’t be counted on in the idealized cases that the moderate must ultimately 
confront in answering the differentiation challenge.39   
We began with the pond question, noticing that a simple appeal to the salient fact 
is a fitting and ordinarily sufficient answer.  Moreover, we noticed that answers that 
append further considerations to the salient fact often seem inappropriate.  The challenge 
for the moderate is to explain these observations without resorting to Fishkin’s idea that 
we problematically assume that the salient fact just is a sufficient condition for generating 
a duty to perform the rescue.  The last explanation we considered gained plausibility 
through its promise to also provide a compatible answer to the famine question, and 
therefore, the differentiation question. The problem, however, is that its suggested 
                                                
39 This is of course not problem for someone who accepts the demanding conclusion in highly idealized 
cases like Distant Rescue, only resisting the demanding conclusion in the arguably distinctive famine-like 
cases actually encountered.  Such a person may conclude that the moderate commits a fallacy when 
extending to the highly idealized cases her resistance to the demanding conclusion—resistance that is 
appropriate for the more familiar, actual cases.  On this view, the moderate commits a fallacy of over-
generalization.  Though this would not be a moderate position in my defined sense, it strikes me as a 
relatively attractive alternative, despite the concerns mentioned in chapter 3, section 2.4.  The attractiveness 
of this alternative, however, somewhat depends on the success or failure of my attempt to justify the more 
thoroughgoing rejection of the demanding conclusion.  
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answers are endemically threatened by the idealized cases with which our moderate must 
contend.    
Since the difficulty here concerns the suggested answer the famine question, I will 
now consider that question directly.  
 
2. THE FAMINE QUESTION 
 
The famine question asks why I am not similarly required to rescue a person 
through Heroes for Hamilton.  The answer here, I think, will need to be sensitive to the 
force of the salient fact.  The other factor that is likely to figure in centrally to the 
moderate’s answer is the potentially high cumulative cost of compliance, to the 
benefactor, of any requirement to so respond to the salient fact.  Call this factor the costs 
of repeated rescue.  The problem is that this factor fails to distinguish the pond-like cases 
from the famine-like cases.  So, while pointing to the costs of repeated rescue may seem 
to be the moderate’s most straightforward explanation for why one isn’t morally required 
to respond to the salient fact in Distant Rescue, the costs of repeated rescue fail to explain 
why we should treat Shallow Pond any differently.  It fails to explain why, in the face of 
Distant Rescue, the imperiled person in Shallow Pond isn’t to be regarded as just one 
other person who can be rescued at a very small cost to oneself.   
If, however, the costs of repeated rescue are most plausibly motivating the 
moderate to distinguish between Shallow Pond and Distant Rescue, then such costs will 
likely play a role in the most promising justifications for the moderate’s position.  
Attempts to defend the moderate’s position without appealing to the factor actually 
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motivating that position will tend to generate inadequate rationalizations of only some of 
the moderate’s judgments rather than justifications of them all.  
 
2.1 The centrality of the costs of repeated rescue 
To defend these conjectures I need to argue that the costs of repeated rescue are 
an important motivating factor in resisting the demanding conclusion.  In the last chapter 
I tried to spell out a sense in which the moderate is pressured by his or her own will to 
find a solution to the differentiation challenge.  These pressures arise in part because of 
the severe costs of repeated rescue arising if Distant Rescue obligates one to perform a 
rescue whenever Shallow Pond does.  There, my autobiographical descriptions of those 
pressures were meant to ground a measure of skepticism towards the moderate’s position.  
The high costs of repeated rescue plausibly explain, without in any obvious way 
justifying, the moderate’s insistence that Distant Rescue is relevantly different from 
Shallow Pond.  This ready availability of a potentially debunking explanation undermines 
the moderate’s optimism that there is, or must be, a yet-to-be-identified solution to the 
differentiation challenge.   
That potentially debunking explanation of the moderate’s position was supposed 
to show that, even if the moderate lacks other legitimate grounds for rejecting the 
demanding conclusion, the consideration of the costs of repeated rescue would continue 
to motivate that rejection.  My present aim is different.  Here I want to argue that insofar 
as the moderate’s position has promise, the costs of repeated rescue are in fact motivating 
that position.  I start by defending a modest claim about motivation: 
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Weak motivational claim: our40 resistance to the demanding conclusion is 
typically motivated by the perceived threat of the high costs of repeated rescue.   
 
 
2.2 The student’s progression of thought 
To support the weak motivational claim, we can begin by noting what is plausibly 
a common progression of thought when a student is first confronted with Singer’s 
famine-relief argument.  It is common, I take it, for students to provisionally concede that 
we have a duty to rescue another person when this can be done at a very small personal 
cost.  It is also common for students to concede that factors such as mere distance, or the 
number of other people involved, do not alter this duty.  What frequently triggers a 
change of mind is the realization that, in our present world, such a duty threatens to make 
shockingly great demands of us given the accumulating costs of having to perform many 
such rescues.  Once their minds are so changed, they are confronted with the task of 
explaining why one is not required to perform the rescues in the famine-like cases. 
This common progression of thought provides a sense in which perceived costs of 
repeated rescue often motivate the moderate’s efforts to answer the differentiation 
question.  This anecdotal story gains plausibility on five counts.  First, such a story might 
fit with one’s own self-examination into why one seeks a moderate position, or is at least 
tempted toward one.  Second, it fits well with how others have described their resistance 
                                                
40 A note about my use of the first-person plural.  I am trying to identify a plausible defense of the moderate 
position.  Since I sympathize with that position, and my project is to understand these sympathies, I find it 
helpful to argue from the first-person. As a condition on plausibility, I take it that the defense cannot rely 
on my own highly idiosyncratic judgments.  I therefore try to restrict my appeals to my own intuitive 
judgments to those which I expect will have broad appeal, and which will be shared by many others, and 
especially by those attracted to the moderate position.  For this reason I use the first-person plural.  If it 
turns out that these expectations are credibly disputed I might revise my claims to the first-person singular, 
and propose more modestly that I am seeking a moderate position that is defensible given the judgments 
that I, as someone who has given a lot of thought to these issues, find highly plausible and difficult to 
dismiss.  
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to the demanding conclusion.41  Third, given a person’s natural aversion to unexpected 
and surprisingly burdensome personal responsibilities, the threat of otherwise enormous 
costs of repeated rescue provokes the right kind of motivation.  Fourth, it would not be 
mysterious if the cumulative costs to an individual of compliance with a supposed moral 
principle is relevant to determining the legitimacy of the principle (compare, e.g., the 
mysterious proposal that the legitimacy of a moral principle is sensitive to the question of 
how compliance would affect the lunar landscape).  Fifth, there is the difficulty of finding 
any other promising answers to what is driving our resistance.  In resisting the famine-
relief argument and its implications, one might propose any number of factors other than 
the costs of repeated rescue to explain or to justify that resistance.  It is quite common, 
however, to discover that one’s resistance to the famine-relief argument and its 
implications outlives any commitment one has to such proposals.  
 
2.3 A normative lens 
The weak motivational claim doesn’t claim quite enough about the centrality of 
the threat of high cumulative costs of compliance in motivating resistance to the 
demanding conclusion.  I would like to suggest further that, if it were not for those high 
cumulative costs, the moderate would likely not feel the need to differentiate Distant 
Rescue from Shallow Pond in terms of moral obligations.  Consider, therefore, a stronger 
claim: 
Strong motivational claim: we would typically not be motivated to resist the 
demanding conclusion apart from the threat of the high costs of repeated rescue. 
 
                                                
41 For example, Herman 2000: 42.   
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While the weak motivational claim lends plausibility to the strong motivational claim, we 
cannot infer the stronger claim from the weaker.  The stronger claim requires something 
more than the plausible story about the student’s progression of thoughts.  Even if true, 
the story about our progression of thought doesn’t of itself suggest that we wouldn’t end 
up with similar judgments about the normative dissimilarity of Distant Rescue and 
Shallow Pond independently of the consideration of the costs of repeated rescue.  Such 
observations about our actual progression of thought are consistent with the view that 
additional factors would motivate us toward a moderate’s position if consideration of 
cumulative costs didn’t kick in.  If, for example, we were blinded to the costs of repeated 
rescue, we might nevertheless be pressured by other factors to adopt the moderate’s 
position. 
So it is difficult to see how we might demonstrate the truth of the strong 
motivational claim.  We would need to rule out all factors other than the high costs of 
repeated rescue that might independently trigger our resistance to the demanding 
conclusion.  I therefore look for a way of narrowing the field of candidates.  I do this in 
response to what the range of these options might otherwise be, the inevitable concern 
that I might have failed to imagine them all, and the tedium of individually ruling out all 
the factors that I do succeed in imagining. 
Given my larger project, not all the factors that might falsify the strong 
motivational claim interest me.  My larger project is to locate the most plausible defense 
of the moderate’s position.  The moderate’s position resists the demanding conclusion in 
the famine-like cases.  Since I am looking for a plausible defense of that resistance, and 
not just a plausible explanation of it, only some of the factors that might motivate our 
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resistance to the demanding conclusion are of interest.  Since, moreover, any factor that 
could justify resistance to the demanding conclusion would also motivate that resistance 
(given the pressure to resist the demanding conclusion, explored in the last chapter), I am 
only interested in a subset of the factors that might render the strong motivational claim 
false.  I am interested in those factors that could show a different claim to be false: 
Justification claim: we cannot plausibly justify our resistance to the demanding 
conclusion independently of the high costs of repeated rescue. 
 
The move from the strong motivational claim to the justification claim reminds us that, of 
all the factors that might explain our resistance to the demanding conclusion, we are 
primarily interested in those factors that might also justify our resistance.  The factors 
that actually motivate our resistance should figure in to the justification of that resistance 
if that justification is to both accurately track our resistance and avoid the appearance of a 
mere rationalization.  
With this last move we bring a normative lens to what up until now has been a 
descriptive project.  This lens makes some of the factors that might explain our resistance 
to the demanding conclusion more worthy of investigation than others. 
 
2.4 The pond asymmetry 
The next step might be to begin a process of elimination, considering whatever 
factor—other than the threat of high costs of repeated rescue—comes to mind as a 
promising reason for resisting the demanding conclusion.  Appeals to analogy are a 
popular method for eliminating factors.  While many proposed factors seem to be 
defensible reasons for resisting the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue, such factors 
intuitively fail to license any similar permissions when added to pond-like cases. Think, 
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for example, of the fact that, in Distant Rescue, there are other people who are better 
positioned to perform the same rescues, or that the primary responsibility for dealing with 
such needs falls to other people or institutions.  If we build these features in to the pond-
like case, they intuitively won’t provide permissions for refraining from rescuing.  
Given the great variety of differences between Distant Rescue and the pond-like 
cases, the mere fact that a putatively significant feature in Distant Rescue seemingly fails 
to carry the same sort of significance in a pond-like case cannot, for reasons previously 
discussed, demonstrate the feature’s insignificance.  The feature’s apparently changing 
significance might arise from its interaction with other variables that differentiate Distant 
Rescue and Shallow Pond.  This warns against hastily eliminating factors through appeals 
to analogy.  
With this weakness of the appeals to analogy in mind, alongside the 
inconvenience of still having too many potential factors to address, I introduce the pond 
asymmetry: there is a set of special features of Distant Rescue which, when added to a 
pond-like case, seem to license the same kinds of permissions that the moderate finds 
appropriate in Distant Rescue.  Consider an example. 
Nightmare: The scenario is like Shallow Pond except that, instead of one child 
drowning in the pond, there are multitudes of people drowning, and there are 
multitudes of such ponds.  Some volunteers are here to help, but they are far too 
few.  After helping a few people get to shore, I see that if I were to rescue all of 
the people who are drowning in this one pond, I would at that time have reached 
the back of the pond and I would then be standing directly in front of another 
pond.  Wiping the sweat from my brow, I observe that a series of such ponds 
stretches into the horizon.  I recall having heard about this depressing state of 
affairs on NPR, but somehow it never stuck with me.  Now, for the first time, I 
am witnessing the horror firsthand, and I am amazed that people don’t find it 
more action-worthy.  Confirming the reports, I see the canals transporting 
hundreds of dead corpses towards the sea while small tornados continuously 
deposit new victims, having raptured them up from afar.  Each new person, gently 
dropped from the air, dizzily flails about in the shallows and then drowns. 
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My name for this case is a nod to Garrett Cullity’s “nightmarish scenario.”  Here is what 
Cullity says about a scenario of just this kind. 
It is surely far from intuitively obvious that it would be wrong of me not to spend 
practically every waking moment saving lives….No doubt, saving no one would 
be wrong, but would it be obviously wrong, say, to spend my mornings pulling 
people out of the water and my afternoons pursuing my own life?” (1996: 61)42  
 
The pond asymmetry enables us to divide into two groups the factors that might explain 
our resistance to the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue.  In the first group are those 
factors, or set of factors, that, though they could explain our resistance in Distant Rescue, 
fail to prompt any similar resistance when they are added to a pond-like case.  In the 
second group are those factors, or set of factors, that not only explain our resistance in 
Distant Rescue, they also prompt a similar resistance when they are added to a pond-like 
case.  Given the greater explanatory power of the factors in the second group, we now 
have further reason to dismiss the factors of the first group as plausible explanations of 
our resistance to the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue.  As such, the pond 
asymmetry gives us a promising way of further limiting our search.  If there is a factor, or 
set of factors, that explains that resistance, it is most likely going to be found among the 
features that contribute to transforming the Shallow Pond into Nightmare.43 
 
                                                
42 Neera Badhwar shares Cullity’s response, attributing a morally significant difference between the pond-
like cases and the famine-like cases on the chronic nature of the needs in the latter: “If emergencies were 
truly like chronic evils in being an ongoing feature of life, who would not say that although drowning 
children were tragic, there was nothing wrong in not spending one’s life saving them?” (2006: 81-2).  She 
suggests that this judgment is reflected in “the actual attitudes of people in poor countries, such as India, 
toward the poor.  These attitudes are shared both by people who, though not destitute themselves, live 
cheek-by-jowl with the destitute, and by people who being relatively well-off or rich live physically 
removed from the destitute but within daily sight of them” (83).   
 
43 I make only a claim of likelihood because it still possible that what explains our resistance to the 
demanding conclusion in Nightmare is entirely different from what explains our resistance to the 
demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue.   
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2.5 Applying the constraints 
We are looking for factors that explain our resistance to the demanding 
conclusion. We have constrained the search to those factors that are distinct from the 
threat of shockingly high costs of repeated rescue, that might plausibly help to justify that 
resistance, and that are common to both Distant Rescue and Nightmare.   
These constraints preclude many of the proposals found in the literature, so long 
as they are supposed to justify resistance to the demanding conclusion independently of 
the threat of the high costs of repeated rescue.  Since we have constrained our search to 
those factors present in Distant Rescue, we can eliminate many other proposals for 
rejecting highly demanding obligations to those imperiled in famine-like cases through 
the built-in idealizations.  We can dismiss as unpromising still more of the remaining 
factors because some of them are absent in Nightmare.  
 
2.6 The alignment test 
After so limiting the field of candidates that promisingly explains our resistance to 
the demanding conclusion, we are near to the point at which the remaining options must 
be directly considered.  The reasons for dismissing these remaining options will vary 
from case to case.  Before engaging in this task, I want to explain a generally useful 
evaluative tool. 
For some of the candidate proposals I observe that, while they would offer 
reasons for resisting the demanding conclusion, they do so without quite providing 
reasons for my resistance to the demanding conclusion.  Since I expect that other 
moderates will share many of the nuances in my resistance to the demanding conclusion, 
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I tentatively regard my resistance to the demanding conclusion as our resistance to the 
same.44  Our resistance to the demanding conclusion has a content that goes beyond 
simple resistance to the claim that, in Distant Rescue, one is morally obligated to perform 
the rescues so long as the salient fact obtains.  Our resistance is marked by insensitivity to 
a variety of small adjustments we might make to Distant Rescue.  If we try to explain our 
resistance to the demanding conclusion in terms of a given factor, we can often test 
whether or not that factor accounts for these nuances in our resistance.  If a proposed 
factor for explaining our resistance fails to account for these nuances, we can say that it 
fails the alignment test. 
By qualifying these adjustments as small, I mean to contrast the alignment test to 
what I earlier called the “appeal to analogy.”  Appeals to analogy often involve extensive 
transformations of the analogized case, changes that would take a case like Distant 
Rescue and transform it into a case resembling Shallow Pond.  Since such changes are far 
more extensive they introduce stronger grounds for suspecting that somewhere among 
those changes other normatively significant factors have been introduced, factors that 
might plausibly allow alternative accounts for the resulting intuitive moral judgments we 
have about such cases.   
Merely adding one feature to Distant Rescue is sometimes enough to show that a 
given factor fails to adequately account for our resistance to the demanding conclusion: 
our resistance may persist even though the supposedly crucial difference is narrowly 
eliminated.  If, for example, we add to Distant Rescue the stipulation that all of the 
people whom we might rescue are imperiled only because of an unforeseeable natural 
disaster, emergency preparations for which could not have been expected of any 
                                                
44 See footnote 40 about my use of the first-person plural. 
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institution, then our resistance to the demanding conclusion is likely to persist.  This 
persistence casts doubt on attempts to explain our resistance to the demanding conclusion 
merely in terms of peculiar causes of the needs.45  
We need to proceed with caution in considering proposals in this way.  Any 
elimination of a given factor will be tentative for at least two reasons.  First, the 
possibility remains that our resistance to the demanding conclusion, with all of its 
nuances, is not to be justified in its entirety.  It may be best to accommodate some 
revisions to our initial intuitive judgments.  Although an explanation that accounts for 
much of our resistance to the demanding conclusion might contain counterintuitive 
implications, it may be best to accept those implications.  Second, even if our resistance 
is to be justified in its entirety, every aspect of that resistance needn’t be explained in 
terms of the same factor(s).  Our resistance to the demanding conclusion in Distant 
Rescue may be justified in terms of one factor while an entirely different factor justifies 
our similar resistance in the slightly revised scenario in which the first factor is absent.  
Although such a possibility tends to lose plausibility as we increase the similarity of two 
test cases, it is a possibility to bear in mind when applying the alignment test.  
With these caveats, I consider some of the proposals that remain. 
 
2.7 The possibility of more ideal collective responses 
A prominent class of the remaining proposals seeks to justify resistance to the 
demanding conclusion in terms of a distribution of the responsibilities for meeting these 
needs.  These conceptions of how responsibilities are to be distributed are, or can be, 
                                                
45 John Kekes (2002) and Dale Jamieson (2005) suggest that our resistance to the demanding conclusion 
might appeal to such root causes.  
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independent of the shockingly high costs of repeated rescue.  I begin with Joel Feinberg’s 
proposal, which also serves to introduce several prominent variants. 
 
2.8 Feinberg on the relevance of the more ideal collective solution  
Although Joel Feinberg’s resistance to the demanding conclusion may have been 
originally motivated by the threat of shockingly high costs of repeated rescue, those costs 
are not in any obvious way essential to his justifications for that resistance.  For Feinberg, 
what is central is the possibility of a more ideal response.  Feinberg considers Lord 
Thomas Macaulay’s discussion of an Englishman in India circa 1835: 
[A] resident Englishman would encounter hordes of beggars on every street 
corner, and thousands of these would die every year of malnutrition or starvation.  
It was manifestly absurd to hold that each time a wealthy man encountered a 
beggar, he had a duty to rescue him by making a small contribution. (1984: 66)  
 
Feinberg is discussing the concern that any way of specifying the Englishman’s legal46 
duty to aid others will either rely upon an arbitrary line dividing duties from non-duties, 
or it will legally require a person to perform acts of rescue well beyond anything that 
morality could plausibly require.  However, in addressing Lord Macaulay’s scenario, 
Feinberg observes,  
Any practical, fair-minded person…[who is] also humane…would desire instead 
some sort of scheme of coordination that would allow the starving as a class to be 
rescued by the wealthy as a class without unjust enrichments of the unworthy or 
unfair disproportions in the contributions exacted from the donors.  A modern 
state’s welfare system, with its maintenance of an income floor for indigents paid 
out of the taxes from those able to pay, is just such a system. (66)  
 
                                                
46 Although Feinberg’s concern is often directed toward the potential legal distinctions, he regards such 
legal distinctions as themselves grounded in moral distinctions.  The objections to the legal distinctions 
Feinberg is considering are objections directed at questions of moral legitimacy.   
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In contrast to this scenario, Feinberg notes that there are different sorts of rescue 
scenarios in which the random and unpredictable emergencies of life that require time 
and effort, rather than money, from chance passersby, are not obviated by state welfare 
systems (66).  Feinberg believes that the distinction between these two types of cases 
provides a principled way of distinguishing those cases in which we have a strict duty to 
provide aid, and those cases in which we do not.  Strikingly, Feinberg proposes that the 
distinction holds even when the state welfare system is not up and running.  So, for 
Feinberg, the Englishman has no strict duty to aid the hungry beggar in front of him even 
when there is no welfare system.  For Feinberg, the salient fact is that the beggar’s hunger 
would be better handled by a welfare system.47  Feinberg’s thought, that facts about the 
more ideal solution are so morally significant, appears to be motivated by his idea about 
the role or function of morality.  For Feinberg, morality (or at least “public morality”) “is 
essentially a way of coordinating private efforts for common goals” (1984: 67, 1987: 
170). 
It is fairly easy see what Feinberg would say about Distant Rescue and 
Nightmare.  In each scenario there are presumably more ideal ways for the societies to 
deal with the problems.  In Distant Rescue, perhaps the more ideal solution might involve 
large-scale development projects, the creation of tax-supported international emergency 
                                                
47 Feinberg dramatically illustrates his position in terms of the responsibility to put out fires: 
 
The reason we have the duty to report the fire but not the duty to fight it is not just that there is 
minimal effort required in the one case and not in the other.  It is rather that the very strict social 
duty of putting out fires is most effectively and equitably discharged if it is split up in advance 
through the sharing of burdens and the assigning of special tasks. (1984: 68)  
 
Here, again, the reason why the individual is not obligated to fight the fire is not that the task will be 
handled by a capable fire department, or that there is some fire department which is responsible for 
handling the fire; it is rather that firefighting would be “most effectively and equitably discharged” if it 
were addressed in a more organized way.  
 
      
93  
funds, political reform, and the cessation of wars.  In Nightmare, the ideal solution might 
involve the National Guard and a community-funded bulldozer fleet to drain the ponds.  
There is something promising in Feinberg’s observations.  The fact that there is a 
far more ideal cooperative solution to a common problem plausibly should affect the 
moral responsibilities of individuals.  Evaluating Feinberg’s proposal, however, is 
difficult because he doesn’t spell out in sufficient detail what he has in mind when he 
says that one solution would be more ideal than another.  If, as it often appears, what 
Feinberg has in mind are solutions that avoid imposing highly costly responsibilities upon 
any one person, then he likely isn’t offering a proposal that is independent of the threat of 
those high costs of repeated rescue.   
 
2.9 Rawls’s division of labor 
Feinberg’s proposal has affinities with Rawls’s emphasis on a distinction between 
the responsibilities that fall to institutions and those that fall directly to individuals.  
Having described such a distinction as a “division of labor” (1993: 268), it suggests a 
way of limiting the responsibilities that apply to individuals. 
Samuel Scheffler argues that where Rawls explicitly uses the division-of-labor 
metaphor, he is contrasting, on the one hand, rules that apply to the basic structure of 
society for the purpose of securing the background conditions in which individual 
transactions can take place fairly, and, on the other, the rules that are to be followed by 
individuals concerning their own transactions with each other.  Rawls’s concern here 
regards the way in which seemingly just transactions among individuals can lead over 
time to unjust conditions.  Such outcomes cannot be feasibly avoided by insisting that 
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everyone comply with norms applying directly to their individual conduct.  Such rules 
would be bound to “exceed the capacity to grasp and follow them with sufficient ease,” 
be “too complex,” “require too much information to be correctly applied,” or “enjoin 
individuals to engage in bargaining with many widely scattered third parties” (1993: 268-
69).  Rawls’s solution is to apply the principles for maintaining background justice to the 
basic structure.  
Since this division of labor is motivated by the impossibility of securing the value 
in question by rules applying to individuals (Scheffler 2005: 238-40, 244-45), this creates 
a significant disanalogy between Rawls’s division of labor and the sort of division of 
labor that might directly justify a reduction in individual responsibilities for the distant 
needy.  If background justice isn’t secured at the institutional level, then there is by 
hypothesis nothing that an individual can do to remedy the problem.  When, on the other 
hand, the relevant institutions fail to secure distant strangers from peril, there is still much 
that the individual can do through Heroes for Hamiltons.  Individuals are free of the 
responsibility to follow norms that might secure background justice because the relevant 
norms would be too complex to follow.  No equivalent excuse is necessarily available 
concerning norms directing individuals to rescue the distant needy when the opportunities 
to do so are present and obvious.48   
                                                
48 Besides the contrast just mentioned, Scheffler identifies another distinction in Rawls between the rules 
applying to the basic structure and rules applying elsewhere.  With this other contrast Rawls is emphasizing 
the limited scope of his project by acknowledging the diversity of values and principles that presumably 
would be relevant were his subject not restricted merely to the basic structure of society.  While Rawls 
doesn’t himself use the division-of-labor metaphor for this further distinction, Scheffler does (2005: 239).  
Here, however, the metaphor would most directly apply to the division of theoretical labor, whereby the 
task of identifying normative principles gets divided up into more manageable parts, justifying Rawls’s 
focus on the basic structure of society without the need to comprehensively address the entire domain of 
justice and morality.   
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Used in the way that Scheffler and others intend,49 however, the division-of-labor 
metaphor is rather meant to imply a way of portioning out responsibilities between 
institutions and individuals for securing just outcomes or realizing moral values, and, 
borrowing from Rawls’s actual use of the metaphor, to do this in a way that leaves 
“individuals…free to act effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive 
constraints” (Rawls 1993: 268).  Used in this way, the metaphor suggests that the 
responsibilities falling to an affluent individual for direct action on behalf of the distant 
needy are reduced on account of the fact that related responsibilities are apportioned to 
institutions.  Rawls would ascribe some such responsibilities both to the basic structures 
of the societies to which the imperiled peoples belong, as well as to all the “well-ordered 
peoples” that owe a duty of assistance if these societies are “burdened” (1999: 106-113).   
So employed, however, the division-of-labor metaphor is dubious.  Extending a 
point once made by Robert Nozick, we shouldn’t assume a model in which responsibility 
exists in a fixed amount to be rationed out.  “Responsibility,” he notes, “is not a bucket in 
which less remains when some is apportioned out” (1974: 130).  To say that the 
responsibilities of the imperiled person’s own society relieves me of the personal 
responsibility to directly rescue him sounds a lot like saying that the responsibilities of a 
child’s parents relieve me from responsibilities of rescuing the child should she fall in the 
shallow pond (through parental negligence or otherwise).   
                                                
49 Thomas Nagel writes that “[t]he idea of a moral division of labor between individuals and institutions 
is…the form of a solution” for the problem of satisfying norms of impartiality in the face of motivational 
constraints, and “each person’s reason to lead his own life” (1995: ch. 6).  Murphy (1998) uses the 
metaphor similarly. Scheffler (2005) cites both.  Approving what he takes to be Rawls’s “‘division of 
responsibility’ between individuals and the larger society,” Arthur Ripstein writes, “On Rawls’s view (or at 
least my appropriation of it) we owe duties of support to just institutions, including institutions that aid 
those in need.  But where just institutions are in place, particular individuals owe no duties of aid to others” 
(2000: 751, see also 756-58).   
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Since, then, we should not assume what the division-of-labor metaphor implies, 
we need an account of how the division of responsibilities affects individual duties 
towards the imperiled.  Barbara Herman and Liam Murphy offer alternative proposals for 
just such an account, neither of which necessarily relies on the threat of high costs of 
repeated rescue.  I will consider Herman’s suggestions first. 
 
2.10 Herman on inherited obligations 
Like Feinberg, Herman suggests that strict duties of rescue might be largely 
isolated to those cases in which a more preferable cooperative strategy isn’t feasible.50 
For Herman, however, an essential aspect of the more preferable strategy is that in it, 
people are fulfilling their “primary” obligations.  Herman suggests that the demanding 
conclusion can be resisted by appealing to the distinction between primary obligations 
and inherited obligations.51  Herman’s basic idea goes something like this: 
                                                
50 This point is also echoed in Gewirth 1987. 
 
51 To be fair to Herman, this distinction between primary and inherited obligations is but one of her 
resources for articulating and justifying a moderate view of what beneficence requires.  Before discussing 
the distinction between primary and inherited obligations, Herman (1984) endorses a distinctively Kantian 
basis for the duties of rescue and beneficence.  That Kantian basis includes two important ideas: first, that 
duties of beneficence and rescue are grounded specifically in the value of rational agency, and second, that 
our others-regarding duties are mitigated by our obligations to cultivate our own agency.  One way for 
Herman to resist the demanding conclusion is with the claim that compliance with such putative 
responsibilities would impermissibly undermine one’s own agency (2001: 238-45).  Apart from the 
faithfully Kantian framework upon which this type of argument relies, these ideas are of less interest to me 
here because of their implicit dependence on the costs of repeated rescue.   
A separate resource is Herman’s view about the “central function” of morality, and, in particular, 
about the way that morality needs to fit into “ordinary, everyday life,” “securing routine action” “as a 
matter of course.” At least two important claims emerge from this view of morality’s role: first, that a 
“reasonable morality is…not something we are endlessly at war with (like a diet), nor a distant goal toward 
which we direct substantial amounts of our energy”; second, that in functioning to serve us in everyday life, 
moral guidance does “not easily extrapolate into extreme situations” (2000: 29-32).  These views about 
morality’s role suggest to Herman that while there should be a duty to rescue in the pond-like cases, this is 
not because of some general principle that can also be used to define our duties in the famine-like case.  
The duty to rescue in the pond-like cases follows instead from morality’s role in meeting the “pressing 
needs that fall outside of or in the crevices of the institutional framework of [welfare] support” (2000: 43).  
With the pond-like case so handled by a kind of special duty that comports with morality’s putative central 
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1) Need-at-a-distance typically arises only because more local people have 
defaulted on their primary obligations. 
 
2) Therefore, the individual obligations we have towards persons in need-at-a-
distance are typically inherited obligations. 
 
3) The scope and content of inherited obligations are significantly limited.  
 
4) Therefore, our obligations towards persons in need-at-a-distance are typically 
significantly limited.   
 
Let us grant (1) and (2) in order to focus on (3).  Herman begins with the general 
observation that inherited obligations are often not the same as their primary 
counterparts:  
One may take on only an aspect of another’s more general obligation….it may not 
be appropriate in some circumstances for the holder of the derived obligation to 
act; in some cases, the derived obligation is only to forestall some bad effect that 
would occur were the original obligation to be unmet. Some cases might generate 
a derived obligation to help restore the primary obligation holder to full 
functioning. One can imagine cases in which the obligation (or what it can 
require) weakens as it descends. (2001: 250) 
 
It is true that we cannot simply assume that the inherited duty is the same as the primary 
one.  That said, it is not obvious that the relevant inherited obligation to rescue will differ 
in a way that makes them more limited.  After all, defaulting on primary obligations often 
only makes a problem worse, causing the inheritors of the responsibility to inherit a 
larger problem.  Moreover, whenever the inherited obligation does differ in scope or 
content from the primary obligation, we expect to be able to appreciate the reasons for 
why this is so. This certainly seems to be true in the examples of inherited obligations 
that Herman uses to illustrate this point.  For these reasons, something more must be said 
before we conclude that our obligations to the distant needy are less demanding because 
they are inherited. 
                                                                                                                                            
function, Herman has then blocked any implications this might have for the famine-like cases, our duties 
for which can then be constrained according to her ideas about beneficence discussed above. 
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2.11 Respecting the priority 
Herman says that we must “adequately respect the priority of the local, primary 
obligation.”  She seems to take this to mean two distinct things.  On the one hand, 
Herman takes the priority of primary obligation to mean that inherited obligations to aid 
others should not increase the likelihood that the primary obligation holders will continue 
to default (2001: 250).  On the other hand, respecting primary obligations is also 
supposed to allow us to favor our own primary obligations, and in particular those 
responsibilities that might seem to be supplanted by inherited obligations (253).  That is, 
respect for primary obligations might license us to “expend resources on higher-function 
needs close to us” instead of directing those same resources to meet more pressing needs 
arising because others have failed to meet their primary obligations.   
Both of these ideas appear to follow from the more general suggestion that we 
have reason to try to ensure that obligations are met by their primary holders in particular.  
So, if I have resources to meet one of two needs, then, other things being equal, the 
suggestion seems to be that I should meet the one for which I have a primary 
responsibility.  Herman suggests that I should still favor my primary obligation even if, 
other things being equal, the other need is in some respect more pressing (perhaps more 
stands to be lost if that other need isn’t met).    
But why should this be?  I cannot think of a case in which what I should do 
plausibly depends only on whether or not my responsibility is primary, rather than 
inherited.  Often something else of normative significance attaches to the fact that one of 
the responsibilities is primary.  I can, however, imagine a fanciful case in which this is 
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not so, where the other normative factors don’t obviously interfere.  Suppose that two 
biologists are asked to closely monitor two tortoises inhabiting opposite ends of a remote 
island.  On their way the biologists divide responsibilities: one is to monitor the western 
tortoise, and the other is to monitor the eastern one. One biologist, however, commits 
suicide before reaching the island, thereby defaulting on her obligation.  Is the 
consideration of primary obligation still relevant in the remaining biologist’s decision of 
which tortoise to monitor?  I think not.    
We need to hear an explanation of the priority of primary obligations, and why we 
are to favor the fulfillment of primary obligations over inherited ones.  Although Herman 
does provide some of this explanation, what she says seems to make her overall proposal 
less interesting, since, as it turns out, the normative work is done by the sorts of 
commonplace considerations that are already frequently mentioned with regard to helping 
the needy.  That is, Herman reminds us that when we try to meet needs arising from the 
failure of sound local institutions, there is the added danger that we will interfere with the 
development of better local institutions, and that our “direct palliative aid” will have 
hazardous side-effects (2001: 250).  There is also the fact that those with the primary 
responsibility for the needs are often in many ways closer to those in need.  This means 
that they will likely possess more insights into the problem.  Moreover, and perhaps just 
because of commonplace expectations, “those to whom we are closest are often those we 
can most easily harm by our neglect” (247).  Once we see that it is these sorts of 
considerations that are doing the normative work, it seems that what we ought to respect 
is simply these considerations directly—rather than the supposed priority of primary 
obligations per se.    
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2.12 Respecting the content 
One final suggestion from Herman is that “[i]nherited obligations…respect the 
content of the primary obligations they take over” (2001: 251).  Her suggestion is this: 
when the primary obligation is an obligation to have sound, local institutions, the content 
of the inherited obligation is similar: it is an obligation to support or develop sound, local 
institutions.  Herman is attracted to this proposal because it avoids the implication that 
what gets inherited is simply the obligation to directly alleviate the problems resulting 
from the lack of sound, local institutions.  Herman wants those inheriting the obligation 
to be able to direct their resources to the root problems, rather than (only) towards the 
“direct palliative aid” of those presently suffering because of the lack of sound, local 
institutions.   
This isn’t a promising way to secure the conclusion.  First, it doesn’t fit very well 
with her prior warning that we can’t simply assume that the inherited duty is the same as 
the primary one.  Moreover, when a person defaults on a primary obligation, this is likely 
to change the circumstances such that it would be foolish for the inheritors of the problem 
to try then to do what those with the primarily obligation should have done in the first 
place.  The captain of an oil tanker is responsible for staying alert while navigating the 
vessel.  Should the oil tanker default on this obligation and spill a million barrels of oil 
we may inherit very different obligations (and these inherited obligations, moreover, may 
be far more onerous).  A government agency may have a primary responsibility for 
enforcing regulations on deep-water oil drilling.  If defaulting on this obligation leads to 
an environmental disaster, it would be odd to insist in that moment that the inherited 
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obligation cannot be more urgent or more directly palliative.  These cases suggest that 
even if the primary obligation is to create or support sound, local institutions serving the 
local people, this does not imply that the inherited obligation isn’t, first and foremost, an 
obligation to alleviate directly the suffering that arises from the lack of such institutions.  
So, if resources can be redirected away from the direct palliative aid and to the 
development of sound, local institutions, this won’t be simply because the primary 
obligation was an obligation to have sound local institutions.     
 
2.13 Murphy on responsibility only for one’s fair share 
More so than the others, Liam Murphy makes it clear that, on his view, what 
motivates and justifies the resistance to the demanding conclusion is not the high costs of 
repeated rescue per se,52 but rather that a requirement to make such sacrifices would 
                                                
52 Murphy’s view here is in part driven by his skepticism towards the over-demandingness objection, which 
might have alternatively been called the “overly-costly objection.”  According to Murphy, if the high costs 
of repeated rescue are prompting us to reject strict obligations to the distant needy, this cannot simply be 
because such obligations would be too demanding.  For one thing, it is unclear whether demandingness can 
be measured in a non-question-begging way that still manages to capture what is intuitively relevant about 
demands.  Second, even if demandingness can be measured, it is difficult to see how we could appeal to 
demandingness as a way of plausibly limiting one’s obligations to the distant needy. Third, if we accept an 
intuitive understanding of demandingness, we will have to acknowledge that morality can sometimes be 
extremely demanding.  We will therefore still need to explain why demandingness limits moral 
responsibilities in some cases but not in others.   
I address the first and second objection in “Better Collective Solutions.” I will discuss issues 
related to Murphy’s third objection later in this chapter.  Regarding the first objection, the basic problem, as 
I see it, is that Murphy is unwilling to give our intuitive moral judgments any credence if they run afoul of 
utilitarianism; such judgments cannot be taken to support a valid objection that utilitarianism is overly-
demanding because, in establishing what is to count as overly-demanding, such judgments beg the question 
against utilitarianism.  My project, however, is to try to accommodate the very judgments that Murphy 
prefers to dismiss.  As such, I am willing to interpret the over-demandingness objection in the “question-
begging” way that Murphy resists.  In other words, when our intuitive moral judgments indicate that 
utilitarianism is making demands that are too severe (particularly with regard to opportunities involving 
rescuing strangers at an individually low cost), my project is to see what can be said on behalf of those 
judgments.  
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illegitimately require you to do more than your fair share of a collective responsibility.53, 
54  Murphy, like Feinberg, attributes significance to facts about more ideal collective 
solutions.  Like Herman, the significant aspect of the more ideal collective solution is, for 
Murphy, that others are fulfilling their moral responsibilities.  Murphy differs from 
Herman in his proposal for why needs arising from the moral failures of others may have 
a more limited claim upon us.  For Murphy, the issue is not whether meeting any 
particular need is your primary or inherited obligation.  This question doesn’t even 
matter.  What matters is the degree to which the overall cost of improving the welfare of 
people generally is sustained by the (concurrent) moral failures of others.  To the extent 
                                                
53 Murphy is developing a view proposed earlier by L. Jonathan Cohen: one’s “duty is only to play a fair 
part in the performance of what is collectively obligatory.  Burdens…ought to be fairly distributed, and 
ceteris paribus, no-one is morally required to take on more than his fair share of a burden because someone 
else defects….” (1981: 76).   For Cohen there is a further reason for this limit: a code of ethics that passes 
obligations on to others after the original bearer of that obligation has defaulted would undermine the 
original bearer’s motivation to fulfill his/her obligation.  Cohen’s reasoning strikes me as dubious.  The 
motivation to fulfill my obligation is supposedly undermined by the thought that, if I don’t fulfill my 
obligation, someone else will.  However, the likelihood that someone else will fulfill my obligation after I 
have defaulted isn’t obviously affected by whether or not my moral obligation would thereafter be 
transferred to someone else.  Perhaps Cohen assumes that moral obligations are obligations for which 
social sanctions are appropriate, but that social sanctions are inappropriate in this case because, if they are 
effective, then they will somewhat undermine the motivation of the original bearer of the responsibility.  
This bears affinities to Feinberg’s idea that morality is “essentially a way of coordinating private efforts for 
common goals.” Feinberg’s idea seems to be this: since morality coordinates our behavior (or it is at least 
supposed to) moral obligations should be those rules which, if followed, would result in an effective 
resolution of the problem with the costs of resolving it equitably shared (1984: 67). 
 
54 This type of claim can be generalized.  Even if we concede the claim about the student’s progression of 
thought, it may be that what makes the high costs of repeated rescue so objectionable is not the high costs 
per se (morality can be highly demanding after all) but something else peculiar to Distant Rescue (or the 
famine-like cases generally).  Let X be any factor other than the threat of high costs of repeated rescue.  
Two claims can be made about X: (1) X is normatively relevant because of the threat of the high 
compliance costs; (2) the threat of the high compliance costs is normatively relevant because of X (with the 
implication that X might ground an independent objection to the demanding conclusion).  Our constraints 
dismiss proposals that involve claims of the first, but not the second type.  Often, however, claims of the 
second type lose plausibility from scenarios in which the given factor is eliminated while the threat of the 
high costs of repeated rescue is maintained, as in the case of the many factors eliminated by the pond 
asymmetry.  
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that the (concurrent) moral failures of others sustain these costs, any given person’s moral 
responsibilities for meeting them will be diminished.55    
Roughly stated, Murphy’s proposal begins with the idea that, under conditions of 
full compliance from now on, each of us is required to “keep benefiting others until the 
point where further efforts would burden us as much as they would help others.”  The 
sacrifices (both active and passive) that each person would sustain under full compliance 
with this principle determine each person’s fair share of the sacrifices required to fulfill 
the collective project of beneficence.  Invoking, then, his premise that individuals “are 
not required to take on the entire responsibility of a collective project, but only their part 
in it,” Murphy appeals to the idea of a fair share to limit what can be demanded of any 
individual under conditions of partial compliance.  Stated roughly, the resulting standard, 
which he calls the “collective principle of beneficence,” “requires agents to promote the 
well-being of others up to the level of sacrifice that would be optimal under full 
compliance” (2000: 7).  
In assessing Murphy’s proposal, we can set to the side its distinctively utilitarian 
elements.  Murphy’s most distinctive contribution is separable from his utilitarian 
commitments.  I divide that contribution into two main claims:56 
                                                
55 One upshot of this is that Murphy’s proposal easily avoids the obvious sorts of counterexamples to which 
related fair share proposals might be liable, as in, for example, Rachels 1979 (162-63).  Murphy’s proposal 
does not lead to the counterintuitive result that if there are two children drowning in the shallow pond, and 
there are two potential rescuers, then each potential rescuer is only responsible for rescuing one child, 
regardless of what the other person does.  
 
56 Regarding these two claims, the influence of Murphy’s utilitarianism will show itself most in Murphy’s 
defense of the first, and specifically in Murphy’s claim that beneficence has an “agent-neutral goal.”  While 
the second claim only states the general restriction on the demands of beneficence, Murphy’s full 
description of what beneficence demands (his “collective principle of beneficence”) would re-introduce 
utilitarianism, with a requirement that the agent “must do as much good as possible” within the limit, and 
with a measurement of each person’s fair share (which requires an account of the “compliance effects”—
the effects to each person’s wellbeing under conditions of full compliance to the utilitarian demand upon 
each person to do as much good as possible).   
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1. The collectivist interpretation: Beneficence is a project whose responsibility 
fundamentally falls to everyone as a group.  
 
2. The full-compliance standard (for assessing individual responsibility): 
Individuals are only responsible for fulfilling their fair share of any collective 
project, where this fair share is assessed under the assumption of the full 
compliance of everyone from now on.57    
 
Together, these two claims offer a distinctive proposal for why we should resist the 
demanding conclusion.  Insofar as beneficence is a collective project, it is unlike certain 
special duties and deontological constraints whereby the idea of allocating a shared goal 
into smaller individual responsibilities would not be applicable.  Moreover, because the 
project of beneficence invariably suffers from widespread non-compliance, we should 
resist the temptation to attribute to ourselves and to others moral responsibility for more 
than the fair share of the overly large task that has been left to be done.  
I will focus on Murphy’s full-compliance standard for assessing individual 
responsibility.58  On Murphy’s view, in assessing a moral principle governing the conduct 
of individuals who are collectively obligated to a given goal, we are to consider how 
everyone’s full compliance with that principle (from now on) would impact a person’s 
wellbeing—both through that person’s own compliance and through the full compliance 
of others.  Murphy’s second claim amounts to a constraint: such principles are never to 
require an agent to act in a way that would diminish the wellbeing of herself or anyone 
else relative to what that person’s wellbeing would be if everyone were to fully comply 
with the same principle from now on.  A principle that violates this constraint would, 
                                                
57 What I am calling Murphy’s full-compliance standard is an introductory version of what Murphy refers 
to as the “compliance condition.” The final version of Murphy’s compliance condition is cumbersome 
(2000: 80-82); the added complexities not only obscure the intuitive attractiveness of the original idea, I 
think that they also deviate from what is attractive about the original idea.      
 
58 I discuss the collectivist interpretation in “Better Collective Solutions,” June 2011 draft, pp. 35-42. 
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according to Murphy, impose upon at least someone more than his/her fair share of the 
group’s responsibility.  This means that fair shares are not specified in terms of who is 
supposed to do what, but rather in terms of the amount of burden or sacrifice borne by 
individuals through actions made towards fulfilling of the collective goal.  It also means 
that the fair shares of such burdens are assessed under the idealizing assumption that 
everyone will fully comply from now on.  Since many hands make light work, Murphy’s 
view places significant limits on the amount of help that beneficence requires of anyone, 
particularly whenever widespread and ongoing irresponsibility/immorality is responsible 
for significant losses in wellbeing.   
Although a complete analysis of Murphy’s compliance standard should examine 
the motivations for it and the ways in which it deviates from the intuitive idea “that it is 
objectionable to expect agents to take up the slack caused by the noncompliance of 
others” (1993: 278; 2000: 76-77, 89, 93, 127), here I simply want to look at the ways in 
which its implications run afoul of intuitive, and arguably common-sense, moral 
judgments.  We can divide these implications into three categories.  
Into the first category are the circumstances in which Murphy’s compliance 
condition results in surprising permissibility.  Whenever we have an agent who is already 
badly off, beneficence may require no actions from that person—even when that agent is 
the unique person who can help, even when that help is needed to meet the basic needs of 
the potential beneficiary, and even when the cost of helping would be extremely slight to 
the would-be benefactor.  Murphy suggests that this badly off agent from whom 
beneficence never requires any sacrifice “describes the situation of many—perhaps 
most—people in our actual world” (2000: 87, see also 128, 131ff).  As well as the badly 
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off, we can place in the same category any agents—including well-off ones—who have 
already fulfilled their fair share of the collective project of beneficence.  Beneficence will 
likely not require that these people to do anything in the same scenarios (1993: 290 fn. 
41).  It should be noticed that this tendency of Murphy’s view to demand too little does 
not require the potential benefactors to be badly off in any severe way, or to have already 
performed peculiarly great feats of beneficence.  Such extremes are entirely unnecessary 
so long as either the number of non-compliers is sufficiently great or the neediness that is 
sustained by noncompliance/immorality is sufficiently high.  War, or even war’s threat, 
can easily create such circumstances (1997: 85; 2000: 124-26).  
Into a second category, I place the scenarios in which Murphy’s compliance 
condition doesn’t appear to block the requirements of beneficence from becoming 
intuitively excessive.  In this category are the scenarios in which there is a high 
proportion of impoverished people whose needs are not sustained by the ongoing 
noncompliance of others.  So, for example, by simply increasing the inhabitants of poor 
nations and impoverishing them through natural disasters or past noncompliance, then the 
relatively fewer well-off citizens may still face demands of beneficence as severe as 
anything Peter Singer might be inclined to ascribe in his most radical moments.  
Murphy’s compliance condition would be of no help in limiting demands in such cases 
(2000: 100-101).  
In my third category belong those implications that give rise to what we might 
call, following Tim Mulgan, the “wrong facts objection” (Mulgan 1997; Murphy 1997: 
83ff).  The problem, already visible, is that whether or not an agent is required by 
beneficence to act seems to depend on the wrong sorts of considerations, and seems to be 
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insensitive to seemingly relevant ones.  As we saw above, whether or not an individual is 
required to help another person depends upon how many other people are in need of help, 
and upon how many of these needs exist because of present or expected noncompliance.  
For the particular person needing help right in front of you, whether or not you are 
required to help him may depend on how many impoverished people are living on the 
Indian subcontinent: you may be required to help if they number 200 million, but not if 
they only number 20 million.  You have also got to consider the number of present 
noncompliers.  Or, even if the impoverished number 200 million, the existence of 50 
million affluent noncompliers in Europe may again show that beneficence does not 
require you to help the needy person right in front of you (or, of course, anyone else).59   
 
2.14 Conclusions 
  Doubtless there are other proposals, or other possible proposals, that both slip 
through the constraints I have outlined and attempt to justify resistance to the demanding 
conclusion in Distant Rescue independently of the repeated costs of rescue.  My modest 
                                                
59 Torbjörn Tännsjö finds the idea of fare shares of a collective responsibility a promising way to explain 
our motivation to reject the demanding conclusion, finding evidence of this in a thought experiment, which 
adds a twist to Peter Unger’s scenario of the Vintage Sedan (when you must decide whether to transport an 
injured person to the hospital in your car, knowing that this will ruin your expensive upholstery; if you 
don’t so transport the person, he will certainly lose his leg): 
 
If I and five other persons find a person in distress, and if there is a simple way of helping him 
(such as standing together on a certain platform), provided we do all cooperate, and an expensive 
way of helping him (with a cost to the agent comparable to the cost to the Sedan owner, if he 
would have the upholstery of his car ruined), provided each act on his or her own, and if I do my 
share in the cooperative venture (I stand on the platform and urge the others to join me), then I 
think most people would say that I do what I ought to do. They say so even if my behaviour means 
that the person is not saved, because the other folks refuse to cooperate. Blame them, people 
would say, not me. (2000: 119) 
 
Tännsjö’s scenario would be more relevant to Distant Rescue if he knows with certainty that at least one of 
the other five will not cooperate.  Is he still acting permissibly if he chooses to stand on the platform, 
knowing full well that this will mean that the injured person will lose his leg? 
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ambition is not to demonstrate the necessary failure of all such proposals, but rather to 
convey the lack of promise in this direction.  Having pursued several of the prominent 
alternatives, I propose that the moderate should tentatively accept the justification claim, 
conceding, as a working hypothesis, that the intuitively fitting answer to the famine 
question is basically correct: the reason I am not required to provide another person-
rescuing donation in Distant Rescue concerns the cumulative costs to me of repeatedly 
having to do so.  
 
3. THE COMPOSITE QUESTION 
 
  The intuitively fitting answers to the differentiation question’s two component 
questions leave us in a poor place for answering the composite question.  I must perform 
the rescue in Shallow Pond simply because I can easily rescue an imperiled person.  This 
doesn’t, however, distinguish the opportunity presented in Shallow Pond from the 
opportunities presented in Distant Rescue.  From the other direction, I am permitted to 
refuse rescuing the imperiled person in Distant Rescue because of the costs of repeatedly 
having to do so.  Given Distant Rescue, however, the costs of repeated rescue fail to 
distinguish such rescue opportunities from the opportunity presented in Shallow Pond.   
  Beyond leaving the differentiation question unanswered, the difficulty of 
answering the differentiation question is increased by these intuitively fitting answers.  In 
Shallow Pond, I am inclined, on the one hand, to regard the imperiled person simply as 
someone whom I might easily rescue.  Adding further specifications to explain why I 
must perform often seems inappropriate.  On the other hand, it is also clear that I cannot 
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regard the imperiled person as simply someone whom I might easily rescue, since this 
doesn’t distinguish that person from the countless others who share that status in Distant 
Rescue.   
  Put another way, if the salient fact provides decisive reason to act in the pond-like 
cases, this gives some reason for expecting the salient fact to function in the same way in 
the famine-like cases.  From the other direction, if the costs of repeated rescue counteract 
the salient fact in the famine-like cases, this provides some reason for thinking that such 
costs could also counteract the salient fact in the pond-like cases.  
 The moderate might try to respond by pointing to some feature (or set of features) 
that justifies treating the two sorts of cases differently.  If this feature is peculiar to the 
pond-like cases, then we will want to say that it is this feature, in addition to the salient 
fact, that explains why one must act in Shallow Pond.  Saying such things, however, is 
liable to sit uneasily with the earlier observation that other considerations often seem 
inappropriate as additions to an answer to the first component question.  On the other 
hand, if we try justifying the differential treatment by pointing to additional features 
peculiar to the famine-like cases that counteract the salient fact in them, then this will 
likely sit uneasily with the fitting answer to the famine question—that it is the costs of 
repeated rescue that permit our inaction.  If, moreover, the moderate’s resistance to the 
demanding conclusion is indeed motivated by the threat of the high costs of repeated 
rescue then pointing to other features will look suspiciously like a rationalization.   
 So there are two ways in which our answers to the component questions increase 
the difficulty of the differentiation question.  First, taken individually, the intuitively 
fitting answers to the component questions suggest, if anything, that the two cases should 
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be treated alike.  Second, attempts to identify features that could provide an answer to the 
differentiation question threaten to run suspiciously afoul of the intuitively fitting 
answers to its component questions.   
 
3.1 The promising general shape of a moderate solution 
 The moderate’s most promising strategy, I take it, is to craft a proposal that 
explains why the two sorts of cases should nevertheless be treated differently, but to do 
this in a way that minimizes the conflict with the fitting answers to the two component 
questions.  Following these guidelines, we would look for a moderate solution that has 
two features.  First, it will give a central place to the threat of the high costs of repeated 
rescue in justifying our resistance to the demanding conclusion.  Second, it will explain 
why we should regard the salient fact as providing decisive reason to act in the pond-like 
cases.   
 
3.2 Recasting the challenge 
 Assuming this to be the most promising shape of a moderate solution, we can now 
recast the challenge facing the moderate into a problem with two interrelated parts.  The 
first part of the challenge is to explain how it is that high costs of repeated rescue can 
counteract, at least in Distant Rescue, the salient fact.  How can it be that the costs of 
having to help many imperiled people mitigate my duty to rescuing one person if that 
individual rescue can be performed at a very low cost to myself?  To insist that my duties 
decrease as the costs of compliance increase seems to imply a strange relation between 
the duty of helping others and the needs of others: my duties decrease as the needs 
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increase.  It is also, of course, to insist that I am morally permitted to allow a person to 
perish for want of the ten dollars that I could easily give.  So, contrary to what many 
assume, there is no general moral duty of “easy rescue.”60 If moral requirements are to be 
understood as requirements to uphold minimal standards of decency in our relationships 
to others, this has surprising implications about how minimal those standards can be.  If 
morally permissible behavior is that behavior which we can justify to everyone else, it is 
surprising to learn that we can justify to the perishing person our informed refusal to 
provide the ten dollars that would rescue him.   
  If the standards of minimal decency or for the justification of our behavior to 
others are so surprisingly minimal, we might wonder in what other ways we could be 
similarly surprised.  This question is made acute by the fact that the moderate’s strategy 
simply appeals to the threateningly high costs of repeated rescue, or the demandingness 
of a moral principle that requires one to respond to the salient fact in cases like Distant 
Rescue.  If such costs of compliance can so affect moral responsibility, then we expect 
them to affect other moral issues as well (beyond the narrow range of cases involving 
rescue, beneficence, or even the so-called positive duties).  If it becomes similarly 
onerous to avoid harming distant others, might we come to also acknowledge shockingly 
permissive moral rules about inflicting harm on innocent people?   
 The second part of the challenge is roughly this: if our moral duties of rescuing 
others are relaxed because of the high costs of repeated rescue, then what is to ensure that 
                                                
60 Henry Sidgwick claims that “all admit that we have a general duty of rendering services to our fellow-
men and especially to those who are in special need, and that we are bound to make sacrifices for them, 
when the benefit that we thereby confer very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves” (1981: 348-49, cf. 
261-62).  Rawls offering this as an example of a “natural duty”:  “the duty of helping another when he is in 
need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself….” (1999a: 97).  
The same is explicitly affirmed by many others (Arthur 1977: 48-49; 2002: 535; Smith 1990: 23-24).  
Michael Walzer (1983: 33), Thomas Hill (1997: 62), and Barbara Herman (2001: 227) note the general 
agreement on this point.  
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one has a duty to perform the rescue in the pond-like cases?  If the high costs of repeated 
rescue can counteract the salient fact, what can possibly prevent them from so 
functioning in the pond-like cases (especially in the case in which Distant Rescue is 
conjoined with Shallow Pond)?  However we answer this question, it will be important to 
bear in mind the observations about the seemingly fitting answers to the simple question 
of why one should rescue the imperiled person in Shallow Pond.  When we point to some 
feature peculiar to the pond-like cases to explain why the consideration of the high costs 
doesn’t counteract the salient fact, this explanation needs to somehow accommodate the 
fact that considerations beyond the salient fact are often intuitively inappropriate to 
various kinds of deliberations about such cases.    
 My strategy for dealing with the two-part challenge is first to identify in each of 
them a bullet that the moderate should bite.  This done, the next steps will be relatively 
clear: seek to mitigate the damage.  These steps, however, won’t remain purely defensive.  
They also direct us further towards a promising positive account of rescue duties and of 
the relevance of costs of repeated rescue. 
 
3.3 Biting the first bullet  
  Since the second part of the challenge requires the moderate to explain the duty of 
the rescue in the pond-like cases in terms of features that set them apart from the famine-
like cases, the moderate’s proposal is bound to sit uneasily with what may seem like an 
intuitively fitting answer to the question of why one must perform the rescue in Shallow 
Pond.  Here, then, is a bullet that the moderate must bite.  The moderate must concede 
that there is a sense in which it is perfectly correct to list factors other than the salient fact 
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when answering the question of why one must perform the rescue in the pond-like 
cases.61  Depending on what these further factors turn out to be, it is at least possible that 
they won’t strike us as so intuitively inappropriate.  The moderate might try to select 
further features for differentiating the pond-like cases with an eye towards minimizing 
the intuitive inappropriateness of the answer.  My own attempts to implement this 
strategy suggest to me that it doesn’t provide adequate guidance.62  
 We might also try to lessen the uneasiness by providing an account of what makes 
some answers to the first component question seem more fitting than others.  To do this, 
                                                
61 An implication here is that the refusal to rescue the child in Shallow Pond isn’t (necessarily) wrong 
because it violates the rescue principle, as I tentatively suggested at the end of ch. 3, sect. 2.1 (page 48).  
That is, the threat of excessively high cumulative costs of rescue, posed by the threat of famine-like cases, 
may itself generally counteract the presumptive duty created by the salient fact.   
 
62 Attempts to implement this strategy lead me to think that it is not very promising.  The idea is that some 
features beyond the salient fact will seem intuitively more inappropriate than others.  Consider a variety of 
answers to the first component question (“Why should I rescue this drowning person?,” where “this 
person” refers to the imperiled person in Shallow Pond): 
 
1. “Because I can easily rescue her and she is right in front of me.”  
2. “Because I can easily rescue her and I can hear her screams for help.”  
3. “Because I can easily rescue her and I’ve yet to do very much on behalf of others.” 
4. “Because I can easily rescue her and it would help sustain a valuable community practice.” 
 
Answers 1 and 2 are intuitively more acceptable than answers 3 and 4 even if the further features identified 
in 1 and 2 do not, upon reflection, seem to be features that could carry much normative weight (mere 
physical proximity to the need; the salience of the need to the potential rescuer).  By that way of scoring the 
features, answers 3 and 4 should fare better.   
What makes answers 1 and 2 seem intuitively more appropriate, however, plausibly is not that 
they appeal to features that can themselves account for what is normatively special about the pond-like 
cases.  Rather, the features appealed to in answers 1 and 2 may instead express sensibilities that are 
themselves made appropriate by other consideration that do the real normative work.  Such answers may 
also be appropriate as appeals to shared sensibilities, or as appeals to common ground.  Understood in this 
way, the answers function like a rhetorical question: “Isn’t it also just obvious to you that, in a pond-like 
case, with such and such features, one must perform the rescue?”  What the moderate needs to provide, 
however, is an account of what could ensure that the sensibilities of the kind triggered by the pond-like 
cases (physical proximity, the auditory salience of the need, etc.) are morally appropriate sensibilities to 
possess. The features that should trigger our responses of rescue in the pond-like cases may not of 
themselves reveal the appropriateness of their status as triggers.  (These points do not, I think, undermine 
the relevance of the broader intuitively fitting responses to the first component question to the 
differentiation challenge.  The moderate’s solution to that challenge will deviate from commonsense to the 
extent that it ultimately fails to accommodate the intuitively fitting answers to the first component 
question.) 
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we could try to give an independent account of the special norms of practical deliberation 
that would explain why only certain sorts of considerations are appropriate in our 
deliberations about Shallow Pond.  We might appeal to a two-level theory whereby the 
principles that should guide deliberation are different, though perhaps derivable from, the 
principles or values that determine the moral status of actions.63   
 Alternatively, we might try to justify the special status of pond-like cases in terms 
of a value whose realization necessarily depends upon our treating the salient fact as a 
decisive reason to act in such cases.  Just as the value of my friendship with another 
person might be plausibly thought to depend on the way that I treat the interests of my 
friend—in my actions as well as in my deliberations—there might well be some valuable 
“relationship”64 we have towards anyone in our immediate physical proximity (for 
example)65 that likewise depends upon our granting to their interests a special kind of 
                                                
63 From a consequentialist perspective, and given our practical limitations, the optimal rules for deliberation 
may not always lead to optimal choices.  As such, consequentialist standards for appropriate deliberation 
(or habit formation) may diverge from consequentialist standards for right action.  At the level of the 
actions, however, such an analysis fails to distinguish failures to act in Shallow Pond from failures to act in 
Distant Rescue.  Recognizing this creates a conundrum for the agent in any particular instance of 
deliberation about what to do in Distant Rescue.  Perhaps it helps that the consequentialist can still know 
that his failure to act in Distant Rescue might plausibly be, from a consequentialist perspective, much less 
blameworthy, taking blameworthiness to concern the appropriateness of sanctions or punishments (Arneson 
2004: 51-56).  However, for the agent who is deliberating about what to do (as opposed to deliberating how 
to evaluate an action already accomplished, or about which habits to break or cultivate) the difficulty 
persists: for such deliberation the category of blameworthiness is out-of-place when the optimal choice 
about what to do is in this instance so clear.     
 
64 Since it is also the case that the imperiled person in Shallow Pond is a complete stranger to me, the 
notion of “relationship” will have to be somewhat broad.  What we might look for is not necessarily a 
relationship that resembles prototypical “special relationships” (familial relationships, contractual 
relationships, and friendships, e.g.,) but rather a relationship whose value is similarly recognizable and 
important relative to the costs that respecting those values entails (e.g., costs to the range of our permissible 
options, and costs concerning the distribution of our concern and care for other people and for valuable 
projects).   
 
65 It would be its own project to identify the precise conditions of this relationship.  For now, to simplify, I 
will speak of it as a relationship based on physical proximity to the person in need.  If, however, intuitive 
moral judgments about cases are a reliable guide to the features of this relationship, there are interesting 
nuances to how proximity matters (while physical proximity seems to matter, what matters is not 
necessarily the proximity of the potential benefactor to the potential beneficiary) (Kamm 2007: 345-97).    
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unquestioned decisiveness in our deliberations about how to respond.  In this way, the 
value of the proximity-sensitive relationship would imply both our reasons for 
performing the rescue and the appropriateness of taking the salient fact as providing 
decisive reason for doing so.  Since this kind of ready explanation of the seemingly fitting 
answer to the pond question isn’t available under all proposals for why one must perform 
the rescue in Shallow Pond, it suggests a way in which a special relationships proposal is 
distinctively promising. 
 If we account for the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases in terms of standards 
essential to a valuable relationship we share (at least) with whoever happens to be nearby, 
then this will also provide resources for dealing with the first part of the challenge.  That 
part of the challenge concerns the counterintuitive permissiveness that the moderate’s 
proposal threatens to imply.  We must address the apparent fact that the requirements of 
morality sometimes are highly demanding.   
 To address this issue, we might try to set apart the kinds of cases in which 
extremely high moral demands are intuitively legitimate, showing that there is something 
characteristically special, and characteristically valuable, about following them.  
Alternatively, we might focus on the distinctive burdensomeness of the costs associated 
with the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue.  Both strategies hold promise and there 
is no reason why they shouldn’t be combined.  
 Following the first strategy, we might try to separate out those highly demanding 
requirements associated with prototypical special relationships.  The duties based in 
friendships and in family relationships can become highly demanding.  Here, however, 
we might argue that when a moral duty is understood in terms of the standards essential 
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to a valuable relationship, it is intelligible why such duties are occasionally highly 
demanding.  This is intelligible insofar as it is an important part of what makes such 
relationships valuable that the friend or the family member is prepared to meet certain 
needs even if the costs of doing so should become quite high in a perfect storm of 
unfortunate circumstances.  It isn’t only through blind tradition that marriage vows often 
include the phrase “in sickness and in health.”  If a child cannot expect her parents to 
remain at her side should she be afflicted by a debilitating disease, this diminishes the 
special value of that relationship, even if the child is perfectly healthy and no such 
unfortunate circumstances ever arise.  Our most valuable friendships are not fair-weather 
friendships, even in fair weather.    
 Measured ex ante, or before the actual occurrence of the unfortunate events can be 
anticipated, the costs of participating in such relationships are unobjectionable in light of 
the value of those relationships.66  If accepting those costs is essential to realizing the 
                                                
66 In appealing to the relevance of ex ante measurements the moderate will want to provide a principled 
way of steering clear of the view that ex post measurements of costs are to be generally replaced by ex ante 
measurements.  If costs are always to be assessed ex ante, then a utilitarian principle that would require the 
sacrifice of one person’s basic needs, when this is a way to produce small benefits for every one of a great 
many individuals, might seem to generate only tolerable costs for everyone.  The expected costs to any 
individual may be quite small, or they might be offset by expected benefits to the individual that 
widespread compliance would imply.  What is central, however, to the proposal I am considering is the 
intuitive value of the interpersonal relationship that depends on the potential benefactor’s ex ante 
acceptance of the relevant costs.  In the utilitarian case, no such intuitively valuable interpersonal 
relationship is realized by the ex ante acceptance of the cost of sacrificing oneself for the trivial gains of 
many others, should the opportunity to do so arise.  
The proposal I am suggesting also contrasts with the contractarian idea that the duty of rescue in 
the pond-like cases is to be understood as an agreement of mutual aid, where such an agreement is mutually 
beneficial when the costs and benefits are assessed ex ante, and perhaps under some suitable restrictions on 
the contracting parties’ knowledge of particular facts about their abilities, needs, or positions. The proposal 
I have in mind doesn’t depend on the rationality of a quid pro quo agreement with others in one’s 
community.  Like the value of a friendship, the value of the proximity-defined relationship, as I see it, is 
not fundamentally the instrumental value to individuals of standing in that relationship.  While there is 
value to individuals of standing in these relationships, such value does not reduce to the value to 
individuals of better securing their own narrowly defined self-interests—like their interests in the rescue of 
themselves or their loved ones, should the need arise.  (Likewise, in contrast to a utilitarian perspective, the 
value of the proximity-defined relationship also doesn’t reduce to, or arise from, the value of promoting the 
general good.)       
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value of these relationships, then it is more intelligible why special relationships can, in 
unfortunate circumstances, generate highly demanding duties.  A similar story might be 
told about the special relationship we share with anyone who is (for example) nearby, 
even if they are strangers.  We might explore the importance of being able to count on 
one another to respond as one might expect in the pond-like cases.  In this way, the 
moderate proposal might help to account for certain cases in which morality is highly 
demanding, including certain cases of rescuing a stranger.  
 Following the second strategy, we might identify ways in which the compliance 
costs associated with the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue are distinctively 
onerous, placing burdens on us that differ in kind from those we are still pressured to 
accept as legitimate.  When facing Distant Rescue, it is not as if the demanding 
conclusion simply prevents me from purchasing a movie ticket.  Rather, it essentially 
prevents me from ever engaging in discretionary spending on my own non-altruistic 
projects, or from ever sustaining a personal financial state in which, should I lose ten 
dollars, it would only be a small loss to me.  If moreover, I am ever given the opportunity 
to make another ten dollars with just a bit more effort, or time, or inconvenience, I must 
take that opportunity, as this extra income will mean one more person whom I can rescue 
at a small cost to me.  So, even if living without cash feels like a tolerable option,67 
Heroes for Hamiltons might add an option of accepting, as rescue-sized donations, small 
                                                                                                                                            
 
67 As it did to one graduate student, described in an article entitled “I live without cash – and I manage just 
fine: Armed with a caravan, solar laptop and toothpaste made from washed-up cuttlefish bones, Mark 
Boyle gave up using cash” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/green-living-blog/2009/oct/28/live-
without-money).  
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pieces of my time, allowing me at any time to rescue another person by clocking another 
hour on a menial online task.   
 What strikes me as particularly burdensome about the demanding conclusion in 
Distant Rescue is the way in which compliance so oppressively limits the range of 
permissible options left open to me.  While I still want to concede the legitimacy of other 
highly demanding duties of rescue, such duties typically still leave me with a range of 
attractive options and possibilities going forward.  Consider a high-cost case mentioned 
by Murphy:  
For years some astronomers have been planning an observation that must take 
place at sea at a particular date and time; many hundreds of thousands of dollars 
have been spent in preparation. Just as they are about to take their readings, they 
receive a Mayday signal. If they rescue the sailors in distress, the project will 
come to nothing. But, as we intuitively think, rescue they must. (2000, 127) 
 
While the costs are great, the only ones that are emphasized are sunk costs.  So, while the 
required sacrifice may frustrate significant past expenditures, the limitations on future 
prospects are highly circumscribed.  To any one individual, the greatest prospective cost 
may fall on some intensely curious astronomer whose highly specialized career depends 
on the project’s success.  However, even in the unlikely event that the project’s failure 
requires her to abandon her passionate professional pursuit of astronomy, the options 
remaining open to her are not limited in any shockingly extreme way.68   
  Elizabeth Ashford, claiming, “Any plausible moral theory must hold that there are 
some situations in which agents face extreme moral demands,” illustrates her point with a 
                                                
68 Hershenov (2002), discussing Unger’s case of Bob’s Bugatti (page 134, below) and variants, argues in a 
similar vein, but emphasizes the psychological differences between prospective costs and costs that merely 
render one’s past sacrifices futile.  Even if, however, someone idiosyncratically found it disproportionately 
difficult to render past sacrifices futile, I suspect that this shouldn’t greatly alter the wrongness of that 
person’s refusal to rescue in cases like Bob’s Bugatti or the astronomer’s.  The normative fact is largely 
independent of the psychological one: regardless of what a person is inclined to feel, sunk costs are 
generally not comparable to prospective costs.   
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scenario “in which the only way of stopping billions of people suffering an agonizing 
death [is] by hacking off your left leg with a fairly blunt machete” (2003: 274).  While 
the cost here is both extreme and prospective, it is still very different in kind from the 
prospective compliance costs of the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue.  Once past 
the leg removal I am free to proceed, on one leg, however I choose. 
  The way that the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue severely limits options 
cannot of itself, however, entirely justify our resistance to that conclusion.  Plausibly, 
there are moral requirements, and even rescue requirements, that place similarly severe 
and ongoing limitations on our options.  I might encounter a child drowning in a shallow 
pond in the midst of my escape from a Siberian labor camp, to which I have been 
wrongfully sentenced for life; I escape with my freedom if and only if I run past the 
drowning child.  Alternatively, and possibly more convincing on the general point, I 
might escape with my freedom if and only if I torture and kill an innocent hostage.69   
  So while I think it is helpful to bear in mind the distinctive kind of cost associated 
with the demanding conclusion, this can only provide a partial explanation of the 
moderate’s resistance to that demand.  We will likely also need the support of the first 
strategy, showing, perhaps, that there is something characteristically valuable about 
accepting the extreme costs of the demands that the moderate is still pressured to accept 
as legitimate. 
                                                
69 The demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue is perhaps made more oppressive also by the manner in 
which it severely limits my options.  Cullity mentions the “kind of self-surveillance that would have to 
characterize the life of anyone who was aiming to follow” the demanding conclusion in Distant Rescue 
(2003: 407).  The duty to voluntarily hand over any discretionary income for the sake of morality makes 
demands of my will that aren’t mirrored in any externally-imposed coercion I experience in the labor camp.  
I don’t, however, believe that these additions can carry us all the way to a sufficiently principled distinction 
(Heroes for Hamiltons might offer the service of external coercion if I sign my name to a suitable contract, 
enforcement of which is provided pro bono by the Zetas drug cartel). 
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3.4 Biting the second bullet 
 However we characterize the burdensomeness of the high costs of repeated 
rescue, so long as we claim that these can counteract a moral requirement to rescue 
another person at a very small cost, we may have to concede that the threat of similarly 
high cumulative costs elsewhere can likewise counteract other elements of what is 
commonly assumed to be a fixed moral standard, including the so-called negative 
duties.70  The alternative is to advocate a dubious exception for rescue obligations.  Let us 
therefore bite a second bullet.   
 One way to minimize damage is to tell a plausible general story about how the 
moral standard for our interpersonal relationships can be sensitive to the anticipated 
cumulative costs to individuals of having to comply with such standards.  In the previous 
chapter I argued that we might reasonably think that if I can easily rescue another person 
from serious peril at little cost to myself, then, by default, I am morally required to do so.  
This may seem like a standard of minimal decency in our relationships to other people as 
such, and we might think of moral wrongdoing generally as violations against such 
standards of minimal decency.  
 While we might assume that such standards of minimal decency are fixed 
regardless of great increases (or decreases) in expected costs of compliance, this 
assumption isn’t necessary. We might alternatively suppose that the standards of minimal 
                                                
70 Robert Goodin writes that the “relative supremacy of negative over positive duties has long been 
established.  Among the ‘absolute duties…such as oblige all men antecedently to any human institution,’ 
Pufendorf ranked ‘first and noblest’ the requirement ‘that no man hurt another.’ Besides the importance of 
the duty to maintaining ‘the life of society,’ Pufendorf writes that ‘[i]t is at the same time the most easy 
[duty] to be performed, consisting for the most part purely in a negative abstinence from acting’” (1985: 19, 
citing Pufendorf 1717, bk. 1, chap. 1, sec. 1, and bk. 3, chap. 1, sec. 1). 
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decency can be affected by significant changes in anticipated cumulative costs of 
compliance.71  If we grant this supposition, then we can consider two ways of reducing 
the costs of compliance through adjustments to the standards of minimal decency.  The 
first way is to weaken the content of such standards, so that they require of us even less in 
our relationships to everyone.  The second way is to limit the scope of such standards, so 
that instead of requiring us to fulfill their requirements in our relationships to every 
person, they only require it with regard to some.  When the standards of minimal decency 
are limited in this second way, they create a kind of special relationship between oneself 
and those within the newly limited scope of that content-preserving standard of minimal 
decency.72 
                                                
71 The flexibility of the moral standard of minimal decency might instead be characterized by a more 
complex inflexible moral standard, one that might be expressed with conditional clauses that render it 
sensitive to the same changes in anticipated cumulative costs of compliance.  An unchanging conditioned 
standard could be extensionally equivalent to the adjustable standards that I describe in that, in the same 
circumstances, both always require the same actions. The unchanging conditioned standard might better 
resemble deontological principles with appended “catastrophe clauses” permitting, for example, someone 
to lie or to kill the innocent if doing so is the only way to prevent a nuclear war (Hill 1992: 199-200).   
 
72 These two different ways of reducing the costs of compliance track, I think, a commonly used distinction 
between special duties and general ones.  There is, however, a way in which all such distinctions seem to 
collapse.  Any special duty that relies on, for example, a special relationship, can be re-described as a 
general duty that (like any duty) only applies in specific circumstances.  The specific circumstances in 
which the so-called special duty applies are simply those that constitute the so-called special relationship.  
Any special duty I owe to my child might therefore be re-described as a (general) duty I owe to anyone 
who happens to occupy the particular circumstances that my child happens to occupy in relation to me.  
Similarly, it should be possible to re-describe restrictions on a moral principle’s scope as restrictions on a 
moral principle’s content.  My justification for using the distinction despite the possibility of collapse is 
that the idea of a special relationship—as opposed to simply special circumstances that trigger a duty—
seems to convey an intuitively meaningful category of circumstances that are normatively privileged on 
account of the valuable interpersonal “relationship” we take such circumstances to constitute.  The notion 
of “relationship” here is not as loose as the trivial one in which any one thing is related to any other in 
infinite ways, but it is also not as strict as, for example, Scheffler’s.  For Scheffler, the valuable special 
relationships that generate practical reasons “of partiality” are “ongoing bonds between individuals who 
have a shared history that usually includes patterns of engagement and forms of mutual familiarity, 
attachment, and regard developed over time” (2010: 115, 124).  As I see it, what is relevant is not so much 
whether the relevant proximity-sensitive relationship contains the features common to prototypical special 
relationships that most clearly generate special duties (familial relationships and friendships, e.g.), but 
whether or not the value of the relationship is similarly recognizable and also important relative to the sorts 
of costs that respecting those values entails (costs, e.g., to the range of our permissible options and to our 
“moral autonomy,” and costs concerning the distribution of our concern and care for other people).  What 
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 To illustrate this idea we might imagine a small and completely isolated island 
community whose culturally homogenous members are prosperous and secure.  The 
standards of minimal decency in this world may be much higher than those of a less 
flourishing world.  If any islander should happen to fall into the relatively dire straits of 
running short of good wine, minimal decency alone may require all other members to 
rescue the poor fellow by opening their own private cellars to her.  In such a world, the 
expected costs of compliance of the standard would still be quite low, and it might even 
be gratuitously mean to reject such a standard, to which all may have come to appreciate 
and expect of one another.  In such a world, this standard of minimal decency applies 
generally; it applies independently of any “special relationship” between particular 
persons in that world. 
 Suppose, however, that this island community suddenly makes contact with a 
billion less prosperous wine lovers heretofore not known to exist.  The expected costs of 
compliance with the former standard of minimal decency suddenly skyrockets.  This 
plausibly licenses an adjustment to that standard.  Under certain circumstances, it might 
be appropriate to maintain the original standard, but simply to limit its scope (perhaps to 
include only one’s fellow islanders, or maybe just one’s immediate neighbors).  In such a 
                                                                                                                                            
we need, for my purposes, is something that is recognizably a relationship between persons, the value of 
which can make it more intelligible why the circumstances in question give rise to practical reasons.  
A somewhat related distinction that avoids such collapse is the distinction between agent-relative 
and agent-neutral reasons/duties.  Special-relationship-generated duties might be understood as agent-
relative duties, where an agent-relative duty would be any duty that makes some kind of essential reference 
to the particular agent to whom it applies (Nagel 1978: ch. 10): it is only because agent A stands in such 
and such circumstances that A has such and such duty.  Drawing the distinction between special-
relationship-generated duties and general duties this way might in other ways be useful, but it seems to 
come with at least two costs: the interpersonal component of the duty becomes inessential, and the 
discussion is rendered into terms the significance of which isn’t as intuitively accessible as “special 
relationship.”  We could avoid the first cost by characterizing special-relationship-generated duties as 
agent-relative duties generated by the interpersonal relationship I stand in with the person to whom the duty 
is owed.  Doing so, however, seems to sideline the contribution of agent-relativity, placing the idea of the 
relationship again at the forefront.  
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way, what had formerly been a general standard of minimal decency might now become 
a special one, helping to define a kind of special relationship. 
 If we accept that significant increases in what would otherwise be the expected 
costs of compliance can justify cost-reducing adjustments to the standards of minimal 
decency, then we might further speculate about which of these two kinds of adjustments 
is more appropriate.  Recall that the standard at issue is that of rescuing another person 
when this can be done at a small cost to oneself.  If we have conceded that the extreme 
costs of compliance license alterations to this standard of minimal decency, then we have 
already eliminated the claim that we are required to fulfill that requirement in our 
relationships to every other person.  Now the question becomes whether the costs of 
compliance should be reduced through a weakening of that standard with regard to all 
persons, or if instead the scope of that requirement should simply be limited.  How we 
decide this question might plausibly depend on a variety of factors, including the value of 
maintaining that original standard with regard to at least some people, the available 
options for how we might limit the scope in a way that might secure that value, and the 
costs of treating people unequally (including the disrespect that the differential treatment 
might express towards those standing outside the potential special relationship).73  We 
might try to formulate higher-order principles that govern the formation of special 
relationships in the face of changing circumstances.    
                                                
73 I stress the last consideration in this list so as to preempt the charge, which is sometimes made against 
those advocating for a moderate position (or the current “moral status quo”), that the kind of justification I 
am offering would have provided the antebellum slave owner or a racist with a straightforward defense of 
his/her differential treatment of those outside of his/her group (James 1982: 4; Kagan 1989: 14; Unger 
1996: 19-20).   
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 Could alternative changes in circumstances make it the case that seemingly fixed 
deontological prohibitions lose their status in the general standard of minimal decency?  
An affirmative answer to this question is that second bullet that the moderate will have to 
bite.  Here, however, I am not suggesting that all moral principles should be equally 
sensitive to the cumulative costs of compliance—as if the requirement against killing 
others should, in the face of threateningly high cumulative costs of compliance, be 
compromised as readily as a requirement to help others further their non-vital interests.  
Some standards are more important in our interpersonal relationships than others.74  I am 
instead saying that when we resist the demanding conclusion by claiming that the moral 
standards of minimal decency are not fixed, but are rather open to adjustment as expected 
cumulative costs of compliance change, then we cannot simply assume that this 
sensitivity applies only to the part of the moral standard that deals with the rescue of 
strangers.  
 The implication that there is no general duty of easy rescue—that is, no general 
duty to rescue someone from serious peril when doing so can be done at a very small cost 
to oneself—may be surprising largely because we didn’t expect that circumstances would 
make the cumulative costs of complying with such a duty so shockingly high.  This 
would fit the earlier discussion about a student’s typical progression of thought when 
initially confronted by the famine-relief argument.  If, then, it is initially so 
                                                
74 On this point, Mill’s observation is apt:  
 
The moral rules that forbid mankind to hurt one another…are more vital to human well-being than 
any maxims, however important, that merely point out the best way of managing some aspect of 
human affairs….Their being observed is the only thing that preserves peace among human beings: 
if it weren’t for the fact that obedience to them is the rule and disobedience the exception, 
everyone would see everyone else as an enemy against whom he must be perpetually guarding 
himself. (1993: ch. 5) 
 
      
125  
counterintuitive that there may be no general duty of easy rescue, this is because the 
circumstances created by Heroes for Hamiltons are so unexpected.   
 The moderate can tell a similar story about other standards of morality commonly 
assumed to be fixed, or which are commonly assumed to be a part of moral standards of 
minimal decency in our interpersonal relations.  We assume such standards are fixed 
because we don’t expect the anticipated costs of compliance with them to similarly 
become shockingly great.  It is difficult to imagine, for example, a scenario in which a 
general prohibition against breaking a promise to avoid a trivial inconvenience could 
entail, through accumulation, extremely high anticipated costs of compliance to an 
individual.  Promises after all are the sorts of things one can simply avoid making if the 
anticipated costs of having to keep them would be too high.  If, however, unexpected 
circumstance do arise in which seemingly fixed deontological prohibitions come to have 
exceptionally high anticipated costs of compliance, perhaps this would make us rethink 
whether or not the prohibition should be part of the standard of minimal decency.  What 
we should conclude would presumably depend not simply on the anticipated costs of 
compliance, but also upon the positive values associated with the prohibition in question.  
 While it is easy to imagine cases in which the costs to an individual of having to 
keep a promise or avoid theft or murder is exceedingly great on a particular occasion, it is 
difficult to imagine cases in which the costs of compliance with such standards resemble 
the sorts of costs associated with a general duty of easy rescue in the famine-like cases.  It 
seems characteristic of negative duties, as opposed to positive ones like a duty of 
beneficence, that compliance with them still leaves people with plenty of freedom to 
pursue other interests.  To find a comparable case in which the prohibition against killing 
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an innocent person is similarly constraining requires a fictitious scenario quite a bit more 
fanciful than Distant Rescue.  Here is such a case: 
Intergalactic Killer: We suddenly realize that our universe is much stranger than we 
previously thought when NASA discovers the following series of startling truths:  
 
1. Distant galaxies are full of humanoid creatures that perfectly resemble 
ourselves.  Were we to meet them here on Earth, we would simply take them 
to be people from an unfamiliar country.  Nothing about these humanoids 
otherwise distinguishes them from normal human beings. 
 
2. Peculiar one-way causal laws connect every individual on Earth to huge 
populations of these distant humanoids.  The content of these laws is this: 
over the course of an average lifetime, each of us on Earth causes the early 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of distant humanoid creatures.  The way I 
cause such deaths is similar to the way everyone else on Earth does: for every 
day that I continue to live, the simple fact that I have lived another day 
causes the early death of 48 distant humanoids, at a rate of exactly two deaths 
per hour.  
 
3. Every day I can avoid killing humanoids in only one of two ways: I can 
commit suicide, or I can spend the entire 24 hours climbing stairs.  Every 
half-hour that I climb stairs is a half-hour that I continue to live without 
killing a humanoid.75   
While I expect moral judgments will differ about what one must do in Intergalactic 
Killer, I wouldn’t be surprised if many judged as supererogatory the endeavor to fully 
maximize the portion of one’s life spent stair-climbing, and as permissible the decision to 
                                                
75 If negative duties are characterized as duties that merely require one to refrain from doing things, in 
contrast to positive duties requiring one to perform certain acts, then the avoidance of killing would, in this 
circumstance, count as a positive duty.  To fit this characterization of negative duties, we can instead 
imagine that, in order to avoid killing the distant humanoids, one must refrain, for the entire 24-hour period, 
from moving one’s limbs and opening one’s eyes.   
 We might make Intergalactic Killer resemble Distant Rescue in other respects if we add further 
features.  We could, for example, also stipulate that scientists discover an easy method for allowing one 
person to vicariously stair-climb for someone else.  While a vicarious stair-climber continues to kill 
humanoids at the same rate as always, his/her stair-climbing prevents another person’s life from killing.  
An innovative organization employs confirmed sociopaths (people who would not otherwise spend their 
days climbing stairs) to vicariously climb stairs on behalf of anyone who is willing to pay the considerable 
fee.  Through this organization, you can now avoid killing humanoids if you are willing to spend your life 
either climbing stairs or earning enough money to continuously employ a vicarious stair-climber.  Either 
way, at least for most of us, all leisure time or discretionary income would have to be sacrificed if one is to 
live and to avoid killing innocent others.  
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continue living largely as before alongside a serious commitment to a regular stair-
climbing routine, and to give up jogging and the gym.  Such a judgment would concede 
the absence of a general moral prohibition against killing an innocent person, even when 
such any individual killing could be avoided at only a modest cost to oneself (a mere 
half-hour of stair-climbing).  I would, however, still expect most to maintain the 
conviction that it is impermissible to deliberately run over a stranger with one’s truck, 
even if the cost of doing otherwise is unusually great (perhaps it will mean missing your 
very important flight). 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 I have argued in this chapter that the difficulty of the differentiation question can 
be appreciated through an examination of its two component questions.  Viewing the 
difficulty in this way led me to suggest that the moderate’s most promising path lay in 
accepting that natural idea that it is at least in part because of the costs of repeated rescue 
that I needn’t treat the opportunity in Distant Rescue like the opportunity to rescue in 
Shallow Pond.  To better accommodate the idea that the costs of repeated rescue can 
counteract the salient fact, I suggested how moral duties more generally are plausibly 
limited by compliance costs of the same sort, and that sometimes such limitations can 
create “special” duties which we only have in more circumscribed circumstances, or only 
towards select people.  Such duties might be said to correspond to “special relationships.”  
 The answer to why I must, nonetheless, continue to perform rescues in Shallow 
Pond remains underdeveloped.  I concluded that the moderate must accept that the 
question of why I must rescue the person in Shallow Pond isn’t adequately answered by 
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an appeal to the salient fact.  Since, however, appending further considerations to the 
salient fact tends to make for awkward answers, the moderate’s best strategy is to account 
for that uneasiness.  This led to the thought that whatever it is that might explain my 
continuing duty to perform the rescue in Shallow Pond (in the face of Distant Rescue) 
might also explain why, in such cases, I should also take the salient fact as providing 
decisive reason to act.  Since properly valuing special relationships often also involves 
special standards of deliberation, the idea of explaining the circumscribed duty to rescue 
in the pond-like cases in terms of something like a special relationship seemed attractive 
again.   
 What prominently remains, of course, is the task of explaining how pond-like 
cases can be intelligibly viewed as involving anything like a special relationship, lending, 
as it seems, such heightened significance to salient fact that there is in them a special duty 
to respond.  In the next chapter I will approach this task; before doing so, however, I will 
try to clarify better the features of the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases, showing how 
these features comprise, in the context of the differentiation question, a neglected 
challenge. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE STRINGENT DUTY TO RESCUE  
 
 
 
1. A NEGLECTED QUESTION 
Moderate responses to demandingness challenges often attempt to explain limits 
on what can be morally demanded of us.  I argued in the last chapter that the moderate’s 
most promising strategy in response to question why, in Distant Rescue, one need not 
keep responding to the salient fact is to propose that moral requirements generally are 
sensitive to the cumulative costs to individuals of compliance.  To leave off here, 
however, would be at best to answer only half of the differentiation question.   
A weakness of the most developed moderate responses to the famine-relief 
argument is that they do tend to leave off more or less here.  Efforts are aimed at 
responding to the famine question while the pond question is comparatively neglected.  
Garrett Cullity’s arguments primarily attempt to explain why the repeated costs of rescue 
limit our duties in the famine-like cases.76  The task of explaining why we continue to 
                                                
76 Cullity has published a number of essays on this problem at least since “International Aid and the Scope 
of Kindness (1994), culminating in The Moral Demands of Affluence (2004).  He reaffirms the structure of 
his central argument for resisting the demanding conclusion in “Demandingness and Arguments from 
Presuppositions” (2009).   
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have a duty in the pond-like cases, however, seems to arise as an afterthought.  Cullity 
seeks to partially explain our intuitive moral judgments in the pond-like cases as 
judgments about character or blameworthiness, as opposed to judgments about the moral 
impermissibility of inaction.  Since these explanations fail to account for the moral 
obligation of acting in Shallow Pond, Cullity then suggests that there might yet be further 
features of the pond-like cases that somehow create stricter obligations.77  As a contrast 
to a case like Distant Rescue, however, Cullity doesn’t offer any indication of what these 
further features might be (2004: 199-201).78 
 Similarly, while Liam Murphy’s Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory offers a 
detailed justification for limiting the general demands of beneficence, he offers only a 
brief discussion about the pond-like cases.  Like Cullity, he suggests that our intuitions 
                                                
77 At one point in his argument Cullity provides a principled reason for distinguishing pond-like cases from 
certain sorts of famine-like cases in which the charitable organizations operate in such a way that no 
individual contribution has any chance of making a significant difference in any needy person’s life.  For 
Cullity, one’s obligation to the distant needy in such cases is an obligation to do one’s fair share of a 
collective action (2004: 60-65, 2000: 14 ff).  Pond-like cases are therefore importantly different because 
they provide one with an opportunity to perform an action that will of itself rescue a person, and this 
explains, for example, why, in pond-like cases, performing the rescue takes precedence over preventing 
threats (2004: 66-67).  Believing that that international aid organizations function in such a way that 
individual contributions don’t make any difference (or any significant difference) for anyone (2004: 58-60, 
2000: 2-3, 1996: 53-55) (a point emphasized in Whelan 1991: 158-62), Cullity doesn’t consider more 
idealized cases like Distant Rescue, or peculiar organizations like Heroes for Hamiltons.   
One might try to argue for additional significance of this de facto difference between pond-like 
cases and famine-like cases by something like Violetta Igneski’s suggestion that it would be morally wrong 
for aid agencies to set themselves up like Heroes for Hamiltons (2006: 452 ff).  Alternatively, following 
Onora O’Neill, one might try to argue that if cases like Distant Rescue “are very unlikely, we don’t need a 
moral theory” to deal with the problems they pose.  While there may be other ways of supporting this 
conclusion, O’Neill’s own reasoning is narrowly pragmatic: “There is little point in strenuous thought 
about unlikely problems when there are so many problems that we know will arise and require 
decisions….” (1986b: 300).  Here, as well as in Faces of Hunger (1986a), O’Neill’s efforts are primarily 
aimed at discovering, for the sake of implementing, general policy guidelines for individuals and 
institutions in addressing global needs as they typically exist. 
 
78 Cullity accommodates my observations about the second component question without fully addressing 
the implications this might have for the first component question (and, of course, without fully addressing 
the composite question).  Cohen (2005) exemplifies a response to the famine-relief argument that 
accommodates my observations about the first component question without accommodating my 
observations about the second (and, so, without providing a moderate answer to the differentiation 
question).   
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about such cases might be understood in terms of blameworthiness judgments directed 
towards the agent’s character, as opposed to judgments about the moral impermissibility 
of inaction.  Unlike Cullity, Murphy expresses skepticism that any special duty applies in 
the pond-like cases on account of peculiar features of such scenarios.  Murphy suggests 
instead that surprising revisions may have to be made to how we might otherwise 
evaluate certain pond-like cases (2000: 127-33).79  
 Such treatments don’t do justice to the challenge posed by the pond question.  To 
introduce this particular challenge, recall some previous observations.  I argued that two 
considerations must be at the forefront of any moderate solution to the differentiation 
question.  One is the importance of responding to the vital needs of others; the other is the 
cumulative cost, to an individual, of having to meet the needs of others.  It is tempting to 
conclude that a fitting way to honor these two considerations in Distant Rescue would be 
to adopt the following personal policy: allocate a generous percentage of one’s personal 
resources to the work of rescuing others and then maximize the number of people whom 
one rescues with those resources.  After all, if my duty to imperiled strangers is limited 
by the costs of compliance, then we might reasonably suppose that the needs of imperiled 
strangers can only legitimately claim some portion of my resources.  In earmarking such 
resources ahead of time, I make a good-faith effort to set aside an amount that is safely 
beyond what the needs of imperiled strangers can legitimately claim.  Having done this, it 
only seems reasonable to then direct these resources in the way that most efficiently 
addresses the needs.  However, despite the apparent reasonableness of such a plan, it fails 
                                                
79 As we have seen, for Murphy, if it is less costly to rescue a person overseas, or if you have already done 
your fair share in our collective responsibility of beneficence, or if you are already very poor, then, 
counterintuitively, you may be under no obligation to rescue the nearby child from drowning in the shallow 
pond. 
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to respect the stringency, or the non-optional priority, of our duty to perform the rescue in 
the pond-like cases.  A pond-like case could arise which requires me to deviate from my 
plan, forcing me to spend resources on the pond-like case beyond those I have allocated 
for meeting the needs of imperiled strangers.  Since, moreover, pond-like cases can 
require me to perform higher cost rescues, they can also force me to deviate from my 
plan to maximize the efficiency of what I sacrifice on the behalf of others’ needs.  
To answer the differentiation question, then, the moderate must account for this 
relative stringency of the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases. To justify the stringency, 
the moderate seemingly must appeal to some third factor that sets the two types of cases 
apart.  Since the factor must mark a difference between pond-like cases and famine-like 
cases we can call it a differentiating factor. The mystery is how the distinctive features of 
the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases can be explained in terms of any such factor, or 
set of such factors. 
 
2. THE CHALLENGE OF STRINGENCY 
 
2.1 Priority 
When we note the stringency of the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases we are 
recognizing in them a feature more typically associated with deontological constraints. 
What is being constrained, or restricted, are certain kinds of seemingly reasonable, or 
attractive, trade-offs.  I must not kill a passerby even if this means significant loss to 
myself, to others, to the preservation of biodiversity, and to the advance of the arts and 
sciences.  Deontological constraints characteristically prohibit value-increasing tradeoffs, 
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whether the value is some supposedly overarching one, such as aggregate well-being, or a 
specific value that is seemingly driving the prohibition itself.  Deontological constraints 
also characteristically prohibit violation-decreasing tradeoffs.  These are the tradeoffs 
that would reduce the overall number of violations of the same constraints.  I must not 
kill a passerby even if doing so would prevent five other people from killing five other 
passersby.80  While it is the latter kind of tradeoff that gets associated with the so-called 
paradox of deontology, the former isn’t less puzzling, or less in need of explanation.  If 
there is something puzzling about the paradox of deontology, then it is presumably 
because the point of the constraint is taken to be the minimization of violations.  Put 
another way, if the point of the constraint against killing is something other than the 
minimization of killings, then a prohibition against violating the constraint to decrease 
killings is no paradox.  If there is something paradoxical, it is a constraint against 
tradeoffs that appear to be advantageous in terms of the very considerations that justify 
the constraint.  
In what ways, then, do duties of rescue exhibit these paradox-inducing features?  
Performing a costly rescue of one person in a pond-like case may so deplete my set-aside 
charity fund that the remainder will finance the rescue of five fewer people.  In such a 
case, however, I could typically just add more money to the fund; I can still rescue just as 
many distant strangers as I otherwise would have. 
In a case like Peter Unger’s Bob’s Bugatti, however, the resemblance to the 
paradox of deontology grows.  In Unger’s case, 70-year-old Bob has invested nearly all 
of his assets into an uninsurable Bugatti automobile whose market value is expected to 
                                                
80 This is not to say that the constraint cannot be overridden if we greatly increase the numbers who would 
be killed.  Perhaps it is permissible to kill a passerby if doing so is the only way to prevent five other people 
from killing five billion passersby.   
      
134  
increase dramatically over the next two years.  Bob plans to then sell the car for several 
million dollars and enjoy a comfortable retirement thereafter.  Here is the case. 
Bob’s Bugatti. On a rural road near the garage where it’s securely kept, Bob’s 
gone for a careful drive in his Bugatti. At a certain point, he spies a shiny object. 
To inspect it, Bob parks his car in the only place from where, directly, he can 
proceed on foot for a close encounter, a parking place that’s just ten yards beyond 
the end of a certain trolley track. As it develops, when Bob walks over to the 
shiny object, he finds it’s a switch that can be set in two ways. And, as Bob 
observes, there’s a trolley up the line that’s barreling toward the switch’s fork. As 
the shiny switch is set, the trolley will go down the fork’s opposite side, not the 
branch leading to a spot near Bob’s Bugatti. But, as Bob sees, on that side there’s 
a young child trapped on the track. As he knows, Bob has two options: If he does 
nothing about the situation, the child will be killed…. If he changes the switch’s 
setting, his second option, then, while nobody’s killed, after rolling down the 
vacant branch and beyond that track’s end, the trolley will totally destroy Bob’s 
uninsurable Bugatti, wiping out his entire retirement fund. (Unger 1996: 136) 
 
It is plausible to me that Bob is morally required to perform the rescue.  Suppose, 
however, in what I will call the augmented case of Bob’s Bugatti, that Bob’s predicament 
occurs amidst the standing offer of Distant Rescue.  Bob, then, might do a quick 
calculation.  If he rescues the child, he will be able to rescue far fewer children through 
Heroes for Hamiltons.  So Bob reasons with his own conscience: “Let me preserve my 
Bugatti and I will, in exchange, commit to donating $100,000 to Heroes for Hamiltons 
from its sale.  In this way I will rescue many more people, since this is far more money I 
would otherwise be capable of donating.”  If Bob is nevertheless required to activate the 
switch and rescue the child, then a value-increasing trade-off is curiously prohibited.  
Rescuing the one stranger in the pond-like case requires forgoing his own opportunity to 
rescue many other strangers.  
We might also imagine cases in which an agent can, by refraining from 
performing a pond-like case rescue, ensure that several other agents would perform pond-
like case rescues that they otherwise wouldn’t have.  We can imagine encountering 
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something like Shallow Pond with this additional feature: several very similar pond-like 
scenarios are about to occur overseas, and only if I refrain from rescuing the drowning 
child in front of me will several other agents, far away, rescue the drowning children in 
front of them.81  If I am still required to perform “my” rescue in this pond-like case, then 
a violation-decreasing tradeoff is also prohibited: I must perform the pond-like case 
rescue even if by doing otherwise I could decrease the number of cases in which people 
failed to perform such duties.82  
The moderate isn’t committed, as far as I can see, to any particular judgment in 
these particular high-cost rescue cases.  The moderate might join those who deny the 
legitimacy of the constraints that generate paradoxes of deontology.83  There will remain, 
however, some degree of that characteristic non-optional priority over seemingly 
reasonable alternatives that makes those constraints seem plausible for duties of rescue in 
                                                
81 Perhaps it is puzzling how my failure to perform a pond-like case rescue could result in the violation of 
five other agents of their pond-like case rescue duties far away (my causal role here may appear to stand in 
conflict with the requisite agency of these five others).  Suppose therefore, that on any given day, hundreds 
of people encounter pond-like rescue scenarios, but that today, because of an unusually widespread malaise 
triggered by the defeat of the beloved underdogs in the World Cup, the number of people willing to violate 
their duties to perform such rescues is significantly higher.  Fortunately, I have the opportunity to 
significantly counteract this malaise by ordering the global broadcast of a particularly inspiring Pepsi 
advertisement that is otherwise scheduled to air next week.  By doing this today there is a statistical 
certainty that at least five people who would have refrained from performing a pond-like case rescue will 
instead perform their duties.  Since the unusual malaise is temporary, airing the advertisement on any other 
day will have no similar effects.  Unfortunately, in order to place my time-sensitive order to advance the 
broadcast, I must run past the drowning child in the nearby shallow pond. 
 
82 While I find it plausible that one is still required to perform the rescues in these cases, there are other 
similar cases in which it seems permissible to refrain.  Suppose there are five people drowning in the 
shallow pond, and five onlookers, where each onlooker, including myself, is physically able to rescue only 
one child (imagine that the onlookers are evenly spaced around the same small pond, and there is a child 
drowning in the shallows next to each onlooker).  Suppose further that the other onlookers will rescue 
children only if I refrain from rescuing.  In this case I find it more plausible that it is permissible for me to 
refrain from rescuing.  As with the other cases, however, this strikes me as the sort of intuition that I might 
be talked out of relatively easily. 
 
83 That said, I think that some cases like these, though perhaps not quite as extreme (e.g., perhaps the agent 
is not faced with a choice between saving just one nearby person or many thousands of distant ones) will 
have to be counted as pond-like cases if the moderate position is to avoid being deeply at odds with 
intuitive moral judgments about rescue cases.   
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the pond-like cases.  I will call this feature deontic priority.  The moderate should explain 
the deontic priority of rescue requirements in pond-like cases, even if she also tries to 
debunk it to some extent. 
Providing the explanation is bound to be challenging.  The paradox of deontology 
is said to be “formally puzzling,” having an “apparent air of irrationality” (Nozick 1974: 
30, Nagel 1986: 178, Scheffler 1994: ch. 4).  There is no consensus on how these 
“paradoxes” are best understood or defended.  Moreover, the proposals that are offered 
tend to be customized for principles that are crucially different from the duty to rescue in 
the pond-like cases.  So, for example, any account of deontological constraints that places 
weight on the doing vs. allowing, or the harming vs. not aiding, distinction is a non-
starter for our purposes.  It is likewise difficult to see how accounts based on the 
inviolability of persons, upon the doctrine of double effect, or the Kantian restriction 
against treating others as mere means could be extended to duties of rescue.84  In many 
cases, the associations of the paradigmatic deontological constraints with negative duties 
seem to have prompted accounts that are unlikely to extend to positive requirements of 
rescue. 
I have argued, then, that the difficulty facing the moderate resembles a puzzle, the 
so-called paradox of deontology.  Given our lack of any suitable explanation of these 
features of the pond-like cases, the prospects of finding a satisfying moderate response to 
the differentiation question may seem to be weakened.  More optimistically, however, we 
might also say that we have come upon an opportunity to approach a well-known puzzle 
                                                
84 I don’t mean to suggest here that Kantians lack other resources for explaining deontological constraints.  
Here I mention only one aspect of Kant’s second formulation of his Categorical Imperative.  More 
promising might be a different aspect of that same formulation, requiring us to treat people, or the humanity 
in the person of any other, always as an end.  
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of morality from a new and distinctive angle, one that might shed more light on the 
problem, or at least force us to look beyond the various commonly suggested proposals.  
 
2.2 Priority and special duties 
Towards the end of the last chapter, I suggested that it might be helpful to try to 
understand the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases as a kind of special duty.  This idea 
initially arose when seeking to harmonize suitable answers to the differentiation 
question’s component parts.85  The current challenge of deontic priority gives us another 
reason to explore this idea.  Special duties, like duties of rescue in the pond-like case, 
sometimes also exhibit deontic priority.  Generally, I must keep my promise even if 
breaking it would allow me to prevent five others from breaking their comparably 
significant promises.  I ought not to betray my friend even if through so doing I might 
somehow prevent five strangers from betraying their friends.  
Unfortunately, it is also unclear how special duties come to have “paradox” 
generating deontic priority.  It is doubtful whether we even have a compelling general 
understanding of special duties and of why they command our respect.  This shows the 
lack of substance in the current suggestion that the pond-like cases somehow trigger 
special duties.  At best we have proposed an association with the sorts of duties that 
moral philosophers classify as special duties.  This, however, reveals a further concern.  
Characteristically, the duties considered special can be traced to some significant past 
transaction or some special relationship between the duty-bearer and the one to whom the 
duty is owed.  In the paradigmatic pond-like case, however, I have a duty to rescue a 
complete stranger, and I cannot trace my duty to any special role or responsibility that I 
                                                
85 This discussion is in the latter part of ch. 4, sect. 3.3 (pages 114 ff). 
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have voluntarily assumed.  So the duty of rescue in the pond-like cases is not an easy fit.  
Simply to insist that it is a special special duty is unsatisfying.   
To build a case that pond-like scenarios trigger special duties of rescue, we need a 
conducive account of special duties.  Voluntarist accounts aren’t promising, since it is 
doubtful that I have voluntarily assumed any special responsibility for the imperiled 
person in Shallow Pond.  It is helpful, therefore, that at least some special duties are 
plausibly independent of the agent’s voluntary assumption of responsibilities.86  Of the 
non-voluntarist accounts, we might discount those that assume a kind of value monism, 
attempting to account for all moral duties generally, or even of all special duties, by 
appealing to some single kind of value.  Such accounts hold little promise for maintaining 
the desired contrast between highly idealized pond-like cases and famine-like cases.  
What could plausibly be the single value that accounts not only for special duties, but 
also for the desired contrast between of all of the strategically idealized pond-like cases 
and famine-like cases?  
Offering a non-voluntarist, non-monistic account of special duties, Samuel 
Scheffler considers “relationship-dependent” reasons, suggesting that these arise not 
because one has voluntarily accepted the terms of the relationship, but rather because of 
the value of the relationship itself (1997: 196-98, 2010: 110).  Scheffler argues that, as a 
further consequence of the relationship in question, these special reasons become special 
duties with deontic features.   
                                                
86 This is not to deny striking exceptions in, for example, Hart (1955: 185), Rawls (1999: sections 18, 52), 
and Thomson (1971: 65).  Robert Goodin argues that voluntarism (the idea that special duties are 
voluntarily assumed responsibilities) fails to accommodate our “preanalytic” judgments about the special 
duties we have (1985: chapters 3-4).  Scheffler addresses the apparent motivations that drive voluntarism 
(1997, 2003).   
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Rejecting any monistic restriction on what the value is, Scheffler’s proposal 
allows us to think broadly about what could be generating special reasons for rescue in 
the pond-like cases.  While I may have no relationship, in Scheffler’s restricted sense, 
with the imperiled person in Shallow Pond, there may well be something distinctively 
valuable in that people relate, and are expected to relate, in the sorts of emergency 
scenarios that pond-like cases comprise.  The very norms people ordinarily accept with 
regard to the pond-like scenarios could itself comprise a social relationship, the value of 
which we might appreciate by considering its absence.  This is Richard Miller’s 
observation: 
[T]he expectation that others who encounter us would help us if we needed to be 
rescued from imminent peril makes us much less alone, much more at home in 
our social world.  Even if I were guaranteed not to need help in emergencies from 
mere passersby—say, because official emergency services were so wonderfully 
effective—I would be profoundly deprived of fellowship if those whom I 
encountered typically had no such inclination to help me if need be.  (We find it 
chilling if someone ‘looks straight through us,’ even if we know this person is 
intensely active in relieving neediness worldwide.) (Miller 2004: 376) 
 
So, between people who encounter one another, or who simply might encounter one 
another, there is something like a valuable relationship that we can call the assumed 
practice of mutual aid.  This practice is the public’s general respect for the norms 
surrounding the pond-like cases, which require us, in particular, to perform the rescue 
should such scenarios arise.  The value of this relationship, which I will call the Millerian 
value, might give rise to special, relationship-dependent reasons.  If Scheffler can then 
show us how reasons of this sort can give rise to special duties, we might also have a way 
of explaining how special duties arise in the pond-like cases.  We would then have 
identified a recognizable value which is distinct from the importance of rescuing others 
generally, which distinguishes pond-like cases from famine-like cases, and which 
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generates duties that belong to a category for which deontic priority is not uncommon.  
The differentiating factor would be those special reasons generated by the value of the 
assumed practice of mutual aid. 
That, at least, is the hopeful idea.  The task of developing it, however, faces 
several problems.  Part of what makes me hopeful about this approach is Scheffler’s 
confidence that relationship-dependent reasons can create special duties, where these in 
turn might exhibit deontic priority.  The first problem, however, is that Scheffler himself 
would reject my appropriation of his proposal.  As he sees it, the only kinds of 
relationships that give rise to relationship-dependent reasons are “ongoing bonds between 
individuals who have a shared history that usually includes patterns of engagement and 
forms of mutual familiarity, attachment, and regard developed over time” (2010: 115).  
Whatever relationship binds me to any stranger I might encounter in Shallow Pond, it 
isn’t one that fit Scheffler’s criterion.  Scheffler argues that it would undermine any 
explanatory role for the relationship if we understood relationships otherwise (123).   
A second concern is that it is doubtful that Scheffler’s own account succeeds in 
explaining how relationship-dependent reasons can ever amount to requirements of the 
kind we need to explain—requirements that posses their distinctive kind of stringency or 
priority.  The puzzle of deontic priority is tricky, and I will later argue that Scheffler’s 
proposals are inadequate. 
 
2.3 Significance 
Lacking the help we need from Scheffler, we are left with a considerable gap 
between the Millerian value and the deontic priority of the duty of rescue in the pond-like 
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cases.  The problem, however, is still greater.  Deontic priority is only one of the features 
that a simple appeal to the Millerian value leaves unexplained.  Attributing priority of any 
kind to a duty is bound to seem inappropriate, and perhaps strangely legalistic, if 
violations of that duty do not strike us as correspondingly significant, failing to resonate 
with attitudes of remorse, resentment, or personal grievance.   
That rescue duties in the pond-like cases do have a great deal of significance isn’t 
doubted.  My refusal to rescue the drowning child in Shallow Pond is horrific.  What is 
doubted is whether this kind of significance can be justified if we account for the duty in 
terms of anything like the Millerian value.  The Millerian value is the value of a social 
practice.  It is perhaps a kind of public good.  Speaking for myself, it is difficult to feel 
deep moral remorse at my failure to support an important public good, particularly when 
I know that my isolated failure does little harm to the public good itself.87  This remains 
true even if I ascribe great importance to that public good.  Towards failures of this kind, 
I can often clear my own conscience just by resolving to do better next time, or by doing 
something to compensate for any damage I have already done to the public good (trivial 
as that damage, and the compensating effects of my efforts, may be).  So such an 
explanation of the duty seems to be phenomenologically amiss.  
 
 2.4 Direction 
In accounting for the duty to rescue in Shallow Pond in terms of my responsibility 
for sustaining a public good, what seems amiss is that, under such an account, the value 
at stake is impersonal.  Missing is any appreciation of the personal stake that another 
person has in my fulfillment of the duty, or of how my violation of the duty would let 
                                                
87 Here I draw ideas from Scanlon’s remarks on what he has called “the remorse test” (2007: 8-9). 
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down the particular person whom I refrain from rescuing.  So there appears to be a 
connection between the significance of the duty and its directedness.  My sense of deep 
remorse at a refusal to rescue in Shallow Pond seems necessarily to involve the 
appreciation of how I have failed the particular person who has perished for want of my 
rescue (along with that person’s family, friends, and dependents).  It seems to me that the 
only way to have the full and seemingly appropriate remorse is to include in the 
wrongdoing a directional aspect.   
As with priority and significance, this directional aspect is also characteristic of 
deontological constraints.  Such constraints often involve corresponding rights or claims 
held by others.  The constraint that prohibits me from deliberately sneezing on a passerby 
corresponds to the passerby’s claim, upon me, not to sneeze upon her.  Refraining from 
this is something that I owe to the passerby.  So, if I do deliberately sneeze on her, then I 
haven’t simply acted wrongly, I have wronged her.  This wrongdoing has a particular 
victim, and she would have a grievance that she could make on her own behalf against 
me.  All of this characterizes what I will call the deontic direction of deontological 
constraints. 
It should be clear that duties of rescue in the pond-like cases have deontic 
direction.  In Shallow Pond, the imperiled person has a claim to my assistance; I have a 
duty or obligation to the imperiled person; or, if I refrain from performing the rescue, I 
haven’t just behaved poorly, done wrong, or evinced moral defect in my character, I 
have, in addition, wronged the imperiled person, and this person would then have a 
legitimate grievance against me (Feinberg 1987: 150).88   
                                                
88 Some resist certain of these propositions.  Sometimes this is because of a sweeping rejecting of any duty 
to perform the rescue in Shallow Pond (Lomasky 1995).  Others may simply reject the appropriateness of 
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While the deontic direction of such rescue duties is well attested, it is again 
unclear how we can account for this feature.  If the Millerian value is the value of a 
public good, then the reasons it generates might simply be those that arise from my 
responsibility to support the public good.  A duty of this kind, however, seems to be 
owed to the larger community, and not perhaps to the imperiled person.89  When I refuse 
to rescue the imperiled person, such an account may strangely explain my wrongdoing in 
terms of the harms I have done to the community’s valuable social practice.  While this 
gives the duty to rescue a direction, it isn’t the right direction.90   
 So, duties to rescue in the pond-like cases appear to have three features that are 
also characteristic of deontological constraints: priority, significance, and direction.  
                                                                                                                                            
saying the imperiled person has a “claim” upon me.  In arguing for a somewhat restricted sense of claim-
rights, Judith Jarvis Thomson offers an example in which one may have a moral obligation to do something 
on behalf of another person even though that other person has no claim or right to one’s compliance with 
that obligation: two students are attending a lecture and the first student’s only pencil breaks.  Thomson 
thinks the second student, who has plenty of extra pencils, has a moral obligation to lend one out, even 
though the first student has no claim against the second to do so (1990: 117).  
 In pond-like cases in which there is more than one imperiled person to be rescued, and one cannot 
rescue them all, some may deny that anyone has a claim up me, or that I have an obligation towards anyone 
(McKinsey 1981: 311).  Feinberg, on the other hand, argues that while there is in such a case no one in 
particular whom I am obligated to rescue (the duty lacks a “determinate beneficiary”), I would violate the 
rights of every imperiled person in the water if I refrained from acting.  My wrongdoing, in such a case, 
may also have a victim, namely the person who would have been saved had I acted (assuming there is such 
a person) (1987: 143-48).   
 
89 Consequently, and counter-intuitively, Arthur Ripstein argues that “rescuing others in emergencies 
should be seen as a duty to contribute to just distributive schemes, rather than as a duty owed to particular 
persons,” and “[t]he crucial feature of any such duty…is that it is not owed to the particular person.  Instead 
it is owed to society in general.  That is, the duty to rescue is best thought of as a part of a more general 
duty to sustain just institutions….[I]t is a non-relational duty…..Those who fail to contribute breach a duty 
to society as a whole, rather than to the particular person who is not rescued” (2000: 766 fn. 20, 774-75).  It 
is unclear whether Ripstein takes these conclusions to be about one’s moral duties, as opposed to legal 
duties.  Cecile Fabre dissents (2006: section 2.2). 
 
90 It might be noticed that the norms of the assumed practice of mutual aid themselves contain the 
directional aspect we seek to explain.  It is, however, unclear why duly respecting the value of the practice 
requires one to heed the very norms that constitute the practice.  Just as one can duly respect the value of 
baseball without playing baseball, one might be able to duly respect the value of the assumed practice of 
mutual aid without engaging in the practice itself.  Or, even if one is engaged in the game of baseball, 
competing values may give one sufficient reason to violate its rules. 
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While these deontic features are plausibly interrelated—the priority requires a 
corresponding significance, and the direction supports that significance—it isn’t clear 
how to explain any of them.  Although special duties often exhibit such features, it is 
difficult to see how the relevant rescue duties can be understood to be special duties.  So, 
a large gap separates what we have—the Millerian value—from what we want—a duty 
with deontic priority, significance, and direction.   
 Although these difficulties may seem to suggest that we should look elsewhere 
than the Millerian value for a differentiating feature, I think this would be a mistake.  
First, it is far from clear where else we should look.  Whichever differentiating feature we 
choose, we will encounter the challenge of trying to explain why I owe it to the imperiled 
person in Shallow Pond to perform the rescue, but not to the person whom I might rescue 
through Heroes for Hamiltons.  We must resist the temptation to beg the question, 
appealing to the idea that the imperiled person in the Shallow Pond has a claim to my 
rescue, or that my refusal to perform this rescue would be particularly disrespectful.  Our 
task is to account for this person’s claim or for this violation of respect.  We may want to 
explain the imperiled person’s claim upon me by pointing to what is at stake for that 
person in the Shallow Pond.  The problem here is that it is difficult to see how any such 
personal value can even qualify as a differentiating feature.  What, after all, is at stake for 
the imperiled persons in the pond-like cases which isn’t also at stake for some imperiled 
person in a famine-like case?  If, on the other hand, we appeal to some impersonal value, 
then we are confronted by the very challenges we face when appealing to the Millerian 
value: there remains a gap between the impersonal value and duties with the deontic 
features.  
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 The deontic features of duties of rescue in the pond-like cases are therefore a 
general challenge for the moderate, one that isn’t generated by the idea that such duties 
are special duties, nor by the idea that we should appeal to the Millerian value.  In short, 
the moderate is in no position to evade the challenge of explaining the deontic features of 
the rescue duty.   
To meet this challenge we must think about how features characteristic of 
deontological constraints and special duties can come to be attached to a duty to rescue a 
stranger for whom one has no particular, voluntarily assumed, responsibilities.  I will first 
try to show how the Millerian value, which is the value of a social practice, can generate, 
or translate into, individual duties to perform rescues.  I will then try to justify the 
significance of duties so understood, and to explain their directional aspect.  Lastly, I will 
address the issue of deontic priority.  Insofar as the object of the Millerian value is a 
social practice that doesn’t extend to the famine-like cases, my resulting account will 
contain the needed differentiating feature. 
 
3. FROM THE MILLERIAN VALUE TO A STRINGENT DUTY 
 
Some have suggested that individual responsibilities for helping people in need 
derive from fair allocations of our collective responsibility for meeting needs generally.  
On such accounts, the importance of people’s welfare generates a collective 
responsibility for promoting welfare, and the task is to show how this collective 
responsibility is fairly distributed among individuals.  However, if the fundamental value 
is simply that of promoting welfare, or of meeting needs, it is difficult to explain how the 
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only appropriate allocation of responsibility requires such a prioritization of the pond-like 
cases.  As in the augmented case of Bob’s Bugatti, such a prioritization can get in the 
way of directly respecting the underlying value.  We can avoid this general difficulty if 
the value at stake is not the general one of meeting basic needs, but is rather the much 
more specific value of the assumed practice of mutual aid.  The Millerian value already 
provides this advantage, but we still need to find a plausible way to derive individual 
requirements from the value of the societal practice.  
 
3.1 Unacceptability judgments 
Miller solicits our appreciation of the practice’s value by having us consider its 
absence.  A society that doesn’t respect the assumed practice of mutual aid will, I suspect, 
strike many of us as unacceptable.  To say that something is unacceptable is to say more 
than that it is simply bad.  It is bad for us that the laws of physics preclude cold fusion.  
This, however, is not unacceptable.  It is also merely bad that there isn’t an inexpensive 
pill that makes us, without side effect, happy and reasonable.  A bad thing is unacceptable 
only if it is also in some sense unnecessary, preventable, or avoidable.91  The absence of 
the assumed practice of mutual aid is unacceptable in part because this absence would be 
so unnecessary in the relevant sense.  That absence would be the consequence of human 
choices, and if people only behaved differently—and they easily could—the good social 
practice would be realized. 
                                                
91 Here I state merely one necessary condition of unacceptability because I want to highlight the connection 
between the unacceptable and the avoidable.  Spelling out all the conditions would take us farther afield. 
For a bad condition to be unacceptable in the normatively significance sense that is relevant, it may also be 
that the badness itself has to be somewhat egregious.  An innocuous condition may be bad relative to what 
it otherwise might feasibly be, and yet still not be, in the relevant sense, unacceptable.   
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This connection between the value of the assumed practice of mutual aid and our 
unacceptability judgments is noteworthy.  There are a great many things that are valuable 
or good that do not generate moral requirements.  Moral requirements seem to concern 
practical standards of minimal decency, requiring us, in our actions, not to fall below that 
line.  If, as I have suggested in the previous chapter, the standards of minimal decency are 
generally sensitive to costs of compliance, then our unacceptability judgments are in the 
same ballpark as our judgments about moral duties.  Costs of compliance will affect the 
degree to which any bad condition we bring about is feasibly avoidable, and this will in 
turn determine whether the bad condition is unacceptable.  Miller’s observation, which is 
essentially a judgment about the unacceptability of specific conditions brought about by 
choices, is therefore a promising place to anchor an account of rescue duties.  I expect 
that these connections will become clearer as we proceed.92  
 
3.2 To practical norms applying to individuals 
The first gap to address is that which separates unacceptability judgments from 
practical norms applying to individuals.  Unacceptability judgments concern the kinds of 
things that both hold value/disvalue (whether instrumental or non-instrumental) and 
which are dependent upon choices (although not necessarily upon any individual choice).  
                                                
92 In relating moral standards to unacceptability judgments, I am guided in part by Scanlon’s analysis of 
rights claims: “To claim that something is a right, then, is to claim that some limit or requirement on policy 
decisions is necessary if unacceptable results are to be avoided, and that this particular limit or requirement 
is a feasible one, that is, that its acceptance provides adequate protection against such results and does so at 
a tolerable cost to other interests….What rights there are in a given social setting at a given time depends 
on which judgments of necessity and feasibility are true at that place and time” (Scanlon 2003a: 99). 
Similarly, in “Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” Scanlon writes, that “the case for most familiar rights—
freedom of expression, due process, religious toleration—seems to be more concerned with the avoidance 
of particular bad consequences” in a way that is sensitive to “considerations of cost” (2003a: 34-38).  
Scanlon is usually addressing legally enforced rights, and so the consequences of a given “assignment of 
rights” might be assessed in terms of the effects of coercive enforcement. As he notes, his “own account 
emphasizes the value attached to rights for the sake of what they may bring rather than their value as signs 
of respect” (38-39).   
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So understood, the object of an unacceptability judgment may be a state of affairs, or it 
may be some specific feature of the world, such as a particular relationship or a practice.  
So as not to restrict possibilities, I will simply speak of the objects of unacceptability 
judgments as “conditions.”  What we are looking for is some way to derive individual 
practical norms from judgments about unacceptable conditions.   
In considering how this might be done, we can think of ways in which criticisms 
of actions appeal to unacceptable conditions.  There are, on the one hand, criticisms of an 
action that point out how the action itself causes the unacceptable outcome: throwing a 
lighted match into a bed of pine needles during a heat wave in Yellowstone is bad 
because it will cause a needlessly devastating fire.  This, however, is not the relation we 
find between one failure to perform a pond-like case rescue and the unacceptable absence 
of the valuable social practice.  The one failure to perform the rescue cannot be rightly 
criticized for obliterating the valuable social practice.  The one failure to perform the 
rescue might not even weaken the relevant social practice, or, if it does weaken or 
undermine the social practice, this effect may be trivial.93  Finally, when we consider the 
particular choice in my augmented case of Bob’s Bugatti, it is difficult to see how, if I 
should let the one child perish, the overall outcome is even bad.94 
In other cases, we appeal to unacceptable conditions in order to criticize an 
individual action that neither threatens to produce the unacceptable outcome, nor is even, 
on its own, particularly bad.  These cases merit attention.  I will offer an example of such 
                                                
93 Circumstances might, for example, allow me to keep secret my refusal to perform the rescue in Shallow 
Pond.  Or, should my secret be discovered, I might still fortify the public sentiments supporting the social 
practice by confessing my refusal with a repulsive show of arrogance, or, oppositely, with groveling 
humiliation.   
 
94 If we do insist that letting the one child die in such a circumstance really is unacceptable, it looks as if we 
are just responding directly to the perceived wrongness of the particular action.  Unacceptability judgments 
of this sort cannot help to explain the wrongness of the action. 
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a case that is very different from the pond-like cases and the deontic rescue requirements.  
This case is instructive because of a few relevant features.  
Suppose that the following is a fact: as a direct result of people’s careless disposal 
of household batteries—tossing them out with the trash—dangerous levels of toxic 
metals have seeped into the water table, a vital source of our drinking water.  Filtering out 
these toxic metals is impractical.  The public has known about these consequences for 
some time and, during this time, free means of safe battery disposal have been available 
at conveniently located recycling centers.  Importantly, the dangerous levels of toxicity 
are the collective consequence of the negligent behavior of hundreds of thousands of 
residents.  The effect of tossing one dead battery out with the garbage is trivial.  Even the 
effect of tossing out a household’s yearlong accumulation of dead batteries is trivial.  For 
these individual acts, the resultant increase in the groundwater toxicity poses no 
significant harm to anyone.  Such individual acts don’t, on their own, even pose any risk 
of harm.  
Still, of the person who carelessly tosses out batteries in this scenario, I think we 
want to say that some kind of criticism is both weighty and appropriate.  One colloquial 
form that such a criticism might take is this: “It is because of people like you that the 
groundwater is dangerously toxic.” I expect that such a criticism will deliver a forceful 
sting to anyone distressed by the needless toxicity of the groundwater.   
The criticism takes a form that is quite common and, I think, readily intelligible.  
If we were to hear any of the following statements uttered among strangers we could 
readily appreciate the kind of accusation being leveled: “It is because of people like you 
that everyone has to lock their doors,” “that the grades at this college are so inflated,” 
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“that there are still outbreaks of whooping cough,” “that inhumane methods of factory 
farming are so prevalent,” or “that those idiots might win the election.”  When the 
outcome appealed to is instead positive, we can similarly recognize the praise: “It is 
because of people like you that humanity still has a fighting chance,” or “that Oxfam is 
now able to work in over ninety countries,” etc.   
Statements of the form “It is because of people like you that X,” where X is some 
valued or disvalued condition, explicitly assert only a causal judgment, or a judgment that 
X is brought about by “people like you.”  The normative content is implicit.  When 
statements of this form are intended as criticism, as opposed to praise, they contain the 
implicit normative judgment that the condition in question is unacceptable.   
Such statements of criticism also, I think, contain the implicit normative judgment 
that the person in question is blameworthy for being among the people who are bringing 
about the unacceptable condition.  If the person is blameworthy it is because of that 
person’s attitudes or actions.  It is people who act in certain ways who are causally 
responsible for bringing about the unacceptable condition. When people act in those ways 
without excuse, they are also blameworthy.  So, when the criticism states, “It is people 
like you,” instead of “It is actions like that,” this implicitly identifies the problematic type 
of action, and it additionally implies that the person in question has no good excuse for 
performing an action of that type.  The crucial point is that the normative content here is 
practical and personal, concerning the sorts of things for which individuals have personal 
control. 
We notice, then, that the colloquial judgment “It is because people like you that 
X” implies a personal, practical norm which is somehow derived from the unacceptability 
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of some condition.  This implication apparently holds, moreover, despite the full 
recognition that the individual action, for which the person is blameworthy, doesn’t of 
itself bring about the unacceptable outcome.  What we are looking for, then, is the 
principle that allows us to derive the personal, practical norm from the unacceptability 
judgment concerning X.  We are looking for the bridge principle that connects 
unacceptable conditions to personal, practical norms.  
When we express criticisms of this form, I suspect that we typically have already 
identified some type of action that, in aggregate, brings about the outcome in question.  
Moreover, part of what goes into making the outcome unacceptable is that the individual 
actions of the identified action types are, or were, so unnecessary.  In the example given, 
the identified type of action is something like this: the careless disposal of household 
batteries.  So, the criticism presupposes that, collectively, the careless disposal of 
household batteries is causally responsible for the pollution of the groundwater.  The 
personal, practical norm is simply the norm against performing individual actions of that 
type.  If you do perform such actions, and you lack a good excuse for doing so, then you 
are blameworthy, and the criticism in question applies: it is because of people like you 
that groundwater is so polluted.  Generally, then, the suggested bridge principle is simply 
this: don’t perform individual actions of the identified type that collectively bring about 
the unacceptable condition.   
The unacceptable condition that Miller envisions differs in several potentially 
important respects from the unacceptable condition in the battery disposal case.  One is 
that, in Miller’s observation, the unacceptable condition is unrealized.  There currently 
exists a social practice of rescuing one another in pond-like cases.  This difference may 
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not be deep.  We might suppose, for example, that despite current levels of toxicity, many 
people continue to toss out their batteries with the trash, and, should this trend continue, 
the dangers to public health will advance from bad to catastrophic.  In such a case, the 
full catastrophe isn’t realized.  This merely potential catastrophe might still figure into a 
criticism of a similar form.  Of the person who carelessly disposes batteries, it might be 
said: “It is because of people like you that the groundwater pollution threatens to become 
catastrophic” (similarly: “It is because of people like you that those idiots might win the 
election”).  Alternatively, if conscientious behavior is widespread, another criticism can 
be leveled: “It is only because others don’t allow themselves to act like you that the 
toxicity isn’t catastrophic.”95 
                                                
95 In this last criticism, the implicit causal judgment concerns an unrealized outcome; its realization may 
not even be a live threat.  When the unacceptable outcome isn’t realized, the causal judgment identifies a 
class of actions that needlessly would bring about the unacceptable outcome.  The interpretation of “would” 
is tricky.   
We might characterize a class of actions in terms of principles of action applying in specific 
circumstances, where such principles identify behavior to be performed in a specified circumstance. We 
can say that such actions would bring about whatever condition is created simply by everyone’s full 
compliance with the given principle, with everything else remaining as otherwise expected.  We can say 
that the costs of compliance are the costs for individuals, as individuals, in whatever circumstances the 
principles apply, encompassing various levels of others’ compliance. (Notice, then, that the levels of 
compliance we should assume when assessing compliance costs differ from the compliance levels we 
should assume when determining what conditions “would be brought about.”  It is a mistake to think that 
we must latch onto the same level of compliance to answer both questions.)  Whether the outcome of such 
actions is unacceptable depends (at least) on these costs of compliance and the value/disvalue of the 
condition that such actions would bring about, where both the costs of compliance and the value/disvalue of 
the outcomes is assessed relative to those of alternative principle-specified actions.  To illustrate, consider 
the principle of action under which a person donates $10 to Heroes for Hamiltons whenever this would 
rescue another person.  In the imagined world of Distant Rescue, the costs of compliance to individuals are 
very high because such a principle applies even at very low levels of compliance.  The condition that the 
actions would bring about would be good (Heroes for Hamiltons would rescue everyone who can be 
rescued for $10), but it would not be any more valuable relative to the following, slightly less specific, 
alternative: rescue a person whenever this can be done at a very low cost to oneself.  If, moreover, Heroes 
for Hamiltons would have sufficient funds to rescue everyone it identifies if everyone gave just ten percent 
of their income to humanitarian projects, the outcomes associated with a far less onerous principle would 
be just as favorable.  
I suggest that the assessment of unacceptability depends at least on such considerations because 
there are undoubtedly other relevant considerations.  There may also be considerations of fairness in how 
the principle of action distributes costs.  There are also considerations of costs and value associated with 
less-than-full compliance levels (e.g., while full compliance may be very valuable, one’s own compliance 
under conditions of partial compliance may be futile or even deleterious).  Similarly, sometimes the 
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This last form of judgment suggests further differences when the unacceptable 
outcome isn’t realized.  First, it may be the conscientious sacrifices of others that are 
preventing the unacceptable outcome.  Second, others may be drawing benefits from the 
absence of the unacceptable outcome.  So, as an existing good, the absence of the 
unacceptable outcome may be something that others are presently relying upon.  If, for 
example, the groundwater is not yet polluted, it is likely to be a good that people depend 
upon, which, if anything, only increases the significance of polluting it (Goodin 1985: 
124-25).  Third, if you are among those drawing a benefit from the unacceptable 
outcome’s absence, and this is sustained by the good behavior of others, then your bad 
behavior might also violate some constraint against freeriding.96  
These considerations offer further normative resources either for guiding the 
unacceptability judgment, or for deriving the practical norms against what is essentially 
the same kind of behavior, namely the actions identified as bringing about the 
unacceptable outcome.  In the imagined case, these additional considerations either 
support the conclusion that the yet-to-be-realized catastrophic levels of pollution are 
unacceptable, or to they add force to the criticism of those actions that threaten to bring 
about that unacceptable outcome. 
                                                                                                                                            
value/disvalue of acting in a given way may be sensitive to people’s expectations of how people will 
behave.  If so, then we shouldn’t assume the particular value/disvalue of acting in a given way in the actual 
world is accurately represented in a world in which expectations are very different.  In our assessments of 
unacceptability, we may therefore need to fix expectation levels somewhat artificially so that they do not 
vary with the differing compliance levels we must imagine. 
 
96 Some may view a constraint against freeriding as central, fundamental, or at least independent from the 
kind of proposal I am offering (as in Rawls’s principle of fairness (1999a: 96-7)).  I regard the constraint 
against freeriding as a supplement to the general proposal I am offering, and one that is perhaps even 
derivable from the general proposal.  When it is criticizable, we can regard freeriding as a more general 
type of action that brings about, or threatens to bring about, unacceptable outcomes.  An action may belong 
to more than one type, and each type may be criticized in terms of productive relations to different 
unacceptable outcomes.  Careless battery disposal might be criticized as the kind of action that threatens to 
bring about catastrophic water pollution, and, more generally, as the sort of action that frustrates, via 
freeriding, the realization of public goods. 
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We needn’t regard these criticisms, or the norms they express, as moral criticisms.  
It suffices here if these criticisms are common, intelligible, and legitimate; that they 
express disapproval for the violation of legitimate norms that assign responsibilities to 
individuals; and that the disapproval on such grounds is recognizably significant.  In the 
battery disposal case, if I throw out my batteries with the trash, others may rightly say 
that it is because of people like me that the groundwater is getting contaminated.  This 
criticism plausibly expresses both a reason for others to blame and resent me, and a 
reason for me to change my behavior.  The criticism therefore carries both interpersonal 
significance, and significance for me as an individual deliberating about what to do.   
 
3.3 Adding deontic direction 
In this example, the value at stake (the potable groundwater) is a public good 
which everyone in the community has reason to respect.  The criticism towards me for 
my careless battery disposal expresses a norm that allocates to each individual in the 
community a specific responsibility with regard to that public good.  However, although 
that responsibility is personal in that it applies to me as an individual, it registers a non-
personal, or impersonal, complaint in the specific sense that its force is not captured by 
any complaint that is properly made on any particular individual’s behalf.97  In this sense, 
then, the norm that applies to me lacks the kind of directional aspect associated with 
                                                
97 Here it may be said that the complaint is personal because it is made on each person’s behalf.   I take it, 
however, that the complaint is more significant for that reason, that is, for the reason that it is made on 
many people’s behalf.  In this sense, the significance of the complaint isn’t represented by any complaint 
that can be made on behalf of any particular person.  So, as the complaint of the aggregate, the special 
significance of the complaint has an impersonal aspect.  For my interpretation of the personal/impersonal 
distinction, where the personal claims are those that can be made on an individual’s behalf, I believe I 
follow Scanlon in what Derek Parfit has called his “individualist restriction” (Scanlon 2003b: 429).  It is 
important to me to try to show how such impersonal values can come to support personal claims and the 
particular moral significance that personal claims in particular seem to carry.   
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prototypical deontological duties.  While proper disposal may be something that I owe to 
my community, it isn’t something that I owe to any individual in particular.  
This impersonal complaint might, however, come to acquire a further personal 
aspect.  Should a particular child become ill on account of the contaminated groundwater, 
my irresponsibility might then be said to have a victim.  This particular child might then 
be said to have a personal grievance against me.  Here however it might be noted that, 
while the child has a personal grievance against me, her grievance isn’t legitimately 
directed towards me in particular.  Rather, her grievance is directed towards all those 
who, like me, have negligently contributed towards the groundwater pollution.  
With a small adjustment the directional aspect can be strengthened so that the 
victim’s grievance is against me in particular.  If I toss a bag of garbage into the river, 
then it might be said that it is because of people like me that our waterways are so 
polluted with trash.  If, however, a year later my rancid bag of garbage washes up and 
befouls someone’s newly acquired riverfront property, then my irresponsibility comes to 
have that person as a particular victim.  She has a complaint to raise on her own behalf 
against me.  It is then, I think, sensible to say that I (in particular) have wronged her (in 
particular).  
 So, the unacceptable outcome often has particular victims.  When it is on account 
of the interests of such victims that the outcome is judged to be unacceptable—and 
responsibilities for its avoidance are therefore allocated—then such people have what we 
might call a non-incidental interest in the avoidance of the unacceptable outcome.  The 
bridge principles in effect assign to individuals portions of responsibility for protecting 
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these people’s interest in the avoidance of the unacceptable outcome.  Towards these 
people we say the fulfillment of the individual responsibilities is owed.   
As an analogy, consider a municipal law assigning to each homeowner the 
responsibility to clear the snow from the public sidewalk in front of his or her house.  
Among the many ways to deal with the snow, the city has chosen this one.  Now I, as an 
individual homeowner, have a responsibility.  Facing that responsibility, I might ask, 
“Why should I comply?” One reason is this: otherwise the city might fine me $25.  $25, 
however, is just a small amount, and I might rather pay the fees than perform the task.  
There is, however, further reason to shovel the snow.  Suppose that compliance levels 
with this ordinance are low.  This means that the sidewalks are a mess and, as a result, 
every winter several people slip and break bones.  In this case, another consideration 
might grab my attention: if I fail to clear my share of the sidewalk, it will be because of 
people like me that the sidewalks are so unnecessarily dangerous, and that, from time to 
time, pedestrians are seriously inconvenienced and injured through falls.  Alternatively, 
suppose the compliance with the law is high.  As the result, I can stroll with ease 
midwinter along the ice-free pavement.  Now, even if I don’t clear my portion of the 
sidewalk, the sidewalks are still just as nearly ice-free.  However, I might rightly be 
accused of freeriding.   
Both kinds of suggested complaints are, in a sense used earlier, impersonal.  That 
is, the force of the complaints that I am freeriding on a public good, or that it is because 
of people like me that the sidewalks are so unnecessarily dangerous, is not captured by 
any complaint that can be made on behalf of any particular individual.  They are made, 
perhaps, on behalf of the community as a whole, of everyone in the community, or of 
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everyone who has a legitimate interest in the public good, or who has done his or her 
share of the collective responsibility.  Though complaints that are in this way impersonal 
lack the sort of character and significance I associate with prototypical deontic 
requirements, they may still be significant.  They might even be said to address moral 
wrongdoings or moral failings.   
To add the peculiar directional aspect of a deontic duty, suppose that a failure to 
scrape my portion of the sidewalk inconveniences a disabled neighbor up the street.  On 
account of the ice, the disabled man finds it difficult to operate his wheelchair.  Under 
such circumstances, my reason to fulfill my share of the snow shoveling might come to 
have deontic direction.  When I now consider why I should shovel the snow, the potential 
complaint of the disabled man now grabs my attention.  Shoveling the snow is something 
that I owe to him.   
I intend this analogy only to provide an illustration.  It is not a demonstration 
since there are alternative explanations for why the situation of the disabled man changes 
the character of my responsibilities.  The analogy is meant to suggest a way in which an 
initial allocation of responsibilities, parallel to the kind generated by unacceptability 
judgments and the bridge principle, is compatible with deontic direction, a feature that 
may come to take the foreground when we then reflect upon the responsibilities.   
The deontic direction does not arise from thin air.  In the snow-shoveling case, 
concern for the disabled man’s interests is at least part of what calls for an allocation of 
responsibility in the first place.  The disabled man is just a more pressing case of the 
interests pedestrians generally have in accessible pathways.  These interests, alongside 
the feasibility of collectively securing them, yield a collective responsibility; they ground 
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an entitlement for some relevant provision.  This entitlement gives individuals, and the 
disabled man in particular, claims upon others for these provisions.  When this 
responsibility is legitimately allocated (in this case through the municipal law), giving to 
individuals specific responsibilities, then the disabled man’s claim becomes more 
specific: it becomes a claim upon those particular individuals to meet their specific 
responsibilities.  So, the directional element originally connected the disabled man and 
his community, but it gave him a claim towards no one in particular.  The allocation of 
that responsibility then connected the disabled man’s claim to the particular individuals to 
whom the specific responsibilities were assigned.  So, when I fail to clear the snow off 
my portion of the sidewalk, the disabled man can rightly identify me as one who is to 
blame for his failing to receive the provision to which he is entitled.  His disability only 
increases the significance of his loss, and therefore the seriousness of my failure.  
This analogy also suggests the sense in which the disabled man has a non-
incidental stake in my fulfillment of my snow-shoveling responsibilities.  Interests like 
those of the disabled man in an accessible pathway are, at least in part, and perhaps in the 
aggregate, what call for the allocation of snow-clearing responsibilities in the first place.  
This stands in contrast to the incidental stake that a local seller of snow shovels has in my 
compliance with the ordinance.  Though the merchant is, in her sales, adversely affected 
by low compliance, she is not therefore wronged, for it is not for the sake of the 
merchant’s sales that the community has a responsibility to deal with the snow.98 
                                                
98 The general issue here is “the problem of third party beneficiaries” that faces interest-based theories of 
rights (Hart 1955: 180).  I am suggesting that the interests that generate directed duties are those kinds of 
interests for which a further condition holds: the failure to make provisions for such interests generally 
would be, perhaps because of certain impersonal values at stake, unacceptable.  In its appeal to a more 
general, impersonal value that lends moral significance to the interests of individuals, my proposal is 
similar to Joseph Raz’s view that a claim-right is “justified by the service it does to the interest of the right-
holder” even though the importance of the interest—including, I take it, the sufficiency of that interest to 
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Returning to the pond-like cases, we can see that Miller’s observation can provide 
an analogous basis for individual rescue duties with deontic direction.  Miller’s 
observation solicits a judgment about the unacceptability of the absence of the assumed 
practice of mutual aid.  Since the practice just is the general respect for the norms 
requiring one to perform the rescue in the pond-like cases,99 it is easier to identify the 
unnecessary action type that is, or would be, causally responsible for an unacceptable 
state of affairs.  Here, the behavior to be criticized just is the failure to respect the norms 
of the practice in question.  The plausible bridge principle that links unacceptability 
judgments to practical norms simply prohibits such failures, thereby assigning to 
everyone the individual responsibility of performing the rescues in the pond-like cases.  
Since, however, there will always be a particular person who has a significant, non-
incidental stake in one’s fulfillment of that responsibility—namely the imperiled 
person—such a duty takes on a directional aspect: it is owed to whomever it is who 
happens to be imperiled.  If I should find myself in the position to perform the rescue in a 
pond-like case, the imperiled person plausibly has a claim upon me to fulfill my 
responsibility.  Such a person’s stake is non-incidental in the same sense that the disabled 
man’s stake in my snow shoveling is non-incidental.  As with the disabled man’s claim, it 
is the claim of the imperiled person that jumps to the foreground when I consider why I 
should perform the rescue. 
                                                                                                                                            
ground rights—may itself derive from more general importance (to the interests of others, or to the 
public/collective good) of providing for that kind of interest (1988: 181-82, ch. 10).   
 
99 Characterizing a practice in this way distinguishes the relevant value both from the value of an 
assignment of rights and the consequences thereof (as in Scanlon’s “Rights, Goals, and Fairness” proposal 
(footnote 92 above)), and from the value of morality itself assigning a certain “status” to individuals (as 
proposed by Kamm in 2001: ch. 10).  The former proposal seems to be a better fit for legal rights, where an 
assignment of such rights will include some kind of enforcement.  The latter proposal strikes me as too 
thin, or at least as not capturing the kind of loss to the community that Miller identifies.    
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With this deontic direction, the duty to do one’s part in blocking the unacceptable 
outcome takes on a distinctively moral character.100  This deontic direction adds to one’s 
responsibility the feature that it is something that one owes to a particular person.  Failing 
the responsibility now has a particular victim, an individual whom one will have 
wronged.  Once our responsibility for doing something is owed to someone, a failure to 
fulfill that responsibility disrespects the particular person, depriving the person of 
something that we owe to him or her.  For the morally conscientious person, such 
considerations are significant.  The morally conscientious person is particularly 
concerned not to be the one who deprives another person of that to which he or she is 
entitled.  This is all the more pressing when, as in the pond-like cases, that to which the 
person is entitled is of vital importance to him or her. 
 
3.4 Explaining deontic priority 
Deontic direction may account for at least some of the priority of the 
responsibilities that have deontic direction.  When my reason for not polluting, or for 
shoveling the snow, takes on deontic direction, then my failure to respect the reason 
constitutes a failure to respect the person to whom my responsibility is now connected.  
If, then, I have further and weighty reason simply to respect other people; or to render to 
others what I owe to them; or to maintain my relations of “mutual recognition” with 
them, acting only in ways that are justifiable to them; then this deontic direction makes 
my polluting, or my failure to shovel the snow, more consequential.  Deontic direction 
                                                
100 Deontic direction puts the responsibility within the range of Scanlon’s “morality in the narrow sense” 
(1998).  J. J. Thomson writes, “There are endless things that we ought to do though others have no claim 
against us that we do them….The realm of rights is squarely within the morality of action, but it is not 
identical with it” (1990: 117), cited in Sreenivasan 2010: 472.  R. Jay Wallace argues that what I call 
deontic direction is the characteristic feature of moral obligation (2012, unpublished).   
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thereby ratchets up the significance of my responsibility.  This added significance may 
increase the priority that I should give to snow shoveling over the other things I have 
reason to do.  
This sense of added priority, however, does not independently account for the 
feature of deontic priority, or at least not in its full-fledged, “paradox”-generating sense.  
While deontic direction is an important part of the moral significance of our reason to 
perform the rescue in the pond-like cases, this deontic direction doesn’t account for the 
way in which such duties still apply in scenarios like my augmented case of Bob’s 
Bugatti.  It may well be true that if I owe it to one imperiled person to rescue her, I cannot 
rightly opt to do anything else instead.  However, all I have yet provided is an 
explanation why I owe it to an imperiled person in Shallow Pond to rescue her, and how 
such an obligation might derive from the value of a more general practice, like that of 
mutual aid in the pond-like cases.  I still need to say why I might owe it to the imperiled 
person to rescue her even in the special sorts of circumstances here imagined, where I 
may also have opportunity to better serve many other equally imperiled people as an 
alternative.  In other words, while we might concede that, in many pond-like cases, there 
is a special duty, owed to the imperiled person, one needn’t concede the full-fledged 
deontic priority of such special duties.  Alternatives that would allow me to do so much 
better for so many others far away might seem like they should defeat any duty to the 
person nearby.   
If I am to make the case for the full-fledged deontic priority of the duty to rescue 
in the pond-like cases, then I must argue that I owe it to the nearby imperiled person to 
rescue her in the face of many other things that I might alternatively do that would, 
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perhaps from some impersonal point of view, have equally good if not better 
consequences.  Since I seek to maintain a parallel to special duties, and at least some 
special duties plausibly do have this kind of deontic priority, such an argument is worth 
an attempt.  
On my proposed account, the deontic priority of a rescue duty will derive from 
the more general value of the practice that calls for such a rescue.  The assumed practice 
of mutual aid calls for people to perform the rescues in the pond-like cases.  When I 
suggested that the absence of this practice would be unacceptable, I had in mind the 
condition in which individuals acknowledge no norms requiring them to help the 
imperiled person in cases very much like Shallow Pond.  This is the sort of unacceptable 
condition that Miller characterized.  What seemed unacceptable was the condition in 
which a person violates no recognized norm in walking past the child drowning in a 
shallow pond.  
To say that such rescue duties also have the kind of deontic priority that generates 
paradoxes of deontology, we would need in addition to say that changes to the assumed 
practice of mutual aid that were more modest and reasonable are also unacceptable 
(supposing that the assumed practice does include rescue duties of a “paradox”-
generating kind).  We might imagine that, while there is a practice of performing the 
rescue in Shallow Pond, there is no such recognized norm of rescuing the child when, by 
letting the child perish, one might more effectively help imperiled people overseas.  If, 
however, such a deviation from the assumed practice of mutual aid is still unacceptable, 
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then we might appeal to this further judgment to defend the deontic priority of the rescue 
duty.101  
When we ask these questions, I don’t assume that full-fledged deontic priority of 
the rescue-duty will always be vindicated.  Some changes, however, do strike me as 
unacceptable deviations from the assumed practice of mutual aid.  For example, I find 
unacceptable the practice that licenses the refusal to perform the rescue in Shallow Pond 
so long as one promises to give an extra twenty dollars to Heroes for Hamiltons.  Such a 
change would, it seems to me, greatly diminish the valuable sense of community we have 
with those around us, and we would lose this value gratuitously.  There is a sense in 
which the integrity of the practice would be deeply damaged if it allowed for such 
potentially pervasive exceptions.  Highly unfortunate global circumstances, such as those 
that allow Heroes for Hamiltons to successfully operate, would, through such exceptions, 
undermine the assumed practice of mutual aid (one could always, and very easily, opt out 
of the pond-like rescue), and the loss would not be offset by any general gain for 
imperiled people far away (since pond-like cases are so rare, the upshot of people opting 
out of pond-like case rescues won’t be any great increase in the donations on behalf of 
the distant needy).  It is also not as if such exceptions would greatly improve our 
                                                
101 It might be thought that a similar strategy could be used to explain the deontic direction of rescue duties 
in pond-like cases.  That is, since the norms of the assumed practice of mutual aid themselves contains the 
very directional elements we seek to explain, we might appeal to the unacceptability of a slightly altered 
version of that practice in which no such directional components are recognized.  While I would share the 
unacceptability judgment, I suspect that the absence of the directional components are unacceptable 
because of the significant, non-incidental stakes that the would-be beneficiaries have in the fulfillment of 
the allocated responsibilities to perform the rescues.  In other words, in this case the appeal to the 
unacceptability judgment would miss the deeper explanation of why the absences in question are 
unacceptable.  Generally, I am happy to accept a further explanation of an unacceptability judgment if a 
plausible and adequate one is available. 
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relationships with those far away; nor would greatly increase their prospects of being 
rescued by us.102  
Things are less clear to me, however, when I think about my augmented case of 
Bob’s Bugatti.  Here I can see that a much stronger case could be made for allowing an 
exception to the duty of nearby rescue.  If, however, we allow exceptions for some 
extreme cases, or if we just conclude that one’s obligations in such cases are unclear, then 
we don’t sacrifice the parallel to special duties and deontic requirements generally.  Such 
exceptions would be like a catastrophe exception of a kind that plausibly belongs in many 
moral principles.  I am required not to tell a lie—unless doing so is necessary to prevent 
some catastrophe (perhaps telling an otherwise inconsequential lie to a passerby is the 
only way to prevent someone from losing a leg).  In many apparent pond-like cases there 
is room for disagreement, and the success of my proposal doesn’t depend on its ability to 
resolve each of the hard cases.  
Let me review.  I am following Miller in supposing that what is peculiar about the 
pond-like cases is the value of the practice in which people, even complete strangers, are 
prepared to help one another in such cases.  Miller’s observation looks promising because 
it identifies a third value that might help explain the stringency of the pond-like cases, 
and do so in way that fits within a non-voluntarist account of special duties.  The 
challenge is to explain how the value of such a practice can generate an individual duty 
with the deontic features.  To meet this challenge, we can look to the practice’s absence 
                                                
102 A parallel might be drawn to other special duties exhibiting some degree of deontic priority.  Suppose 
that I am permitted to break my promise to you so long as this ensures that two other agents are able to 
keep their comparably weighty promises to yet other people.  Such an exception seems somehow to 
threaten the integrity of promising, along with the valuable kind of guarantee that promising can (at least as 
ordinarily understood, where it doesn’t allow such exceptions) establish between you and me.  At the same 
time, the loss that such an exception would introduce isn’t replaced by any sufficiently important gain.  It 
isn’t plausible that such a change to the assumed practice would greatly improve either the value of that 
practice, our relations with one other, or any other important value that is instrumentally gained. 
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as a condition that is not only bad but also unacceptable.  Unacceptable conditions are 
commonly taken to license criticisms against the actions that bring about, threaten to 
bring about, or would bring about, such conditions. In the right circumstances, the 
standards expressed by such criticism contain deontic direction, ratcheting up the 
significance of these standards and lending to them a distinctively moral character.  
Finally, I have suggested how to explain deontic priority, or at least some degree of it.   
 
4. THE POND QUESTION REVISITED 
 
When I consider the plausibility of my proposal, I am nagged by the feeling that 
something is amiss with my proposed explanation for why I must rescue the drowning 
child in front of me.  There is a range of appropriate responses to the question “Why must 
I rescue this drowning child?” but my proposed answer—which appeals to the value of a 
social practice, or the unacceptability of its absence—does not seem to be the kind of 
answer one should give.  In the previous chapter, I argued that this apparent awkwardness 
is a bullet that the moderate will just have to bite.103  Here I want to say why that 
awkwardness should not deeply trouble us.  
The appeal to the value of the assumed practice of mutual aid may seem strange 
in part because alternative answers seem more fitting.  These alternative answers, 
however, may seem more fitting because, in most ordinary contexts, they would be more 
fitting.  They would be more fitting on account of conversational norms of the sort that 
Paul Grice has discussed (1989: ch. 2).  However, we should only be troubled by this 
appearance of alternative fitting answers in two cases: first, if there seems to be an 
                                                
103 Ch. 4, sect. 3.3, pages 112 ff. 
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alternative answer that is more fitting in the context of the philosophical question we are 
addressing, or second, if my proposed answer is somehow incompatible with the 
fittingness of these other answers for those other contexts in which they truly are fitting. 
It isn’t clear that either of these cases obtain.  The specific context in which I am 
providing an answer to why I must rescue the drowning child is that of the differentiation 
question, which asks for an explanation of why I must rescue that child, but not the child 
who might perish for want of a similarly small sacrifice to Heroes for Hamiltons.  In this 
context, most of the explanations that would be fitting for other contexts in which I am 
asked to explain why I must rescue a drowning child simply don’t suffice.  Many such 
answers fail to identify a feature that differentiates the Shallow Pond from Distant 
Rescue.  Other answers are unsatisfying because they seem ad hoc, failing generally to 
differentiate pond-like cases from famine-like cases.  Some answers are unsatisfying 
because they point to a difference, like physical proximity, for which it is hard to 
understand why it should possess such moral significance.  
My proposed answer, moreover, is compatible with many of these attractive 
answers of other contexts.  Consider the answer that I should rescue the drowning child 
“because she is right there in front to me.”  Let us interpret this answer as pointing to the 
imperiled child’s physical proximity to me.  If such physical proximity is a characteristic 
feature of pond-like cases, we might regard this answer simply as expressing the 
appropriate sensitivity to the features that make a rescue scenario into a pond-like case 
(or, the features that make it so unacceptable for a community to lack the practice of 
mutual aid for the pond-like cases).  My account attempts to justify the significance that 
we ascribe to the pond-like cases relative to the famine-like cases. 
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It may be that the morally conscientious deliberator is directly sensitive to general 
moral principles, principles that take for granted the sort of content provided by my 
proposal.  It may be, for example, that the morally conscientious person is primarily 
concerned to avoid depriving another person of anything to which he or she is entitled.  
Facing a pond-like case, this deliberating agent simply takes for granted the imperiled 
person’s entitlement to help.  Such a consideration, as opposed to the deeper explanation 
of that consideration, is all that he or she need attend to.  What my proposal then does is 
provide the deeper explanation of that salient consideration, explaining why entitlements 
are distributed as they are taken to be.  
So, within a pond-like case, the morally-sensitive deliberating agent obviously 
does not need to recount consciously the philosophical justification of the moderate’s 
response to the differentiating question.  It is sufficient for the deliberating agent to be 
sensitive to the sorts of considerations that, in this world, reliably indicate that she is in a 
situation governed by the assumed practice of mutual aid, or that the imperiled person has 
a claim upon her to be rescued.104 
We can add, finally, that the fittingness of these simple answers to the pond 
question is what we might expect if my philosophical justification of the moderate’s 
position is correct. The Millerian value, which is at the heart of this justification, 
concerns the valuable sense of community one feels with others whom one might 
encounter.  That valuable sense of community goes beyond the mere expectation that 
                                                
104 Further questions might be asked about what these reliable indicators are, and which specific factors 
prompt us to either attribute or deny that the imperiled person has a claim upon us to perform the rescue.  
Analyzing the descriptive factors that distinguish pond-like cases from famine-like cases is not a project 
that I pursue in this dissertation.  This project is central to Peter Unger’s augmentation of the famine-relief 
argument; it is also central in Frances Kamm’s replies to Unger and in her proposals about the significance 
of distance.  
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those around me would rescue me or my loved ones from serious peril, especially if such 
could knowingly be done at no risk and at very little cost.  Some of that sense of 
community would be lost if, in the pond-like scenario, my potential benefactor did not 
take the salient fact as sufficient to ground my claim to be rescued and to motivate action.  
The value that is lost is similar to the value lost in the relationship between parent and 
child if, before attending to his child’s needs, the parent should always have to recount to 
himself the value of the institution of child-rearing. 
 
5. THE DIFFERENTIATION QUESTION REVISITED 
 
 As with the pond question, there is also a remaining concern about how my 
proposal answers the differentiation question.  Here I want to address that concern and to 
state more succinctly why it is, on my proposal, that I must rescue the imperiled person in 
Shallow Pond even when I am not required to rescue another person through Heroes for 
Hamiltons.   
On my proposal, we might say that the crucial differentiating factor that separates 
pond-like cases from famine-like ones is the Millerian value, the value of the assumed 
practice of mutual aid.  It is the assumed practice itself that differentiates the two sorts of 
cases, since it requires action in the pond-like cases without similarly requiring action in 
the famine-like cases.  The value of that practice then gives rise to individual duties to 
respect its norms.  This answer, however, will not be satisfying unless it is understood 
why an alternative valuable practice, whether actual or hypothetical, cannot similarly 
generate duties to rescue imperiled people in the famine-like cases.   
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This challenge has force insofar as it is easy to imagine practices more demanding 
than the assumed practice of mutual aid that, if realized, would be highly valuable.  A 
more demanding practice could extend to all people the fellowship and solidarity that the 
assumed practice of mutual aid only facilitates for restricted circumstances.  The more 
demanding practice would also add security to many people, and it would relieve certain 
of the inequalities sanctioned by the assumed practice.  Moreover, while the value of the 
assumed practice of mutual aid generates duties on account of the unacceptability of its 
absence, we might also think that the absence of the more demanding practice is also 
unacceptable.  After all, aren’t the conditions that allow an organization like Heroes for 
Hamiltons to operate clearly unacceptable?  Isn’t there something outrageous about the 
circumstance in which I knowingly allow some other human being to perish for want of 
the ten dollars that I am about to spend on a fancy cocktail?  Using the terms of the 
Millerian value, we can say that my purchase of the cocktail signals a striking lack of 
fellowship between me and fellow human beings.   
 To clarify this challenge, we need consider the non-moderate rescue practice 
according to which I am required to perform rescues in famine-like cases just as the 
assumed practice of mutual aid requires me to perform rescues in the pond-like cases.  It 
is this particular alternative that directly threatens the moderate’s resistance to the 
demanding conclusion.105  The non-moderate practice is unrealized, and therefore merely 
hypothetical, insofar as its system of norms is not generally recognized and respected. 
                                                
105 It is open to the critic to try to describe valuable alternative hypothetical practices that conflict with the 
assumed practice of mutual aid.  While this wouldn’t directly challenge the moderate’s denial of the 
demanding conclusion, it could still challenge the moderate’s answer to the pond-question.  As I see it, the 
most promising candidate here would be a slight variant of the assumed practice whose only difference 
would be that it didn’t require rescue in extreme scenarios like my augmented case of Bob’s Bugatti.  I 
touched on this possibility above.  
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The moderate must explain why we are not required to respect the norms of the 
hypothetical non-moderate practice on account of the unacceptability of its absence. 
 The moderate’s best response, as I see it, is to concede that the non-moderate 
rescue practice would be valuable, and to further concede the unacceptability of its 
absence.  The moderate should insist, however, on interpreting this unacceptability in a 
certain way.  Recall that unacceptability judgments imply the feasibility of avoiding that 
which is judged to be unacceptable.  In the example cases I discussed, the unacceptability 
of a condition turned on the fact that the bad condition in question is, or was, so easily 
avoidable: the bad condition can be avoided in a way that doesn’t saddle anyone with 
excessively great responsibilities.  So likewise, if we judge the absence of the non-
moderate practice to be unacceptable this is only because we think that the practice could 
be realized without excessively burdening anyone.  We could, for example, be thinking 
that if only many people acted a bit more conscientiously an organization like Heroes for 
Hamiltons could not exist; the non-moderate practice would never overwhelm any one 
person with extremely high costs of compliance because no one would be perpetually 
confronted by opportunities to perform additional rescue at small costs.   
 While these concessions accept the plausible parallels between the assumed 
practice and the non-moderate practice, they do not yield any parallel duty to act on every 
rescue opportunity presented in the famine-like cases.  The concessions rather suggest 
that we can use a similar form of reasoning to understand that we also have duties 
concerning imperiled people in famine-like cases (and the moderate should never have 
supposed that our responsibilities for the needs of strangers are exhausted by the norms 
comprising the assumed practice of mutual aid).  The licensed criticism would apply to 
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those unwilling to make even modest sacrifices on behalf of imperiled strangers far away, 
for (on the assumptions described) it is because of people like this that we cannot feasibly 
realize the non-moderate rescue practice, with all benefits to fellowship and security 
against peril that such a practice would provide.  The corresponding requirement would 
only be a duty to act in those ways that, if many others did the same, we could feasibly 
realize the non-moderate rescue practice.  For many people, this might just mean a 
requirement to be a bit more conscientious concerning the welfare of people far away. 
 The differentiation question asks why I am required to rescue the person in 
Shallow Pond even when I am not required to rescue someone through Heroes for 
Hamiltons.  On my proposal here is what the answer should be.  Moral duties are limited 
by their sensitivity to the cumulative costs of compliance.  In particular, my duties to 
rescue others are limited by the cumulative costs to me of performing those rescues.  This 
limitation blocks any requirement upon me to keep rescuing people through Heroes for 
Hamiltons so long as I can continue to perform such rescues at individually small costs to 
myself.  It doesn’t, however, block a more limited requirement to perform the rescue in 
the pond-like cases, where these cases are distinguished from the famine-like cases 
insofar as only the former are governed by the norms of the assumed practice of mutual 
aid.  Were I to fail to rescue the person in Shallow Pond, I would be violating my 
responsibility to avoid performing an action of a type which collectively brings about, or 
would bring about, an unacceptable outcome.  The unacceptable outcome that would be 
brought about by refusals to rescue people in the pond-like scenarios is the absence of the 
assumed practice of mutual aid.  
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6. RESCUE DUTIES AS SPECIAL DUTIES 
 
In this chapter I have focused on the challenge of explaining the deontic features 
of the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases.  I observed that a similar challenge would be 
faced in attempting to account for special duties.  The special duties I have towards my 
children, for example, are in some ways similar to the duty I have to the imperiled person 
in Shallow Pond.  That imperiled person has a special claim upon me that isn’t shared by 
others equally imperiled whom I might also rescue; my children have special claims upon 
me that aren’t shared by others whom I might similarly benefit.  My corresponding duties 
to my children, similarly, seem to feature the kind of priority, significance, and direction 
of my duties to rescue in Shallow Pond.  The tempting suggestion, therefore, was that I 
might borrow from the accounts of special duties to understand the duties to rescue in the 
pond-like cases.  I did not, however, find what I was looking for.  Although the 
discussions of special duties I found most suited to my purposes where those of Samuel 
Scheffler, I ultimately did not find them to provide the insight I needed.  I now want to 
address more fully Scheffler’s proposal, as it seems to be, in these respects, the nearest 
competitor to my own.  I will close by considering the extent to which it is helpful to 
view the stringent duty of rescue in the pond-like cases as a special duty, and, in 
particular, how we can close the loophole that allows the problem of over-demandingness 
to arise.  
 
6.1 Responding to Scheffler 
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In Scheffler’s terminology, special duties, as opposed to general ones, are “duties 
that we have only to those particular people with whom we have had certain significant 
sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in certain significant sorts of relations.”  Most 
relevant to my own project is the subset of such duties that Scheffler calls the 
“associative duties.”  These are the special duties which “members of significant social 
groups and the participants in close personal relationships are thought to have to one 
another” (2003: 50-51, 68).  I am particularly interested in Scheffler’s proposal for how 
such duties arise. 
According to Scheffler, to value, in a non-instrumental way, my relationship with 
another person “just is, in part, to see that person as a source of special claims in virtue of 
the relationship between us” (1997: 196).  Moreover, if we are “correct to [so] value our 
relationships—insofar as our relationships are valuable—they are indeed sources of 
reasons” (2010: 110).  So, according to Scheffler, a non-instrumentally valuable 
relationship that I have with another person makes this other person a source of special 
claim upon me.  The valuable relationship “transforms the needs and desires” of this 
other person into special reasons for me to act on behalf of him or her in suitable contexts 
(110).  
Scheffler’s account is most questionable when he tries to explain how these 
reasons to act on behalf of the other person become duties to so act.  Scheffler draws out 
the challenge by considering the asymmetry between relationship-dependent reasons and 
project-dependent reasons.  Drawing a parallel between these two types of reasons, 
Scheffler claims that “if one values a personal project non-instrumentally, then one will 
see oneself as having reason to devote special attention to that project.”  If, moreover, 
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that personal project really is valuable, then it presumably is a source of special reasons. 
The asymmetry is that we are often “morally required” or “obligated” to act on the 
relationship-dependent reasons, but we are not so required to act on the project-dependent 
ones (2004: 258-60, 2010: 108-09).  
After rejecting a few proposal for explaining this asymmetry, Scheffler latches 
onto the idea that relationship-dependent reasons are importantly different because of 
their “shared” or “interlocking” characteristics.  Here is how he describes the important 
characteristic:  
A valuable relationship transforms the needs and desires of the participants into 
reasons for each to act on behalf of the other in suitable contexts.  At the same 
time, it gives each of them reasons to form certain normative expectations of the 
other, and to complain if these expectations are not met.  In particular, it gives 
each of them reason to expect that the other will act on his or her behalf in 
suitable contexts.  These two sets of reasons—reasons for action on the one hand 
and reasons to form normative expectations on the other—are two sides of the 
same coin.  They are constitutively linked and jointly generated by the 
relationship between the participants. (2010: 110) 
 
Scheffler seems to be suggesting that if A’s relationship with B gives A reason to act on 
B’s behalf, then B has reason to complain if A does not do so.  The further implication, it 
seems, is that if B’s entitlement to so complain against A shows that A owes it to B to act 
on B’s behalf.  If A so owes this to B, then the action is morally required; A wrongs B if 
she fails to perform the action. 
Suppose, however, that I have a one-of-a-kind interpersonal relationship with my 
next-door neighbor, but that it is only slightly valuable.  The slight value of this 
relationship may still generate some relationship-dependent reasons, but I expect that 
these will be weak, and rarely, if ever, decisive.  So, then, if this slightly valuable 
relationship generates a slight reason for me to fire up the grill and invite him over from 
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across the driveway, it is doubtful whether any corresponding normative expectation that 
he has for me to do so will ground a complaint against me when I decide to eat cold 
cereal and do philosophy instead.106  If my failure to act on a relationship-dependent 
reason is to correspond to a complaint-grounding normative expectation of the other 
participant, that relationship-dependent reason must already be strong or decisive.  There 
is some evidence that Scheffler agrees, for he also writes, 
[I]f the source of my reason to respond to your needs and desires lies in the value 
of our relationship, and that reason is compelling, then my reason for action is 
complemented by your entitlement to expect that I shall respond.  The very same 
consideration that gives me reason to act on your behalf gives you reason to 
complain if I do not. (2010: 111, italics added) 
 
If this is right, then it would be nice to have something to say about when a relationship-
dependent reason comes to be sufficiently strong or compelling enough to have a 
corresponding complaint-grounding entitlement in the other person.  It is not obvious 
how this should be done.  It wouldn’t work, for example, simply to measure the strength 
of a relationship-dependent reason in terms of the weightiness of the other’s interests that 
are at stake.  That my neighbor happens to have an extremely strong interest in eating 
from my grill today wouldn’t suffice to ground his complaint.   
So it may be more promising to look at the significance of the relationship.  
However, it seems that my deeply valuable relationship to my child might nevertheless 
sometimes generate very slight relationship-dependent reasons for me to act in certain 
ways on my child’s behalf.  Moreover, it is conceivable that a particular interpersonal 
relationship might generate strong relationship-dependent reasons even though the 
relationship itself (i.e., the token, not the type) is relatively trivial in value.  The cost of 
                                                
106 Or, if this does give my neighbor a complaint against me, it won’t have the sort of normative 
significance Scheffler seeks.  The complaint won’t correspond to any moral wrongdoing.     
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denying this possibility is great if we are supposing that the strength of relationship-
dependent reasons is a function of the relative value of the relationship.  While my 
associative duties towards my own child might be secure (it being a relatively high value 
relationship), any associative duties towards my colleagues, students, or neighbors would 
be suspect.   
Now it might be thought that the strength of a relationship-dependent reason is a 
function of what is stake in the relationship itself.  So if a failure to respect such a reason 
would destroy the relationship, this should strengthen the reason.  One problem with this 
proposal is, as Scheffler himself observes, that “it is often wrong to neglect one’s special 
responsibilities even when doing so would not destroy the relationship giving rise to 
those responsibilities” (2004: 265).  Another problem is that whether or not the 
relationship will be damaged will often depend on whether the participants in the 
relationship regard the reason in question as providing a moral duty.  This suggests that 
the decisive factor in determining the strength of a relationship-dependent reason might 
simply be what the participants, or at least one of them, take the significance of that 
reason to be.  This may make the question of special duties counter-intuitively vulnerable 
to perversion by the unreasonable expectations of any participant in a valuable special 
relationship.  Do I suddenly have a duty to call my friend on his birthday just because, 
strangely, he has unilaterally come to believe that this is a requirement of the friendship?   
It seems rather that a given type of relationship creates reasons peculiar to its 
type, and that some of these reasons will be stronger than others.  Whether or not a given 
reason of a given relationship is a particularly strong one will depend on the role of that 
reason within the type of relationship, and whether or not, in the given type of 
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circumstance, it would be acceptable to permit members of the relationship to refrain 
from acting on the reason.  The reason that my student has a complaint against me if I 
neglect to read her paper hasn’t directly to do with the relative significance of the 
student’s interests in having her paper read, nor with the value of my relationship to this 
particular student.  Rather, the legitimacy of the student’s complaint is better explained 
by the unacceptability of a general permission for teaching fellows to neglect to read their 
students’ papers in similar circumstances.107  On my own view, it is unacceptability of 
this kind that generates special reasons of the sort that, with the addition of deontic 
direction, can become special duties owed to others. 
I propose, then, that the valuable relationship that generates relationship-
dependent reasons is not the particular history of interpersonal interactions that Scheffler 
has in mind.  The valuable relationship is the type, not the token.  It is this which helps to 
explain why I have a compelling enough, relationship-dependent reason to grade the 
student’s paper even though it would not be very detrimental to the student or to anyone 
else if I neglected to do so, and even though my relationship with the student is not, of 
itself, highly valuable, at least as interpersonal relationships go.  I say that my 
relationship-dependent reason to grade the paper is still compelling enough in the sense 
that it corresponds to a complaint she has against me if I fail to respect it.  
In speaking, then, of relationship types as opposed to relationship tokens, I have 
in mind the sets of interlocking norms and normative expectations comprising these 
                                                
107 Raz proposes something similar for a broad class of rights, noting that “quite commonly the value of a 
right, the weight it is to be given or the stringency with which it is to be observed do not correspond to its 
value to the right-holder” (1992: 128).  So Raz argues, “The protection of many of the most cherished civil 
and political rights in liberal democracy is justified by the fact that they serve the common or general good.  
Their importance to the common good, rather than their contribution to the well-being of the right-holder, 
justifies the high regard in which such rights are held….” (135).  As examples, Raz points to freedoms of 
contract and expression.  Elsewhere he points to the right of journalists to protect their sources (1988: 247-
48).  Raz also thinks, “Arguable the same is true of all rights” (1992: note 6).   
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relationship types.  This puts me directly at odds with Scheffler’s insistence that the 
relationships from which associative duties derive be understood as “ongoing bonds 
between individuals who have a shared history” (2010: 115).  As I see it, Scheffler’s way 
of understanding the object of value makes it difficult to explain adequately why 
relationship-dependent reasons sometimes become obligatory or non-optional, and why 
sometimes they don’t.  Scheffler, it seems, is unable to appeal to the larger societal 
practice in which the norm-defined relationships are respected.  For the same reason, 
Scheffler’s insistence would block my attempt to extend his account of associative duties 
to duties of rescue in the pond-like cases.  In the paradigmatic pond-like cases the agents 
have no special shared history with one another.   
Scheffler defends his insistence by claiming that unless relationships are 
understood in his historically robust sense, we may be incapable of appealing to the 
relationship to explain the relationship-dependent norms.  The idea is that, unless the 
relationships have content beyond those norms of the relationship, the relationship cannot 
explain the norms (2010: 123).  
Is this right?  Suppose we define a hypothetical relationship that consists merely 
of a defined set of interlocking norms specifying the terms according to which 
participants should relate.  This would not, for Scheffler, count as a proper relationship.  
However, of such a hypothetical, purely norm-defined relationship we might 
acknowledge this: if such a relationship were realized (i.e., if such norms were actually 
respected) such a relationship would be non-instrumentally valuable.  Inspired by 
Scheffler, we might then say that such recognized value provides us with reason to 
realize the relationship.  This simply means that we have reason to respect the set of 
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norms that constitutes the valuable relationship.  Since this reason to respect the norms 
derives from the non-instrumental value of so doing—which is something that we are still 
yet to do—it must be that this reason does not derive from any historically realized 
relationship of the sort Scheffler insists upon.  Insofar, then, as the recognizable 
prospective value of enacting this relationship explains our reasons for doing so, 
Scheffler must be wrong about the explanatory need for relationships in his historically 
robust sense.  
Or, perhaps Scheffler’s idea is this: if the relationship is nothing more than the set 
of norms defining it, then any judgment that such a relationship is valuable may be 
nothing more than the affirmation that the relevant norms are legitimate.  Such an 
affirmation would not explain the legitimacy of the norms in question.  It is a dubious 
claim, however, that the judgment about such a relationship’s value is nothing more than 
a judgment that each of the specific norms constituting that relationship is legitimate.  A 
relationship of this kind should be regarded as a larger whole of which the many 
particular norms comprising it are parts.  We can, it seems to me, often explain the value 
of the parts by appealing to the more recognizable value of the whole.  When considered 
apart from the whole, the particular norms comprising the whole may look unjustified, 
suspect, or even absurd.  Analogously, if we lift out a particular clause from the larger 
policy proposal it is in, then the particular clause might look pointless.  Likewise, a 
particular rule in a game may seem, in isolation, absurd.  The same is true of the norms of 
interpersonal relationships.  A norm requiring one person to avoid doing things that might 
provoke jealously in another may only be justified within the more complex relationship 
of two lovers.  
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Whether or not we should think of the assumed practice of mutual aid as a 
“relationship,” there is further reason why we ought to be able to extend Scheffler’s 
account so as to include that assumed practice as a source of special reasons.  For 
Scheffler, there are membership-dependent reasons in addition to relationship-dependent 
reasons.  As with relationship-dependent reasons, one may be “required or obligated to 
act on” membership-dependent reasons (2010: 112).   
What is most noteworthy about this class of reasons is the way Scheffler 
characterizes the value from which they derive.  He suggests that one’s membership in a 
group or an association may be non-instrumentally valued “because of the bonds of trust 
and solidarity that members share” (107).  This sounds very much like the value that 
Miller describes when characterizing the value of the assumed practice of mutual aid.  
Miller and Scheffler seem here to be talking about the same kind of value.  Instead of 
membership-dependent reasons, we might even call them “practice-dependent reason.”108 
Here, then, is what I conclude about Scheffler’s proposal about associative duties 
and the prospects for incorporating the duty of rescue in the pond-like cases among them.  
First, Scheffler has no good reason for resisting the derivation of special moral duties 
from values of the sort Miller describes, the value of a societal practice in which people 
are expected to rescue one another in pond-like cases.  Second, Scheffler needs to 
improve his explanation for how membership and relationship-dependent reasons 
sometimes become obligatory.  My proposal, in terms of unacceptability judgments, 
offers a way for Scheffler to do this.  Third, Scheffler’s proposal might be improved by 
interpreting relationships and memberships not as historical interaction between 
                                                
108 Scheffler acknowledges that three categories (“project-dependent,” “relationship-dependent,” and 
“membership-dependent”) “may not be exhaustive” (2010: 112).  
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individuals, but rather as sets of interlocking norms whose value is realized when the 
norms are respected.   
 
6.2 The category of special duties 
 The imperiled person in Shallow Pond is to me a complete stranger, toward whom 
I have made no special commitment.  I have also not, at least in any obvious way, 
accepted the responsibilities of any special role or office requiring me to perform such 
rescues.  It is not as if I am employed as a lifeguard.  It appears as if performing the 
rescue in Shallow Pond is something that I owe to the imperiled person simply as another 
person, and because I happen to be there.  As such, this is the sort of duty that Scheffler’s 
characterization of special duties appears designed to preclude, since the imperiled person 
is apparently neither someone with whom I have had any “significant sort of 
interactions,” nor someone to whom I stand in any “significant sort of relation.”  Or, if 
we insist that I do stand in a significant sort of relationship with this person simply in 
virtue of occupying a circumstance that places me under a duty to that person, then we 
arguably weaken Scheffler’s characterization of special duties to the point of collapsing 
any meaningful distinction between special and general duties.  
 That there may be no important and fundamental distinction between special and 
general duties strikes me as plausible, especially if special duties are taken to include 
contractual duties, relationship-based duties, role-based duties, and membership-based 
duties.  If the only thing that this broad class of duties is taken to have in common is that 
they apply only in certain, specially defined circumstances of one kind or another, then it 
may be difficult to find a non-special duty that is different in any important way.   
      
182  
 I suspect, therefore, that it isn’t worth our while to try to decide whether we 
should regard the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases as a special duty.  It is better just 
to observe that such rescue duties have interesting similarities to many of the sorts of 
duties often classified as special duties (such duties often make positive demands and 
exhibit the deontic features).  These similarities suggest that the category of special duties 
may have been drawn artificially narrow, rendering questionable the attempts to account 
for special duties in terms of the features encompassed by that category.  If, as I have 
claimed, duties of rescue are, in their most theoretically troublesome features, a lot like 
prototypical special duties, then a successful general account of “special duties” might 
need to cover them both.  Or, at least, in attempting to offer a general account of special 
duties, or a subset thereof, we would do well to avoid focusing entirely on the 
explanatory resources made available only through the presence of significant 
relationships or transactions.  If, moreover, my account of the stringent duty of rescue in 
the pond-like cases is successful, it is the kind of proposal that could provide fresh 
insight.  Moreover, because my proposal doesn’t need to appeal to any of those elements 
most typically associated with special duties, it is the kind of account that might shed 
light on moral duties more generally, both special or otherwise.  
 
6.3 Dismissing the over-demandingness loophole 
 I argued in chapter one that the duty to rescue in the pond-like cases poses a 
distinctive threat of over-demandingness insofar as such a duty appears to be general, 
positive, and perfect, thereby avoiding all the categories useful for limiting the 
demandingness of a duty (“special,” “negative,” or “imperfect”).  The more we rely upon 
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such categories for limiting demandingness, the more we should be troubled by duties 
that fit none of these categories.  We should then also be troubled by the puzzle of 
explaining the significance of these categories. Why should it be that a duty tends to be 
perfect if and only if it is negative or special?  Why should it be that positive, general 
duties tend not to be perfect?  
 Such questions are less mysterious if we accept, as I have, that moral duties 
generally are sensitive to the cumulative costs to individuals of compliance.   A reason 
that only negative or special duties tend to be perfect is that positive, general duties 
would tend to demand too much if they were also perfect.  In accepting, moreover, that 
the significance of these categories is in part explained by their ability or inability to limit 
the cumulative costs to individuals of compliance, we can further accept that the negative 
nature of a duty, or the fact that the duty involves voluntarily assumed obligations or 
depends on special relationships, is not the fundamental reason why the duty in question 
is stringent or perfect.  Rather, what fundamentally matters is that the costs to an 
individual of complying with such stringent duties are sufficiently low relative to the 
value of fulfilling them, individually and collectively.  Under my proposal, this implies 
that we should not regard as deeply significant the category differences between, on the 
one hand, negative or special duties, and, on the other, the stringent duty of rescue in the 
pond-like cases.  Of importance is that the costs of compliance with the duty to rescue in 
the pond-like cases are, as with these other duties, securely limited.   
 I am suggesting, therefore, that we should not take seriously the apparent loophole 
for over-demandingness in the standard taxonomy of moral duties that I discussed in 
chapter one.  The stringent duty of rescue in the pond-like cases is not made problematic 
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by its status as general and positive.  So long as the circumstances of the duty’s 
application are sufficiently restricted, its general and positive character poses no 
distinctive problem.  The greater task was to provide a principled basis for such 
restrictions.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The famine-relief argument is of interest because it holds the promise of yielding 
a self-standing problem of over-demandingness, one that might challenge widespread and 
basic assumptions about morality.  I attempted to identify the central problem posed by 
that argument, and to defend, in the face of its challenge, a comfortably moderate 
position.  To gain plausibility for this defense, I avoided making special exceptions for 
rescue duties, or duties of assistance, as a class.  My aim was instead to make room for 
the moderate view of such duties, showing how our rescue duties, so interpreted, are 
unexceptional, exhibiting just those features that we plausibly encounter in moral duties 
more generally.  This aim led me to two broad ideas.  The first is that considerations of 
cumulative costs to an individual of compliance directly limit the scope and content of 
our moral duties generally.  When such costs of compliance dramatically change, we 
shouldn’t assume that the moral duties remain fixed.  Surprising changes in circumstance 
can mean surprising changes in our duties.  The second broad idea is a picture of how 
stringent duties can derive from the unacceptable consequences that a type of behavior, in 
aggregate, has or would have, regardless of the merely trivial consequences that the 
prohibited behavior may have in isolation.  An effect of appealing to such broad ideas is 
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my proposal has implications spreading beyond my particular application.  Such 
implications are, I believe, a further payoff, offering potentially helpful perspectives on 
the category of special duties, the status of negative duties (relative to positive ones), the 
features of deontological constraints, and consequence-based evaluations of actions 
whose individual effects are negligible. 
The plausibility of my account of rescue duties depends in part on the availability 
and the comparative merits of other options.  While I directly discussed only some of 
these alternatives, my clarifications of the basic challenges provide measures against 
which the alternative moderate proposals may be assessed.  Instead of giving a better 
defense of the moderate position, some will prefer to reject the assumptions underlying 
that position.  An obvious option here would be to reject those assumptions wherein I try 
to accommodate my own intuitive judgments about cases, judgments that may strike 
others as less compelling.  Rather than agreeing with my conclusions about, in particular, 
Distant Rescue, Nightmare, and Intergalactic Killer,109 some may feel that certain of the 
challenges I address are unnecessary.  Some may find it best to join the efforts to further 
strengthen the debunking explanation of the moderate’s unwillingness to accept certain 
costly requirements of rescue.  
Despite the remaining possibilities, I take myself to have shown the 
reasonableness of the moderate position in the face of the general skeptical worries 
endemic to that position.  It is a view of our rescue duties that someone can provisionally 
adopt, in good faith and without egregious moral insensitivity, despite awareness of the 
best currently available arguments on the matter.  
 
                                                
109 Pages 40, 86 and 126, respectively. 
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